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The last 8 years have seen a dramatic increase in the flow of Central American 
apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol. Explanations for this surge in apprehensions have been 
split between two leading hypotheses. Most academic scholars, immigrant advocates, 
progressive media outlets, and human rights organizations identify poverty and violence (the 
Poverty and Violence Hypothesis) in Central America as the primary triggers responsible. In 
contrast, while most government officials, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work 
in the immigration and border enforcement realm admit poverty and violence may underlie some 
decisions to migrate, they instead blame lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of 
U.S. immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes (the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis) as the real cause of the surge. Despite the existence of opposing claims, 
neither side has provided a clear data-based explanation regarding what has caused the sudden 
surge of unauthorized immigration from Central America.  
 To address these competing claims, this study explored both hypotheses from a 
macrolevel using an empirically-driven quantitative research design. The study first identified 
the universe of data as tracked and gathered by large reputable organizations for the seven 
relevant countries/regions in the study (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Latin America, and United States). A total of 195 independent variables were selected with 181 
of them being specific to each country/region. This data produced a series of 68 independent 
stepwise regression models that explored the direct and indirect effects of both competing 
hypotheses. Ultimately, the study found more overall support for the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis, though it did not produce findings that confidently dismiss the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis. However, findings do suggest the often-cited Poverty and Violence Hypothesis has 
 
 
likely been overstated and exaggerated as a cause of the Central American migration surge. 
Furthermore, while neither hypothesis had enough inferentially robust support to conclusively 
back its claims, the findings do provide credence to the argument that the often-dismissed Policy 
and Loophole Hypothesis must be considered along with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Background to the Study 
The last 8 years have seen a dramatic increase in the flow of Other-than-Mexican (OTM) 
apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), as seen in Figure 1.1 2 These unauthorized 
immigration flows have consisted of mostly Central American migrants from Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Honduras.3 These three countries historically accounted for only about 2% of all 
yearly apprehensions along the Southwest Border.4 Beginning in 2012, that share began to 
increase at an alarming pace, and, today, apprehensions from these three countries account for 
71.4% of all apprehensions along the Southwest Border. This spike of OTM apprehensions has 
raised new concerns for border enforcement and government officials. 
Academic literature, news reports, and government hearings began to address the issue of 
unauthorized immigration from Central American soon after a never-before-seen surge of 
Central American children began arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014. Since then, the 
consensus among most scholars and the mass media has been that poverty and violence in 
Central America are the primary drivers of the surge (Brendem et al., 2017; Campos & 
Friedland, 2014; Chishti & Hipsman, 2016; Clemens, 2017; De Jesus & Hernades, 2019; 
 
 
1 OTM is the official categorization for migrants apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) before it, that are not Mexican nationals. 
2 According to CBP, apprehensions refer to the physical control or temporary detainment of a person who is not 
lawfully in the U.S. which may or may not result in an arrest. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-
enforcement-statistics. Simply put, for this study, it is the arrest of an undocumented individual in the United States 
by USBP. 
3 For the purposes of this study the terms Northern Triangle, OTM, and Central America will be used 
interchangeably to mean El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras unless otherwise specified. Because El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras are part of Central America (along with Belize, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), the 
region known as the Northern Triangle of Central America, and they make up 90% of OTM apprehensions and 98% 
Central American apprehensions, these terms are commonly used interchangeably in studies, government reports, 
and the media. 
4 The Southwest Border refers to the U.S.-Mexico border located to the southwest of the United States. The terms 





Dominguez-Villegas, 2017; Dominguez-Villegas & Rietig, 2015; Government Accountability 
Office, 2015b; Hiskey et al., 2016; International Crisis Group, 2017; Isacson et al., 2014; 
Kandel, 2017; Kandel & Seghetti, 2015; Kandel et al., 2014; Lesser & Batalova, 2017; Lorenzen, 
2017; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017; Meyer, 2017; Migration Crisis, 2015; Manuel, 2014; 
Meyer & Margesson, 2016; Obinna, 2019; Preston, 2014; Rosenblum & Ball, 2016; Seelke, 
2017; Semple, 2019; Willis & Seiz, 2019). In contrast, government officials and the agencies that 
work in the immigration enforcement realm blame recent immigration related policy changes and 
loopholes for the surge (Arthur, 2018; Asylum Abuse, 2013; Asylum Fraud, 2014; Government 
Accountability Office, 2015a, 2015c, 2016; Inserra, 2014; Kandel, 2017; Kandel & Seghetti, 
2015; Manuel, 2014; McAleenan, 2019; Migrant Children and Border Security, 2019; Ongoing 
Migration from Central America, 2015; Seelke, 2017; Sessions, 2017; Sussis, 2019; “TVPRA 
and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unaccompanied Alien Children,” 2018; “Unaccompanied 
Alien Children,” 2015; Wasem, 2011, 2014).  
Problem Statement 
Despite the existence of opposing claims, neither side has provided a clear data-based 
explanation regarding what caused the sudden surge of unauthorized immigration from Central 
America. One of the main problems surrounding this topic is literature investigating Central 
American migration is very limited. The reason for the lack of research is due to the simple fact 
that, historically, OTM unauthorized migration along the Southwest Border represented only a 
tiny fraction of all apprehensions as displayed in Figures 2. In fact, between 1980 and 2019, total 
OTM apprehensions across the Southwest Border accounted for only 8.4% of all apprehensions. 
In other words, Mexican apprehensions were 91.6% of all apprehensions between 1980 and 





and 2019. Due to the historic low flows of OTM unauthorized migration and the large flows of 
Mexican unauthorized migration, the majority of the literature on unauthorized immigration has 
focused almost exclusively on unauthorized immigration from Mexico. Equally important, what 
makes the existing literature on Central American immigration especially problematic is the fact 
that there are two opposing camps of experts and advocates that clash over the cause of the 




Other Than Mexican – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure demonstrates all Other-than-Mexican apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico 
border by USBP. OTM apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in 


































































































Mexico and Other Than Mexican – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions by Percentage 
(1980–2019) 
 
Note. This figure demonstrates the percentage of apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico Border 
by USBP that were either Mexican or Other-than-Mexican. Mexican and OTM apprehensions 
from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the Limitations of the 
Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section. 
 
As previously noted, the two camps consist of those that identify poverty and violence in 
Central America as the primary triggers responsible and those that admit poverty and violence 
underlie decisions to migrate, but blame lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of 
U.S. immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the real 
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academic scholars, immigrant advocates, progressive media outlets, and human rights 
organizations identify poverty and violence as the primary reason for the surge (hereinafter 
referred to as the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis), while government officials, practitioners, 
conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement 
realm overwhelmingly identify lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. 
immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the principal 
culprits (hereinafter referred to as the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis). 
Interestingly, this is not anything new regarding this topic. Political scientist William D. 
Stanley (1987) identified this ideological divide as far back as the mid-1980s when Central 
America was in the middle of a number of civil wars that caused many to migrate to the United 
States. Stanley (1987) stated: 
It is difficult to reconcile these two diametrically opposed evaluations of the motivations 
behind the Central American exodus. Both sides of the debate have access to individual 
case information about Central American migrants, yet they arrive at opposite 
conclusions. The two sides have different views as to what U.S. policy should be, and 
their respective analyses of the situation reflect these biases. (p. 133) 
Due to the two opposing views, it is difficult to ascertain facts simply from the 
contemporary literature. In addition, there are large gaps and issues in the research on both sides 
of the argument. Currently, the camp that identifies existing immigration policies and loopholes 
as the problem lack any kind of analytical or statistical studies to back their claims. Most of their 
evidence comes in the form of expert testimony from employees and practitioners before 
Congressional hearings and internal investigations that are often alluded to but never released for 





However, possibly even more problematic are the studies that support the Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis. As the Literature Review chapter will explain, despite the fact that this 
hypothesis has been advanced by mostly academic scholars, and despite their claims of 
worsening socioeconomic conditions in Central America, little statistical evidence has been 
provided and few studies have attempted to conduct inferentially robust analytical research that 
take into account immigration officials’ key concerns.  
The reason why the poverty and violence hypothesis less-than-adequate analysis can be 
perceived as especially problematic is because of its impact on the media and its sway on public 
opinion. In theory, the academy’s well-established peer review process should correct 
methodological issues and hypotheses that fail to provide adequate empirical evidence and 
findings. However, the peer review process has failed to catch some of these glaring issues. As a 
result, studies blaming poverty and violence for the surge in Central American unauthorized 
immigration have led to a commonly believed and unchallenged hypothesis that has become the 
consensus narrative in the media and with the public (Beinart, 2019; Correal & Specia, 2018; 
Greenberg, 2018; Preston, 2014; Schwartz, 2018; Semple, 2019; Talbot, 2019; Willis & Seiz, 
2019). 
Ultimately, new research is needed that scrutinizes both camps’ hypotheses. Currently 
empirical evidence is lacking for both hypotheses. Therefore, there is a need for a large 
quantitative study that analyses the socioeconomic and immigration policy data available to 
arrive at more inferentially robust findings.  
Purpose of the Study 
Poverty and violence in Central America have become the consensus root cause among 





unauthorized migration flows. Conversely, government officials, practitioners, conservative 
think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm have 
blamed lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. immigration policy, and the 
exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the real reasons for the surge. Due to these 
“diametrically opposed evaluations” (Stanley, 1987), and research gaps in both sides of the 
argument, it is difficult to arrive at an objective, data-based explanation for the dramatic rise in 
Central Americans illegally entering the United States. For these reasons, an extensive 
quantitative study is needed that takes into account the most important variables associated with 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In addition, due 
to methodological issues in the literature with regard to time frame selection issues, extended 
time frames that take into account decades, not just single year data points or very selective short 
time frames, will be pursued to better measure the impact of socioeconomic and policy changes 
over time on unauthorized migration from Central America.  
Ideally, a more comprehensive study that takes into account more variables, longer time 
frames, and both conflicting hypotheses will provide more inferentially robust findings. More 
importantly, this study will help policymakers and leaders make better decisions regarding what 
is currently known as the Central American Migration Crisis,5 while at the same time 
contributing significantly to the fields of immigration and national security.  
 
 
5 The Central American Migration Crisis, sometimes called the OTM Crisis, is what this study explores. The 
consensus among experts and immigration officials is that the real start of the crisis was 2012 when OTM 
apprehensions along the Southwest Border increased from 46,997 in 2011 to 94,532 in 2012. It includes the 
Unaccompanied Children (UAC) Crisis which made headlines in 2014 and brought to light the surge of 







 The study being proposed here will focus on the following research questions:  
1. What is the universe of poverty and violence data for El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras? 
2. To what extent, if any, is the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis supported by the 
available data in an inferentially robust way? 
3. To what extent, if any, does the immigration Policy and Loophole Hypothesis explain 









CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
As previously mentioned in the Problem Statement section, literature investigating 
Central American migration is very limited due to the simple fact that OTM unauthorized 
migration along the Southwest Border represented only a tiny fraction of all apprehensions. In 
fact, as displayed in Figure 3, 2014 was the first year OTM apprehensions accounted for more 
apprehensions than Mexican apprehensions along the Southwest Border. Simply put, the field 
has historically focused on unauthorized Mexican migration because Mexican migration had 
historically accounted for an overwhelming majority of the unauthorized immigration across the 
Southwest Border.  
However, despite the limited research on Central American migration, historic 
socioeconomic and political conditions in Central America are well known and literature on 
these topics are extensive. Although the literature on socioeconomic conditions in Central 
America has been used to explain some of the small-scale Central American migration of the 
past, today’s literature fails to consider that past data from previous eras that suggest current 
issues associated with poverty and violence are nothing new. Instead, the most recent literature 
only considers contemporary data on socioeconomic conditions to explain the current 
phenomenon. Simply put, contemporary literature on the topic appear to ignore past data and 
research that suggests conditions in Central America today are no worse than in the past and, if 
anything, appear to have improved over time. 
The literature review will focus on the poverty and violence literature of Central 
America. There are four primary reasons to focus on the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis for 





factors responsible for the record number of Central Americans crossing illegally into the United 
States, a historic look at the region is required to see if poverty and violence are new 
contemporary issues; (b) to determine if there currently exists what President Obama defined as a 
“humanitarian crisis at the border” due to poverty and violence, literature on the current Central 
American situation must be reviewed; (c) to support or dismiss the theory that various policy and 
loophole issues in the immigration process are to blame, a complete picture of possible systemic 
push factor causes must be explored; and lastly (d) as alluded to in the Problem Statement 
section, there is in fact very little academic or statistical research to review on the immigration 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. As previously stated, most of the claims behind the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis come in the form of expert testimony from employees and practitioners 
before Congressional hearings and internal investigations that have not been released to the 
public. Ultimately, original research must be conducted to arrive at more concrete conclusions, 
but the first step is to understand Central America’s history of poverty and violence. 
This literature review will be broken down into five parts. The first part of the literature 
review will look at the historical ideological divide in the literature concerning Central American 
migration. Although this was already briefly mentioned in the Problem Statement section, a 
detailed look at the literature is warranted due to the influence this ideological divide has had on 
academic research, the media, and policy over the decades. The second part of this review will 
look at the literature on Central America from the 1920s to the mid-1990s. This part will focus 
on the era commonly referred to as the Central American Crisis; however, earlier historic 
socioeconomic and political conditions will also be briefly discussed to provide context. The 
third part will review literature on Central America from the mid-1990s to 2012. This is the 





recent Central American migration surge in 2012. The fourth part will look at literature on 
Central America from 2012 to today. This is contemporary literature on Central American 
migration from the start of the Central American Migration Crisis in 2012 to the current situation 
in 2020. Finally, the fifth part will summarize the literature, address some of the issues in recent 
research, and make an argument as to why a more comprehensive study is needed. 
Figure 3 
 
Mexico and Other Than Mexican – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure demonstrates all Mexican and Other-than-Mexican apprehensions along the 
U.S.-Mexico Border by USBP. Mexican and OTM apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. 
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The Historical Ideological Divide in the Literature 
As discussed in the previous sections, current literature exploring the cause of the recent 
wave of Central American migration is problematic due to two opposing camps of experts and 
advocates. Most academic scholars, immigrant advocates, progressive media outlets, and human 
rights organizations identify poverty and violence as the primary reasons for the surge. 
Government officials, practitioners, conservative think tanks, and the agencies that work in the 
immigration and border enforcement realm admit poverty and violence underlie decisions to 
migrate, but overwhelmingly identify lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S 
immigration policy, and the exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the principal 
culprits.  
Despite all the literature and expert analysis, due to the opposing views, it is difficult to 
ascertain facts simply from the contemporary literature. Interestingly, however, this is not 
anything new. Poverty, violence, and Central American migration have been topics of debate 
going back to the 1970s thanks in large part to what became known as the Central American 
Crisis (Leiken & Rubin, 1987; Morrison & May, 1994). The Central American Crisis is typically 
dated from 1960 to 1996, and it consisted of a series of civil conflicts and civil wars between 
leftwing militias and rightwing military regimes and dictators. The era included the Guatemalan 
Civil War (1960–1996), the Salvadoran Civil War (1979–1992) and the Nicaraguan Revolution 
and subsequent Contra War (1962–1990). Honduras avoided the long civil wars that plagued its 
neighbors, but government paranoia of leftist movements led to state sponsored clandestine 
campaigns against leftist militias and their supporters. In addition, the neighboring civil wars 
caused hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Honduras, negatively impacting an already 





As the conflicts in Central America picked up steam in the late 1970s, civil wars, 
communist revolutions, and U.S.-backed paramilitary groups ravaged the region. In the wake of 
the ongoing conflicts, unauthorized migration and asylum claims from the region began to 
increase. According to a study done by political scientist William D. Stanley (1987) on whether 
migrants from Central America were either economic migrants or refugees from violence, he 
acknowledged a seemingly ideological divide between camps even back then. According to 
Stanley (1987), the Reagan administration pointed to “the fact that many Central Americans 
pass[ed] through Mexico on their way to the United States [as] evidence of their economic 
motivations” (p. 132). On the other side, humanitarian groups such as  
members of private agencies aiding Central Americans in the United States argue[d] that 
most of the Salvadorans and Guatemalans who [came] to the United States d[id] so out of 
fear for their lives because of political violence in their home countries. Workers aiding 
refugees who were interviewed for this study reported that their clients moved to the 
United States only reluctantly and plan[ed] to return home when it [was] safe to do so, 
although most [were] uncertain as to when th[at] time w[ould] come. (Stanley, 1987, p. 
133) 
Stanley managed to summarize back then exactly what could be summarized today from the 
contemporary literature. Stanley (1987) stated:  
It is difficult to reconcile these two diametrically opposed evaluations of the motivations 
behind the Central American exodus. Both sides of the debate have access to individual 
case information about Central American migrants, yet they arrive at opposite 
conclusions. The two sides have different views as to what U.S. policy should be, and 





Not much has changed since then. The assertions remain unchanged between those that 
believe Central Americans are refugees “escaping poverty, [or] seek[ing] protection from 
violence” (Meissner et al., 2018, p. 5) and those that believe that while poverty and violence are 
always underlying reasons to migrate, the immigration “system is being gamed” and the asylum 
system specifically, is being “subject[ed] to rampart abuse and fraud” (Sessions, 2017). 
Today’s surge of Central American migrants, which includes an overwhelming number 
of unaccompanied children (UAC) and family groups, presents the leaders of the immigration 
and national security agencies a new challenge both legally and logistically. Although 
government officials, experts, and agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement 
realm have openly stated underlying decisions to migrate lie with issues pertaining to poverty 
and violence in the region (Gonzalez-Barrera et al., 2014), they have remained firm in their view 
that the exploitation of immigration system loopholes has been one of the largest, if not the 
largest, contributor to the recent surge in OTM migration. The loopholes found in the asylum 
process have been identified by some as suffering from the most abuse and fraud according to 
the testimony and analysis of some experts (Asylum Abuse, 2014; Asylum Fraud, 2013; 
Government Accountability Office, 2015, 2016; Migration Crisis, 2015; Sessions, 2017). 
However, it must be noted that the reason for this view is not so much that migrants are getting 
asylum fraudulently or finding loopholes to win their immigration cases, even though that is a 
concern. The real issue in the eyes of many immigration officials is that all these asylum claims, 
along with the increased number of immigration hearings, overwhelm the immigration system 
creating huge backlogs. As the system becomes backlogged by cases that are over two years 
behind schedule, detention space runs out (it actually ran out years ago), resulting in the release 





According to immigration officials, the release of migrants into the country soon after arrest6 
creates an incentive for people to come over with a child or claim asylum, especially because 
migrants can be granted employment authorization while having their asylum applications 
reviewed and their cases heard (Bruno, 2019).  
Immigrant advocate groups, some scholars, and many legislators state like the Obama 
administration clearly stated, there is a “humanitarian crisis” in Central America and these 
immigrants are refugees fleeing for their lives. Most advocate groups do not deny the fact asylum 
fraud occurs or some try to scam the system, they just believe it is not as rampant as some 
suggest and current fraud detection capabilities are adequate enough to screen out most abusers. 
According to Human Rights First director Eleanor Acer: 
U.S. authorities have a range of tools to address these abuses . . . including multiple 
identity and background checks, personnel in multiple agencies charged with detecting 
and investigating fraud, and the ability to refer for prosecution those who perpetrate 
fraud. (Asylum Fraud, 2014, p. 32) 
Ultimately, the main concern for most human rights advocates is not whether the wrong person 
fraudulently gets asylum or scams the system to remain in the country, but whether the right 
person is afforded every legal and humanitarian opportunity to remain in the country if they are 
eligible under the law.  
Much like what Stanley (1987) stated 3 decades ago, the two camps continue to be 
ideologically split, and due to this it is difficult to reconcile these “two diametrically opposed 
evaluations” (p. 133). Although both sides admit there is some fraud going on and that there are 
high levels of poverty and violence in Central America, they cannot agree on which one is the 
 
 





main driver of the Central American surge. These diametrically opposed evaluations make it 
difficult to arrive at an objective conclusion. This is a reason why there is a need for a more 
comprehensive study. 
Literature on Central America From the 1920s to the Mid-1990s 
The earliest and most reliable studies on the topic of Central American migration were a 
trilogy of studies written in the late 1980s and early 1990s that attempted to create frameworks 
and models for the then small-scale emigration that arose out of Central America. In addition to 
highlighting the ideological divide between camps with regard to Central American migration in 
the 1980s, Stanley (1987) attempted to gauge the impact of political violence on Salvadoran 
migration to the United States, concluding, “The fact that political violence variables account for 
more than half of the variance in Salvadoran apprehensions . . . suggests that fear of political 
violence is probably the dominant motivation for these migrants” (p. 147). In addition, Stanley 
(1987) found economic variables were not statistically significant in his model.  
In theory, Stanley’s (1987) model appears to explain the recent Central American surge if 
one subscribes to the violence driven narrative that is often cited by many experts and the media. 
However, when contemporary data are applied to his model, it fails to explain today’s surge in 
Salvadoran apprehensions, and it actually contradicts much of the current literature that says 
violence and crime are the root cause of the Central American surge. Stanley’s model is not an 
ideal model for today’s migration crisis because he studied politically motivated murders only. 
Today, politically motivated murders are not what is blamed for the Salvadoran exodus, it is 
general delinquency, crime, and violence—generally viewed in the form of overall homicides. 





try to arrive at the same conclusion as Stanley, one would fail to explain the current surge 
because the numbers are simply too divergent to draw any correlations.  
To provide an example of this divergence in numbers, one can explore the time frames in 
Stanley’s study: 1976 to 1984. The most Salvadoran apprehensions by INS numbered only 
11,916 in 1984, and the average number of apprehensions over the 8 years studied was 7,324 
apprehensions. Yet, the number of political killings from 1976 to 1984, far exceed the number of 
overall homicides seen in recent years, especially if one were to adjust for today’s larger 
population. This suggests current homicide numbers should not be causing the recent surge of 
unauthorized migration from El Salvador. In 1981, for example, there were 12,700 political 
killings in El Salvador but only 9,996 INS apprehensions. Comparatively, in 2014, when the 
Central American Migration Crisis hit the headlines, there were 3,942 homicides in El Salvador 
but an astonishing 66,419 apprehensions by USBP alone. In other words, plugging in the number 
of apprehensions and homicides today into Stanley’s model, with a time series that goes back to 
Stanley’s original time frame, would produce results with no correlation and may in fact even 
result in a negative correlation.  
Sociologists Hamilton and Chinchilla (1991) also made an early attempt at “develop[ing] 
a framework for analyzing [Central American] migration that takes into account historical and 
contemporary dimensions, economic and political motivations and domestic and international 
structures” (p. 76). Simply put, according to Hamilton and Chinchilla (1991), although violence 
played a key role in the decision to migrate, it was difficult to separate whether that decision was 
the result of a political or economic factor. The constructs Hamilton and Chinchilla identified for 
their framework were the same ones every scholar and expert has long associated with migration, 





Although their framework identified two key constructs (politics and economics) that are 
applicable today regarding Central American migration, their framework was limited and not 
robust enough. Although providing a statistical analysis like Stanley’s (1987) was not their intent 
or necessary to create their framework, models like Stanley’s do manage to provide a better 
assessment of a variable’s exact impact on migratory patterns. However, the biggest issue with 
Hamilton and Chinchilla’s (1991) study was that they missed on a few key variables that were 
crucial in explaining Mexican migration since the 1970s that could have been applied to their 
Central American migration framework. Those variables consist of immigration policy in the 
United States (Alden, 2012; Anderson, 2003; Congressional Research Service, 1980; Durand & 
Massey 2001; Durand et al., 1999; Fernandez-Kelly & Massey, 2007; Massey, 1998, 2010; 
Orrenius, 2001; Orrenius & Zavodny, 2012; Phillips & Massey, 1999; Rosenblum et al., 2012), 
demographic changes (Alden, 2012; Hanson & McIntosh, 2009; Passel et al., 2012; Terraza et 
al., 2011; Rosenblum & Brick, 2011; Zuniga & Molina, 2008), and border enforcement along the 
U.S.-Mexico border (Angelucci, 2012; Alden, 2017; Lessem, 2012, 2018; Santos, 2014). 
Without considering U.S. immigration policy, an originating country’s demographics, or U.S. 
border enforcement efforts, any framework looking at migration to the United States will have 
limitations.  
The last of the trilogy was a study by Morrison and May (1994) that looked at the 
influence of political and economic variables between 1976 and 1981 in Guatemala. Morrison 
and May found economic factors were a much more powerful influence than violence, somewhat 
contradicting Stanley’s (1987) study on El Salvador. According to Morrison and May (1994), “If 
both source violence and destination wages were to double, the wage increase would account for 





(1994) found “violence was found to be significant only above a certain critical level; minimal-
level violence appears to have no significant effect on migration” (p. 127). That critical level of 
violence, however, was not very high, with Morrison and May (1994) pegging it at “between 6 
and 10 percent of the level found in the most violent department” (p 127).  
Much like Stanley (1987) and Hamilton and Chinchilla (1991), Morrison and May’s 
(1994) framework also fails to explain today’s Central American migration problem. It was 
simply too narrow in scope. The study only looked at Guatemala between 1976 and 1981, it only 
considered politically motivated deaths not overall homicides, and it focused on internal 
migration not international migration to the United States.  
Regardless of the fact that these three frameworks and studies cannot be used to explain 
today’s migration phenomenon, they provided a rich history of the foundations of systemic 
poverty and violence in the region. The one thing that was clear in all three papers was economic 
and societal conditions in the region were always considered substandard, and conditions since 
then were generally described as ranking at the near bottom in the western hemisphere in almost 
every major category measured by organizations like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In fact, Hamilton and Chinchilla’s (1991) historical account of the 
economic, political, and societal conditions of the region found the region has been plagued by 
low wages, high levels of poverty, high inflation, damaging price shocks to agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors, high unemployment, and political instability that date back as far as data 
are available. In the same vein, Morrison and May (1994) concluded, “Violence has permeated 
the Central American landscape for much of its history” (p. 111). Morrison and May (1994) 
added that in countries like Guatemala, “violence ha[d] been relatively constant [in its politics] 





Moreover, these are not the only papers arriving at this conclusion. Writing in the late 
1980s about the then ongoing Central American Crisis, child rights activist Anita Ronstrom 
(1989) stated, “Central America has been a region in conflict for a long time” (p. 145), with 
active civil wars and armed struggles in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala that had their 
roots in the 1960s. The prevalence of violence was so ingrained in the culture of Central America 
that historian Thomas P. Anderson (1976) “suggest[ed] that there are specific facilities of 
violence, both personal and organized, that have roots in the cultural formation of the Central 
American peoples” (p. 249). Anderson (1976) added ideological violence had a long history in 
Central America beginning with “the organization of leftwing labor movements there in the 
1920s” (p. 250) like the Guatemalan Communist party and other “similar groups in Honduras 
and El Salvador” (p. 250) that formed soon after. According to Anderson (1976), massive 
violence and repression erupted soon after the creation of these groups. In early 1932, for 
example, “the Communist Party of El Salvador led the first organized Communist uprising in the 
Western Hemisphere. Some 10,000 to 15,000 people were killed, mostly in the military massacre 
that followed this abortive revolt” (Anderson, 1971, as cited in Anderson, 1976, p. 250). By the 
same token, according to historian Robert H. Holden (2004), the history of violence and state 
formation in Central America was such that “the persistence of public violence in Latin America 
orgininat[ed] in the patrimonial institutions – among them patronclientage [sic] – that have ruled 
the region since the sixteenth century” (pp. 20–21). 
Ultimately, as far as one goes, the consensus among the experts suggests poverty and 
violence were long-standing issues. Basically, at no point during the 20th century was Central 
America not described as suffering from systemic poverty or not involved in some type of 





America began to join the world economy, many experts, international organizations, and world 
governments increased their expectations of the region with hopes they would catch up to the 
more developed nations of Latin America. 
Literature on Central America From the Mid-1990s to 2012 
Even after the Central American Crisis ended, Central America did not jump into a 
period of prosperity. Despite the initial optimism by major western governments after the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the positive impact they expected it could have on Latin America, the tone 
of the literature on Latin American poverty and violence, and Central America specifically, 
remained as glum and despairing as the previous era. Literature linking those socioeconomic 
conditions to immigration were limited, but on the conditions themselves the literature was quite 
extensive with major organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and the 
IMF making major contributions.  
Poverty  
During this era, the research moved away from political ideological issues and began 
focusing more on Central American economic integration. A UN report by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) provided a general overview of 
Central America during this period of reform and recovery following the Central American 
Crisis:  
Since 1990 the region has been subject to periods of economic volatility and external 
shocks such as the contagion affects [sic] of the Mexican currency crisis (or Tequila 
Crisis) in 1994–95, the Asian currency crisis of 1997, and a variety of commodity price 





disasters due to its geographical vulnerability to hurricanes, exemplified by Hurricane 
Mitch hitting Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1998. (Hammill, 2007, p. 12) 
Despite a focus by the UN (Hammill, 2007), the World Bank (2004a, 2004b, 2005), and the IMF 
(Desruelle & Shipke, 2008; Rodlauer & Shipke 2005) on Central American trade and global 
market integration, recurring themes seen before and during the Central American Crisis 
continued to play a major role in the literature including, chronic poverty, inequality, corruption, 
unemployment, child malnutrition, poor education levels, and weak institutional structures.  
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided some of the easiest to follow 
analyses by publishing reports on each country every year or two. Although each report provided 
the most up to date economic data and analysis, usually citing World Bank, IMF or UN data, 
their analyses failed to point out whether there were improvements or declines from year to year. 
The main issue with the CRS reports was they contained very few time series analyses with 
sufficient time domains on key indicators. This made it nearly impossible to detect overall 
trends. The narrative of the reports themselves also provided little insight as to the direction of 
the data because new data were usually simply “plugged into” the previous year’s paragraph. 
Because the very first reports contained bleak data, and new data changed only slightly from year 
to year, the narratives had little reason to change so they maintained the same morose tone found 
in the first reports.  
However, if one paid attention to the year-to-year changes by plotting them on a graph, 
one noticed that things were in fact moving in a general positive direction, even if unevenly and 
at a less than an ideal pace. Although World Bank and IMF reports also did not generally contain 
the most optimistic language, their economic outlooks usually matched the data, and their reports 





Although these reports tended to consistently state these three countries suffered from chronic 
poverty, high levels of inequality, corruption, child malnutrition, poor education levels, and weak 
government structures, data trends in those reports showed overall improvements on most 
economic indicators. 
Violence 
The subject of violence in Latin America never left the conversation and it continued to 
be highlighted as a key problem in Latin America. According to an Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB):  
Even a cursory view of daily newspaper headlines and conversation throughout Latin 
America and the Caribbean reveals that the subject of violence is foremost on the minds 
of citizens. Few in the region have remained unaffected by what is widely recognized as a 
multidimensional, multifaceted problem; nearly everyone has a story to tell, often in 
graphic terms. Survey after survey consistently underscores the gravity and prevalence of 
the concern. (Buvinic et al., 1999, p. 3) 
That same year the World Bank published a study on youth gangs and violence that also 
highlighted violence as being a “chronic feature of Latin American and Caribbean societies” 
(Rodgers, 1999, p. 1). Moreover, Rodgers (1999) provided some important insight on the topic 
of how violence changed in Latin America.  
Rodgers (1999) stated the manifestation of violence in the region changed beginning in 
the early 1990s from a political one based on conflicts over political systems, to one based on 
delinquency and crime where youth gangs became “among the main features of the new 





cited in Rodgers, 1999), “Violence in the region has not lessened, however, and it arguably 
remains the ‘social pandemic’ of Latin America in the late twentieth century” (p. 1).  
Shockingly, violence in certain countries like El Salvador did not decrease after the 12-
year civil war ended in 1992. According to political scientist, Charles T. Call (2003), general 
violence and crime quickly supplanted civil war issues like war and politics with the first signs 
coming from 1992 polling data that showed “crime almost tripled in frequency as a perceived 
problem facing the country” (p. 839). Call (2003) added that between 1993 and 1999, polling 
data consistently showed crime was “the single most important problem facing the country” (p. 
839). Other studies, such as those done by the World Bank, showed even in the mid-1990s, the 
maras were said to “dominate the landscape of violence [as] gangs of youths and young adults . . 
. staked out their turf in all but the smallest settlements of the country” (Tuckman, 1996, as cited 
in Rodgers, 1999, p. 9).  
Rodgers (1999) added, although Guatemala was not as violent as El Salvador, “there is 
also a ‘culture of violence’ in Guatemala as a result of the 30-year civil war that ended in 1996” 
(p. 10). According to Rodgers (1999), the maras were “much less violent and destructive than 
their Salvadoran namesakes” (p. 10); however, they were nevertheless very present “hav[ing] 
existed in Guatemala since the 1980s, mainly in urban areas” (p. 10).  
Due in large part to Honduras not experiencing “political conflict similar to Guatemala, 
El Salvador and Nicaragua” (Blanchard et al., 2011, p. 62), it was less studied by scholars. 
Regardless, “Honduras was not entirely exempt from the violence that affected other Central 
American countries [and they too] experienced repression, militarization, and human rights 
abuses” (Blanchard et al., 2011, p. 80). Despite all that, Honduras maintained relatively low 





Honduras’ homicide rate began to shoot up surpassing 30 per 100,000 by the mid-1990s and the 
increased levels of criminality began to call the attention of experts (Leyva, 2001). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, numerous studies on crime, violence, and the growing 
gang phenomenon began to appear. Although there appeared to be a lot of disagreement, there 
was a consensus that identified the root cause of crime and violence on income inequality and 
less so on poverty or overall levels of development (Fajnzylber et al., 1998, 2002). In addition, 
contrary to what one would expect, research during this era found little empirical evidence 
linking Central American gangs to violent crime and drug trafficking.  
One of the principal issues affecting the theory that gangs were the primary cause of 
violent crime, was the research that took place did not necessarily support the theory. One of the 
first comprehensive studies on crime in Central America was done by the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) in the mid-2000s. The study found violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Honduras attributable to gangs varied between 10%–60% (UNODC, 2007). The large range 
made it difficult to accurately determine the gangs’ direct impact on violent crime despite media 
reports. Another study on gangs and urban violence by Jutersonke et al. (2009) found “the extent 
and scale of urban violence attributed to pandillas and maras [was] likely to be overstated” (pp. 
380–381), adding “the scale and virulence of Central American gang violence may be less than 
widely claimed.” (p. 381). According to Jutersonke et al. (2009), “Numerous alarmist accounts 
linking Central American gangs” (p. 381) to organized type level crime fall short because “it is 
clear from qualitative studies that both pandillas and maras are principally involved in small-
scale, localized crime and delinquency such as petty theft and muggings” (p. 381).  
Contrary to what one would expect, as more and more studies began to pour in, not much 





The World Bank’s (2011) study on crime and violence in Central America found there was “little 
empirical analysis . . . and reliable data on the role of youth gangs in the narcotics trade” (p. 15), 
and that although  
there is evidence that the maras in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are involved in 
the extortion of protection money from local businesses and from buses and taxis as they 
go through gang-controlled territories. . . . Qualitative studies of Central American gangs 
suggest that they are mainly involved in small-scale, localized crime and delinquency, 
such as petty theft and muggings, which are typically carried out by individual gang 
members. (p. 17)  
Similarly, in terms of homicide, there were few empirical links to gangs. According to 
data from El Salvador’s Institute of Legal Medicine, only between 8%–13.4% of the homicides 
were linked to gang crime between 2003 and 2006 (World Bank, 2011). In Honduras, only 15% 
was linked to gang crime (Casa Alianza, 2006). According to the World Bank (2011), 
“Guatemala is another case in which data paint a mixed picture of [gangs’] overall contribution 
to violent crime” (p. 16). The World Bank (2011) added that, in Guatemala,  
during a month in which the number of homicides was especially high, police statistics 
attributed only 14 percent of them to gangs . . . [and that] data from the Guatemalan 
penitentiary system indicate[d] that gang members accounted for 5.8 percent of the total 
arrestees in June 2006, a figure suggesting that others are behind the high levels of 
violence in Guatemala. (p. 16)  
The World Bank (2011) summarized it best, stating:  
While gangs are doubtless a major contributor to crime in El Salvador, Guatemala and 





minority share of violence; multiple sources suggest that perhaps 15 percent of homicides 
are gang related. Furthermore, reliable data related to the role of youth gangs in the 
narcotics trade are scarce. (p. ii) 
Even in terms of Central Americans’ perception of gangs, the data told a mixed story. 
According to the World Bank (2011), “The overall perception among Central American citizens 
remains that youth gang members are primarily responsible for crime” (p. 17). However, as the 
surveyed areas got smaller moving from urban cities toward rural areas, respondents’ perception 
of how greatly gangs affected their neighborhoods precipitously dropped from 21%–24% in the 
capitals, to 10% in medium size towns, all the way to 3% in rural areas (World Bank, 2011). 
As the unaccompanied child (UAC) crisis hit the headlines in 2014, a new era regarding 
Central American migration began. More literature than ever began to be produced about the 
Central American migration surge, and much like in previous eras, poverty and violence became 
the focal points. However, there was one thing that was clear from literature during this 
postconflict era: poverty and violence were not new phenomena that arose out of nowhere in the 
early 2010s to all of a sudden create a need to illegally migrate to the United States. These were 
long-standing issues that despite the tone of most of the literature, did show improvements 
during most of the postconflict era. 
Literature on Central America From 2012 to Today 
The Central American migration surge hit the headlines in 2014 when tens of thousands 
of UACs began to turn themselves in at the U.S.-Mexico border. What was generally cited in the 
news like The New York Times was that they were “driven out by deepening poverty but also by 
rampart gang violence” (Preston, 2014, para. 4). Some government officials and the Obama 





government reports (such as those by the Congressional Research Service) supported such 
statements blaming the UAC migration crises on “out-migration-related factors” like “high 
violent crime rates, poor economic conditions fueled by relatively low economic growth rates, 
relatively high poverty rates, and the presence of transnational gangs” (Kandel et al., 2014, p. 3). 
Although initial Congressional Research Service reports were careful to highlight their reports 
did “not intend to be an exhaustive review of all factors that potentially underlie the surge in 
unaccompanied children” (Kandel et al., 2014, p. 1), they admitted these were the “major 
possible contributing factors that had been widely cited in published reports” (p. 1).  
The following year, new studies and reports continued to cite “violence and economic 
insecurity” (Rosenblum, 2015, p. 12) as push factors. Even in 2016, more than 2 years since the 
UAC crisis hit the headlines, and 4 years since the actual start of the Central American Migration 
Crisis, the highly regarded Migration Policy Institute continued to cite that the main push factors 
responsible for the immigrant outflows were “high levels of violence, food insecurity, and 
poverty” (Rosenblum & Ball, 2016, p. 3). By 2019, the Central American Migration Crisis was 
surpassing anything that had ever been predicted or seen, yet the literature remained unchanged 
maintaining the theme of a poverty and violence created issue. A common overview typically 
found in the literature in 2019 generally stated “narcotic and migrant flows [were] the latest 
symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in several countries in the region, including widespread 
insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment” 
(Meyer, 2019, “Summary”). 
Blaming poverty and violence had become almost a matter-of-fact statement for some 
government officials, news agencies, and more importantly, even the academic literature. What 





poverty and violence with no references, the use of single year data points as evidence for the 
current migration crisis, the dismissal of other potential variables, and a deeply flawed analysis 
that appeared to try to support the hypothesis that the Central American Migration Crisis was a 
poverty and violence created phenomenon.  
There was in fact very little original statistical research looking at explanatory variables 
like poverty and violence with regard to Central American migration. In addition, the few 
contemporary studies that attempted to look at explanatory variables were full of inconsistencies, 
flawed research, and contained major gaps in the data. Economists Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Thitima Puttitanam (2016) conducted one of the few original studies that attempted to 
actually look at multiple variables, like the impact of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA), to explain the then spike of UACs. Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanam (2016) found:  
DACA has not had a significant impact on those apprehensions once we account for 
traditional pull and push factors and a range of unobserved country of origin and border 
patrol sector time-varying and fixed effects. Rather, the 2008 [William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act] TVPRA, along with violence in the 
originating countries and economic conditions both in the origin countries and the United 
States, emerge as some of the key determinants of the recent surge in unaccompanied 
minors apprehended along the southwest US-Mexico border. (p. 113) 
Although their research factored out DACA as a contributing factor, and factor in violence 
(homicide rate) and economic conditions in originating countries, it also identified the 
immigration policy TVPRA in 2008, as a potential causal factor. However, their research was 
limited. Their study was constrained by limited CBP data, the research focused only on UACs, 





frame, which was due to limited CBP data on UAC apprehensions, could only have produced the 
results found. However, if that exact same model was expanded to include data from 2014 to 
2019, those findings would be less significant, and more likely than not, would find the opposite 
effect. The reason for that is because the push factors they used in their paper, homicide rate data 
and real GDP per capita in the home countries, have improved from 2013 to 2019, yet the 
apprehensions of UACs, and Northern Triangle migrants, have remained near record highs.  
Wong (2014) was another researcher that attempted a statistical analysis that concluded 
“it is not U.S. policy but rather violence and the desire to find safety that is the impetus for these 
children’s journeys” (p. 1). Much like Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanum (2016), the big flaw in 
this study was the time frames that only focused from 2009 to 2013. As previously explained, 
simply extending the time frame would result in no statistical significance because homicide 
rates declined considerably overall since 2012, while UAC apprehensions continued to hit near 
all-time highs.  
Contrary to studies by Wong (2014) and Rosenblum and Ball (2016), Donato and Sisk 
(2015) found “violence and poverty are structural conditions that underlie migration decisions, 
but on their own, they d[id] not predict child migration” (p. 59). Donato and Sisk’s (2015) 
findings indicate “the migration of children is closely linked to that of the parents, and that a 
minor child is significantly more likely to go on a first US trip if their parent has US migration 
experience” (p. 73). Although Donato and Sisk (2015) had a longer time domain than most other 
studies, their study had numerous limitations making it hard to compare to other research. Their 
study used Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) 
survey data, not apprehensions. Although they provided reasoning behind their decision to use 





numerous. First, even if survey results were accurate, they would always produce much different 
results than using apprehension data regardless of study. In addition, they included in their 
regressions countries that are not important to the UAC or Northern Triangle migration issue, 
namely Mexico, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, while excluding Honduras due to nonexistent 
LAMP data. More specifically, Guatemala, El Salvador and the rest of the countries in the study, 
had relatively tiny sample sizes relative to Mexico’s—often 30 to 1 ratios in sample size 
differences. Such a disproportionate difference in sample size could only result in Mexico 
disproportionately affecting the findings.  
Interestingly, another study that used LAMP data relating to Salvadoran migration 
(Flores-Yeffal & Pren, 2018) found the opposite effect of Donato and Sisk (2015). Flores-Yeffal 
and Pren (2018) found increases in civil violence and personal economic issues in fact increased 
first time unauthorized migration likelihood. In addition, Flores-Yeffal and Pren’s (2018) study 
found “no evidence that social networks play[ed] a role on providing support to those taking the 
first unauthorized migration trip” (p. 11). However, much like Donato and Sisk’s study and other 
studies relying on LAMP data, the sample sizes are much too small to draw any generalizations. 
In Flores-Yeffal and Pren’s study, the total sample size that was used to predict Salvadoran 
migrants’ first migration trip to the United States between 1965 and 2007 was only 382 
households. Expecting 382 households over a 40-year time span to provide predictive results is a 
stretch and similar studies with such small sample sizes should be interpreted cautiously.  
Particularity interesting is the fact that since before the UAC crisis hit the headlines, the 
U.S. government was well aware of the issues relating to Central American migration, and 
Congress held numerous hearings to address the issue. In fact, in 2013, a year before the UAC 





discussed among immigration officials (Asylum Abuse, 2013). During and since the UAC crisis, 
numerous Congressional hearings have been held that were much like those in the past, one side 
identified poverty and violence as the principal drivers, while the other side agreed those are 
underlying issues, but stated immigration system loopholes were what was pulling Central 
Americans in record numbers (Asylum Fraud, 2014; Building America’s Trust Through Border 
Security, 2017; Challenges at the Border; Migration Crisis, 2015; Ongoing Migration from 
Central America, 2015; Oversight of Customs and Border Protection’s Response to the 
Smuggling of Persons at the Southern Border, 2019; Oversight of Immigration Enforcement and 
Family Reunification Efforts, 2018; Oversight of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2018; 
Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration Court System, 2018; The Unaccompanied 
Children Crisis, 2016; TVPRA and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unaccompanied Alien 
Children, 2018; Unaccompanied Alien Children, 2015). Much like Stanley (1987) identified over 
30 years ago, there continues to be an ideological divide where both sides of the debate provide 
examples and evidence always arriving at their own conclusions. Regardless of these differences 
in ideology among politicians, what was surprising was that in the academic literature, expert 
testimony provided by border security and immigration officials, often fell on deaf ears. Even 
when immigration officials’ evidence and data were cited in the literature, it was done so in 
passing and no significant study has taken place addressing some of the data they mentioned.  
An influential study by highly regarded economist and immigration expert Michael 
Clemens (2017) is a perfect example of how even the best experts dismiss immigration officials’ 
key concerns and fail to include their concerns in their analyses. Clemens’s paper relegated the 
idea of U.S. immigration policy changes having an impact on UAC migration to a single 





increase in UAC arrivals as a consequence of changes to U.S. policy regarding the deportation of 
unauthorized immigrant children in 2013 (Kandel, 2017, p. 1), but there is no sign that UAC 
arrivals discontinuously rose after the policy change (Amuedo-Dorantes & Puttitanun 2016)” (p. 
6). Not only did Clemens dismiss the idea of that immigration policy changes could have an 
impact, but he misinterpreted Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun’s (2016) paper, which, as 
mentioned earlier, clearly stated TVPRA appeared to be a major factor that influenced UAC 
migration. The dismissal of such a critical variable by an expert of such high regard is especially 
problematic because of the influence of his work which was covered in The New Yorker (Talbot, 
2019), The Washington Post (Schwartz, 2018), The Wall Street Journal (Leubsdorf, 2017), The 
Atlantic (Beinart, 2019), The American Prospect (Madrid, 2018), Forbes (Anderson, 2018), and 
PolitiFact (Greenberg, 2018).  
Clemens’s (2017) paper was arguably the most sophisticated statistical paper on the 
topic. It explored the apprehensions of individual UACs by area of birth and associated them 
with municipal level effects of local homicide while controlling for a number of variables like 
income, poverty rate, and school enrollment. However, much like the few papers that also 
conducted statistical analyses, the paper was limited to only UAC apprehension data between 
2011 to 2016. In addition, and maybe more importantly, it completely disregarded immigration 
officials’ key concerns regarding policy changes and loopholes that they argue have allowed 
UACs, families units, and other Central Americans to gain entry into the United States. 
This is why Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanum’s (2016) study was particularly 
interesting. Despite its limitations and short comings, the study actually considered variables 





Dorantes and Puttitanum provided a summary about why TVPRA is often considered a potential 
factor among immigration officials: 
In sum, the 2008 law significantly changed the way in which unaccompanied minors 
were handled by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which had previously 
removed unaccompanied minors using expedited procedures. The new legislation was 
accompanied by a surge in the flow of unaccompanied minors from El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras, worsening the bottleneck in the handling of unaccompanied 
minors’ deportation. The confluence of all these factors led some to conclude that the 
2008 TVPRA might have led the increase in inflows from those countries. (p. 104) 
Early on the UAC crisis, even a Migration Policy Institute paper by Chirshi and Hipsman (2014) 
managed to mention there was some evidence that the growing perception about the treatment of 
minors due to TVPRA, and possibly DACA, created more child friendly policies and perceptions 
that might be responsible for spurring minors to migrate. However, studies highlighting other 
potential causal factors are few and far between, and statistical studies factoring other variables, 
like immigration system loopholes, have become essentially nonexistent.  
 Despite these issues with the contemporary literature, where the recent literature really 
falls short, is in the persistence of much of the research to use single year data points as evidence. 
Simply put, there is a lack of time series analyses that encompass sufficient time spans relating to 
poverty and violence. Graphs found in most studies and reports often only include the years that 
benefit their findings, and I have not found a recent study that considers the latest socioeconomic 
data from 2014 to 2019.  
Take the issue of poverty in El Salvador as an example. A recent report by the Migration 





common drivers of migration, are reflected in persistently high poverty rates, which in 2017 
stood at 29 percent in El Salvador” (Soto et al., 2019). The study went on to suggest the poverty 
rate, among other socioeconomic factors, were responsible for the surge in migration in recent 
years. More importantly, poverty rates from previous years are not mentioned in the rest of the 
43-page report. Although it is true that a 29% poverty rate is high by first world standards, that 
statistic is not telling us anything about the direction of El Salvador. To suggest a 29% poverty 
rate is significant, it has to be compared to previous years’ numbers, and preferably it has to be 
included in a time series that shows a pattern or some historical context. With no context, one 
year’s worth of data cannot be used to support or predict much of anything, much less a 
migratory trend. Moreover, when this poverty data are actually explored, we find El Salvador’s 
poverty rate has dropped significantly since 2011, when it was a little over 40%.  
To provide another example commonly seen in the literature, take another indicator 
commonly associated with poverty, the Global Hunger Index (GHI). Another recent 2019 CRS 
report exploring the recent migration to the United States from Central America stated, 
“According to the 2018 Global Hunger Index, Guatemala and Honduras ranked second and third 
in hunger levels in Central America and the Caribbean, behind Haiti” (Wilson et al., 2019, p. 5) 
and that such food insecurity is strongly linked to migration (Wilson et al., 2019). What the 
report also failed to mention is that Honduras and Guatemala have consistently been ranked at 
the bottom of the GHI since the inception of the index. Once again, this is not telling us much 
because we do not know if these rankings represent worsening conditions that could justify a 
sudden spike in unauthorized migration. In fact, the GHI website shows Honduras had consistent 
improvements every year the data are plotted from 2000 to 2019 (see Figures 114 and 115). In 





the second lowest ranked country, also shows steady improvements with a decline from 27.7 in 
2000, to 20.6 in 2019. More interestingly, 3 of the 4 GHI indicators for Honduras showed 
improvements from 2000 to 2019, and one indicator, “prevalence of wasting in children under 
five years,” slightly increased from 1.3% in 2000 to 1.5% in 2019. Guatemala showed 
improvement in all four indicators from 2000 to 2019.  
Lastly, take another large multi-organization report undertaken by IDB, Investing in 
Rural People (IFAD), the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IMO), More Rights for 
More People (OAS), and the World Food Programme (WFP) from 2017 that in the title blamed 
food insecurity for the mass emigration of people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
The 93-page report was full of data in the form of surveys, graphs, and charts, yet the entire 
report contained zero time series analyses of economic indicators including food insecurity. The 
only variable that had more than a single year’s data was USBP apprehensions, and even those 
data were not linked to any other data to find any correlation. The entire study was attempting to 
draw conclusions from single data points. Even if the small sample sizes of survey interviews 
provided accurate generalizable answers, they cannot be used because we do not know what 
responses could have been provided by interviewees in previous years. Single year survey results 
cannot be used to suggest a higher or lower migration likelihood unless we have survey data over 
multiple years showing some kind trend or change.  
By and large, the literature during this era painted the same dire picture of worsening 
conditions in Central America like those seen in previous eras. Few studies attempted to conduct 
proper analytical research, and those that did, failed to provide adequate answers due to issues 
pertaining to weak analyses, insufficient data sets, and a dismissal of immigration officials’ key 





new research was surprisingly thin, and the research that did take place fell way below the 
quality found between the mid-1990s and 2012. Even today, the gang research from the mid-
1990s to 2012 continues to be the seminal work in the field that is most often cited. Despite all 
these shortcomings, where the literature really came up short was in the way a lot of the research 
tried to formulate narratives around single year data points instead of multiyear time series 
analyses. All in all, despite the constant media attention, the era provided very little original 
groundbreaking research leaving the Central American Migration Crisis with as many questions 
as when it started.  
Conclusion  
What this literature review meant to do was provide an analysis of poverty and violence 
during three critical eras of Central American history. The literature in all three eras provided no 
clear answers on the true impact of poverty and violence on the Central American migration 
surge. Weak research, insufficient time series analyses, a dismissal of immigration officials’ key 
concerns, and narrative driven studies failed to provide adequate answers. Simply put, the 
literature, regardless of era, has always painted a dire picture of Central America. Yet, despite 
the dire picture painted in previous eras, unauthorized immigration from Central America never 
surged the way it did beginning in 2012. Conversely, if one simply digs a little more, we find 
Central America has in fact improved over the years. Although this does not mean that 
improvement has been evenly distributed or at desirable levels, they are improvements none the 
less that must be acknowledged when devising a study. There is no doubt that improvement is 
needed in Central America in a multitude of facets. However, to claim all of the sudden a shock 
of poverty and violence lead hundreds of thousands to flee from one year to the next requires 





CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
Purpose of the Study 
Poverty and violence in Central America have become the consensus root cause among 
most experts, scholars, and news outlets for the never-before-seen Central American 
unauthorized migration flows. Conversely, government officials, practitioners, conservative 
think tanks, and the agencies that work in the immigration and border enforcement realm have 
blamed lax U.S. immigration policies, incorrect perceptions of U.S. immigration policy, and the 
exploitation of immigration system loopholes as the real reasons for the surge. Due to these 
“diametrically opposed evaluations” (Stanley, 1987), and research gaps in both sides of the 
argument, it is difficult to arrive at an objective, data-based explanation for the dramatic rise in 
Central Americans illegally entering the United States. For these reasons an extensive 
quantitative study is needed that considers the most important variables associated with the 
Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In addition, due to 
methodological issues in the literature regarding time frame selection issues, extended time 
frames that take into account decades, not just single year data points or very selective short time 
frames, will be pursued to better measure the impact of socioeconomic and policy changes over 
time on unauthorized migration from Central America.  
Ideally, a more comprehensive study that considers more variables, longer time frames, 
and both conflicting hypotheses will provide more inferentially robust findings. More 
importantly, this study will help policymakers and leaders make better decisions regarding what 
is currently known as the Central American Migration Crisis, while at the same time contributing 






 The study focused on the following research questions:  
1. What is the universe of poverty and violence data for El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras? 
2. To what extent, if any, is the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis supported by the 
available data in an inferentially robust way? 
3. To what extent, if any, does the immigration Policy and Loophole Hypothesis explain 
the recent surge in Central American migration? 
Research Design 
To test the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, 
the study employed a quantitative analysis research design. Independent regression models for El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras used a wide range of shared and country-specific macrolevel 
push and pull factors over time frames extending up to 39 years. To make sense of unauthorized 
immigration from each country, the study used and tested a number of robust regression models 
that took into account as much relevant data as possible over extended time frames to see to what 
extent the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and Policy and Loophole Hypothesis were 
associated with the flows of unauthorized immigrants from the Northern Triangle. 
The sections in this chapter will explain some of the key variables and design choices for 
the study. The first section titled, Why Focus on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?, will 
provide a little more detail about why El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras were chosen as the 
focus of the study. The second section, Comparing the Northern Triangle to Its Neighbors, will 
explain why neighboring countries and regions were also be included in the study. The third 





apprehensions from each Northern Triangle country were chosen as the dependent variable for 
the study. The fourth section, Time Frames for the Study, will explain reasons for specific time 
frame selections in the study. Lastly, the fifth section, Independent Variables, will provide an 
overview and explanation of how the 195 independent variables were used and interpreted in the 
study. In addition, due to their importance, this section will include a subsection explaining in 
more detail the four key dummy variables that represent the critical immigration policy changes 
and loopholes that this study identified specifically for this study.  
Why Focus on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras? 
Immigration out of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras was the focus of this study. 
There were two powerful reasons to focus on these three Northern Triangle Central American 
countries. First, these are the nations at the center of the controversy due to their surging 
apprehension numbers along the Southwest Border, as displayed in Figures 2, 3, and 4.7 Second, 
these three nations make up the lion’s share of the apprehensions along the Southwest Border. 
Between 1980 and 2010, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras accounted for approximately 
78.5% of OTM apprehensions. However, between 2011 and 2019, that share increased to 90.8%. 
In addition, while apprehensions from the Northern Triangle region used to account for just 
about 2% of total yearly apprehensions along the Southwest Border, that share has increased at 
an alarming pace since 2012, and in 2019 accounted for 71.4% of total apprehensions along the  











El Salvador – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure demonstrates all El Salvadoran apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border by 
USBP. Apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the 
Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions section. Note the Y axis for El Salvador 
is on a different scale from the Guatemala and Honduras figures due to lower overall 








































































































Note. This figure demonstrates all Guatemalan apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border by 
USBP. Apprehensions from 1986-1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the 



































































































Honduras – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019) 
 
Note. This figure demonstrates all Honduras apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border by 
USBP. Apprehensions from 1980–1991 are estimates. Estimates are explained in detail in the 






























































































Comparing the Northern Triangle to Its Neighbors  
To better analyze and compare both hypotheses, I also included the Northern Triangle’s 
neighbors, Mexico to the north and Nicaragua to the south. In addition, the larger overall region 
of Latin America and the Caribbean (herein after called Latin America) was included. There 
were two reasons behind the idea of including Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America. One was 
to see whether each hypothesis impacted these countries and region differently, and the second 
was to provide some perspective by comparing socioeconomic indicators between the Northern 
Triangle and its neighbors. 
Did the two competing hypotheses impact Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America 
differently? In theory, the variables in the stepwise regression models related to the Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis should have had similar impacts on Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America 
as the Northern Triangle. In other words, changes in poverty and violence in those areas should 
have impacted unauthorized immigration to the United States similarly as the Northern Triangle. 
On the other hand, the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis should not have impacted Mexico 
because the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, which will be explained 
in detail in the Independent Variables 188 to 191 – Immigration Policy and Law Changes 
subsection of this chapter, were not directed at Mexicans. These four key policy changes and 
loopholes should have only impacted OTMs. For this reason, Nicaragua should have been 
similarly impacted by the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables as the 





apprehensions coming out of Nicaragua were very few in number relative to the Northern 
Triangle.8  
It was unclear how the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis was supposed to impact Latin 
America. There was one main issue that in hindsight made Latin America a bad candidate for the 
stepwise regression analysis. That main issue was that Mexican apprehensions made up 98% of 
all Southwest Border apprehensions for a considerable part of the time frames in question, as 
seen in Figure 2. The large make up of Mexican apprehensions, especially from 1980 through the 
mid-2000s, disproportionality influenced the dependent variable of Latin American 
apprehensions. In other words, we might have been in fact applying the dependent variable of 
Mexican apprehensions more than the dependent variable of Latin American apprehensions for 
all the models. In fact, the correlation coefficient for Mexican and Latin American apprehensions 
from 1980 to 2019 was .970. Even when just considering the years 2000 to 2019, the correlation 
coefficient between Mexican and Latin American apprehensions was .944. This is important 
because between 2000 and 2019 Northern Triangle apprehensions began to make up a larger 
share of total Latin American apprehensions. Nevertheless, the correlation was largely 
influenced by Mexican apprehensions due to their overwhelming numbers from 2000 to around 
2012.  
Nevertheless, regardless of these limitations, these countries and region were included 
because they at the very least provide some perspective for the socioeconomic data. Appendix D 
includes a large number of time series graphs for many of the socioeconomic indicators used in 
 
 
8 Generally speaking, as a country is farther away from the U.S.-Mexico border fewer migrants will attempt to 
illegally migrate to the United States. Simply put, logistics and costs greatly change the farther away you are from 
the U.S.-Mexico border. The journey becomes longer, more costly, and more dangerous. In addition, Nicaraguan 






the models. These graphs provide visual aids to help us compare the performance of the three 
Northern Triangle countries relative to their neighbors. Simply put, we wanted to know: Did El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras perform better or worse than their neighbors over the 
selected time frames? Such insight might provide a better understanding and perspective of the 
situation in these nations that could better help explain reasons for the surge. 
Apprehensions – The Dependent Variable 
USBP apprehensions along the Southwest Border for El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras served as the dependent variables for this study. USBP apprehensions along the 
Southwest Border was the main measure used to analyze the flow of unauthorized immigration 
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.9 There were three primary reasons why 
apprehensions from each of these three countries were used as the dependent variable. First, 
apprehensions have historically been used to measure the flow of unauthorized migration along 
the Southwest Border (Hanson et al., 2001). Second, while not perfect, apprehension data have 
been recorded every year going back to 1925. This year-to-year recording serves as a good proxy 
for the flow of unauthorized immigration. Lastly, because the number of USBP apprehensions of 
unauthorized migrants along the Southwest Border from the Northern Triangle are at the center 
of the controversy, USBP apprehensions along the Southwest Border from each of these three 
countries must serve as the dependent variable.  
Time Frames for the Study  
This study focused on annual time series data between 1980 and 2019. The time series 
data and the difference-in-differences data varied by regression model, and multiple regression 
 
 
9 Apprehensions along the Southwest Border from Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America will also be the 
dependent variable for those countries and region in their respective models. Figures showing Mexican, Nicaraguan, 





analyses were conducted using several time frames. In addition, time-lags were included in the 
models to increase the robustness of the models and to ensure data were analyzed in a myriad of 
ways.  
Three base years were established for the regressions. Those base years are 1980, 1992, 
and 2000. Using those base years, time frames were adjusted depending on the technique being 
used to create different models, as seen in Table 1. The result was each base year having a total 
of four regression each. For example, as displayed in Table 1, the base year 1980 had models 
using the time frames 1980–2018, 1981–2018, 1981–2019 and 1982–2019. Each of those 
different time frames were the result of using different techniques such as a 1-year time lag or a 
difference-in-differences technique.  
I chose to limit the data from 1980 to 2019 for several reasons. First, apprehension data 
between those dates were the only apprehension data that could be gathered and properly 
estimated to ensure reliable figures that could be used in a regression analysis. Second, many 
important macrolevel socioeconomic indicators this study used, only started to be recorded in the 
late 70s and early 80s. Although large organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and UN had 
started to gather large macrolevel socioeconomic data on nations around the world in the 1960s, 
it was in the 1970s and 1980s when these organizations enlarged their data gathering process 
efforts as part of their expanded mission of poverty eradication and social development (World 
Bank, n.d.-b). Due to those efforts, from 1980 onwards we finally start to get more complete data 
sets and a greater variety of socioeconomic indicators. However, that is not to say all data sets 
start in 1980, many data sets start later, and models adjusted to include or exclude data sets and 





Independent Variables  
All the 195 independent variables are found in Tables 17–28 in Appendix A. Of the 195 
independent variables, 181 of them are country or region specific. In other words, every country 
and region in the study had the same 181 independent variables, but each county and region had 
independent data for each variable that corresponded to each country/region. For example, GDP 
was one of 181 country-specific independent variables. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, and Latin America each had GDP data that corresponded to each of them, 
and that data were used in each regression that corresponded to each specific country/region. The 
remaining 14 independent variables were shared by all the countries/region. These included four 
dummy variables that represent the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, 
six variables that dealt with worldwide coffee pricing, and four variables that constituted U.S.-
related economic pull factors. The section, Independent Variables 188–191 – Immigration Policy 
and Law Changes, will expand the explanation of the four Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 
related variables. 
All the independent variables were either associated with the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis or the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.10 This is important to know because each 
hypothesis had independent variables that were specific to it and, for the purposes of this study, 
did not overlap into the competing hypothesis. For example, Real GDP Growth (Annual % 
Change), was an independent variable that was only associated with the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis and had no association to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.  
 
 
10 Nationwide USBP Apprehensions, Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions, and 
Inadmissible Aliens at Southwest Offices while found in the tables were ultimately not used in the models due to 
limited data. They were intended to be used as possible independent variables and were even considered as 






Another important concept to understand is that an independent variable being significant 
in the model did not necessarily imply it supported the hypothesis it is associated with. The 
direction of that support was determined by the interpretation of the independent variable and 
whether the independent variable lead to more or fewer apprehensions (dependent variable). In 
other words, the estimated coefficient for each significant variable had to be interpreted 
individually. Only after that estimated coefficient was interpreted could one determine if the 
independent variable supported or contradicted the hypothesis.  
To better illustrate this relationship between the dependent and independent variable, 
consider the independent variable Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change). The Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis suggests as economic conditions improve in a Northern Triangle country, 
fewer people are forced to migrate due to economic hardships. In other words, as real GDP 
growth for a Northern Triangle country increases (improves), there should be fewer 
apprehensions (dependent variable) from that respective Northern Triangle country. However, if 
the estimated coefficient shows that as the real GDP growth increased so did the number of 
apprehensions (dependent variable), then this contradicts the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.  
Other independent variables must be interpreted differently. For instance, Inflation (% 
Change in Average CPI) is interpreted differently than Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change) 
because while a higher real GDP growth is good, a higher inflation rate is generally bad for these 
countries. So, if inflation in a Northern Triangle country increased but produced fewer 
apprehensions that contradicts the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. According to the Poverty 
and Violence Hypothesis, we would expect higher inflation in the sending country to lead to 





Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were interpreted slightly different. 
According to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, the implementation of TVPRA should have 
been followed by more unauthorized immigration (apprehensions) from Northern Triangle 
countries and Nicaragua but should not have affected Mexican apprehensions. So, if TVPRA is 
found to be significant in a model, but it suggests it caused a decline in apprehensions from one 
of the three Northern Triangle countries or Nicaragua, that contradicts the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis. Simply put, each estimated coefficient and independent variable had to be 
interpreted individually in each regression to see whether the independent variable supported or 
contradicted the hypothesis it was associated with. 
Ultimately, all the variables were categorized and divided into the 12 different tables and 
those tables were titled based on their categorization. Detailed information regarding the 
variables selected and the universe of data for this study are found in the first section of Results 
chapter. 
Independent Variables 188–191 – Immigration Policy and Law Changes 
Due to the complexity and importance of these four key variables in the study, it is 
important to explain these variables in more detail. These four independent variables were all 
dummy variables created for this study. Although other Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables were included in the study, they are considered indirect variables for a few reasons. 
First, determining whether the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were 
the cause or the effect of more apprehensions is hard to determine. Certain of these indirect 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables, such as Average Number of Days an Immigration 
Case is Open, might just simply be the result of more apprehensions at the border. Second, some 





such as detention space issues and asylum claims. Third, these indirect variables could be more 
of a side effect that stems out of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables. For example, the independent variables Immigration Court Cases in Backlog (see 
Table 26) or Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal; see Table 17) might just be the 
result of more migrants arriving at the borders because they were incentivized to migrate as a 
result of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Lastly, while 
immigration officials have pointed out some of these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 
related variables, such as the increasing percentage of immigration cases resulting in relief and 
an overwhelming number of immigration court case backlogs, they generally put the blame on 
three of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Ultimately, 
disentangling a lot the previously mentioned issues was done in the following sections of this 
chapter and final chapter of the study.  
Of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables, three of them have to 
do with U.S. immigration policy changes. The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), the executive action Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in 2012, and the judicial expansion of TVPRA and the Flores 
Agreement in 2015.  
According to immigration officials, the 2008 TVPRA fundamentally changed the way 
unaccompanied minors from noncontiguous countries (meaning all countries except Mexico and 
Canada) were processed, detained, and handled by the DHS. Previously, unaccompanied minors 
could be removed using more expedited procedures and went through the immigration system 
similar to adults. TVPRA changed all that by requiring an immigration hearing for all 





Flores Agreement,11 which had been in part codified into federal law under TVPRA, the 
detention rules and procedures for juveniles dramatically changed. Not only had the Flores 
Agreement expanded in scope overtime, but its court supervised enforcement also increased. 
Coupled with TVPRA, a lack of adequate bed space and facilities to house juveniles and families 
forced the release of all unaccompanied minors to relatives and guardians in the United States 
while they awaited their immigration hearings, which were usually a year or more down the 
road. The new TVPRA legislation was accompanied a few years later by a surge of 
unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle that many immigration officials partly 
blamed on DACA, worsening the bottleneck of an already strained immigration system. 
According to immigration officials, the 2012 DACA did not create loopholes or change 
immigration law for incoming juveniles. What it did was create and spread incorrect perceptions 
of the policy. According to these officials, these incorrect perceptions caused tens of thousands 
of juveniles to believe they were being allowed to stay in the United States as long as they got to 
the border and turned themselves in to immigration authorities. Since TVPRA was in effect, it 
certainly did appear to people from the Northern Triangle that DACA was allowing juveniles 
into the country. The media coverage of DACA and the release of unaccompanied juveniles as a 
result of TVPRA, ultimately led to a snowball effect of misinformation that spread through the 
migrant social networks and smuggling networks prompting more juveniles and people to 
migrate to the United States. 
 
 
11 The Flores Settlement Agreement is a 1997 court supervised settlement stemming from a lawsuit against INS by 
immigrant advocate groups on behalf of an immigrant minor that began in 1985. Although the Flores Agreement 






Lastly, in 2015, TVPRA and the Flores Agreement were expanded by District Judge 
Dolly M. Gee. Judge Gee ruled that the Flores Agreement not only applied to unaccompanied 
children, but also to accompanied children. To the immigration enforcement agencies, like CBP 
and ICE, this was the straw that broke the camel’s back. According to immigration officials, this 
expansion opened the door to adult migrants who could now use their children, or other peoples’ 
children, to gain entry and release in the country. 
The last independent variable is one that has not been mentioned by immigration 
officials, the media, or scholars – the new Mexican Migration Law of 2011.12 After years 
of complaints over human rights abuses at the hands of Mexican officials, cartels, and locals, 
including the mass media coverage of 72 dead Central and South American migrants in 2010, 
activist organizations, Central American governments, the UN, and the US, pressured Mexico to 
update and change their immigration laws. The result was the unanimously approved new Ley de 
Migración (Alba & Castillo 2012). 
Essentially, the new Mexican immigration law gave all OTM migrants equal treatment 
under the law, a right to due process and justice, access to health services, and maybe, most 
importantly, it “decriminalized irregular immigration and discourage[d] and penalize[d] abuses 
committed by authorities against migrants” (Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2012). Prior to this law, 
not only was it illegal for OTM migrants to be in transit through Mexico, but OTM migrants who 
engaged in this practice were denied simple human rights protections. The new law also limited 
local authorities’ jurisdiction on control and verification of immigrants’ status, and it tackled the 
arbitrariness and corruption of such officials (Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2012). For example, 
 
 
12 Despite an extensive literature review and working in the immigration field for over 14 years, I have not seen, 





the practice of local municipal police setting up and conducting immigration checks points, 
which were used as fronts to extort OTM migrants, were forbidden under the new immigration 
law (Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2012).  
 The new immigration law also called for the dissemination of these policy changes to 
inform the public and migrants. The new immigration law changes were broadcast over the 
radio, internet, and television. However, the most interesting thing about the law was that 
Mexico actually tried to enforce it.13 Specialized units and departments were created and 
expanded (such as Grupos Beta) with the purpose of protecting the well-being and rights of all 
migrants. These groups not only had the mission of providing migrants with emergency medical 
help, social aid, communication assistance, protection from local gangs and bandits, and help 
with orientation, but they were also required to patrol risky areas, monitor local authorities for 
abuses and violations, and help locate missing persons (Secretaria de Gobernación, n.d.).  
What the new Mexican Migration Law intended to do was make it safer, easier, and ultimately 
cheaper for OTM migrants to traverse Mexico on their way to the United States. Although it 
could be argued the new law and its implementation still lacked adequate protections and did not 
go far enough to ensure safety, it was by all measures a step in the right direction. Furthermore, it 
is hard to argue that it was safer to traverse Mexico before the new law because the previous 
immigration law legally forbade most basic human migrant protections and it actually allowed 
most arbitrary and corrupt practices by local officials. Prior to this law, many OTM migrants’ 
greatest fear was not USBP apprehension, but extortion by Mexican authorities and criminal 
gangs. The new law may have led to a new sense of security for OTMs, which may have 
 
 
13 Mexico was being closely monitored by human rights organizations, watch groups, the UN, and other nations’ 





prompted more Central American migration through Mexico and into the United States, opening 
the door to new smuggling routes and smuggling networks. Ultimately, the Mexican Migration 
Law may have inadvertently triggered the Central American migration surge, making this 
variable a critical component of the issue that must be considered when analyzing Central 
American migration. 
TVPRA was signed in late December 2008, but it took effect in 2009, so it was 
recognized as beginning in 2009 in the models. DACA was signed on June 15, 2012. Because 
the fiscal year ends on September 30, DACA appeared in 2013 in the models to allow for a slight 
lag in implementation and the word spreading among the migrant social networks. The 
expansion of TVPRA and the Flores Agreement was signed on July 24, 2015. Once again, due to 
the fiscal year ending on September 30, the TVPRA Expansion started in 2016 of the models to 
allow for a slight lag in implementation. Lastly, the Mexican Migration Law was signed May of 
2011, but it went into effect closer to 2012, so in the models it takes effect in 2012. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Narrowing down which socioeconomic variables to use in a regression analysis will 
always draw criticism, regardless of the study. There is no consensus regarding which or how 
many independent variables one should use when studying socioeconomic conditions in a region 
or country. Because this study intended to look at the large macrolevel socioeconomic changes 
that many experts blame for forcing people to flee Central America (push factors), I decided to 
include some of the most used macrolevel socioeconomic indicators used by scholars, 
international organizations, and governments. In addition, I included some of the most used pull 





To answer the first research question which asked, what is the universe of data with 
regard to poverty and violence, I attempted to find as much socioeconomic data as possible for 
the countries in this study. The data were gathered from large reputable international 
organizations and U.S. agencies whose data are commonly used and widely cited. The most 
comprehensive data bases were the data bases for the World Bank, IMF, and UN. These data 
bases contain thousands of datasets that go back decades for a number of macrolevel 
socioeconomic indicators. I referred to the World Bank for the large majority of the data due to 
their level of completeness, accessibility, and clarity. For some data I referred to the IMF and 
other data to the UN. Other data on U.S. immigration enforcement were gathered from DHS and 
old INS reports, while other data on immigration courts were gathered from Syracuse 
University’s Transactional Records Access Clearing House. Lastly, I used the USDA to get 
coffee production and coffee supply data, the Intercontinental Exchange for coffee prices, and 
the data for the Global Hunger Index came from globalhungerindex.org.14  
As mentioned in the Independent Variables subsection, 195 independent variables were 
gathered and are found in Tables 17–28 of Appendix A. In the tables, the source of the data is 
also found next to the corresponding variable. Furthermore, an explanation of whether the table 
and variables are a pull or push migratory factors are explained in the notes section of below the 
tables. Lastly, the Results chapter will provide an overview and provide details regarding the 
variables that made up the universe of data. 
 
 
14 The Global Hunger Index is currently published by Concern Worldwide, a humanitarian agency, and Deutsche 





Data Analysis Procedures 
To ensure the inferential robustness of all findings, I attempted assortment of regression 
models that tested the two competing hypotheses popular in the relevant literature. These models 
included traditional multiple regression models, hierarchical multiple regression models, and 
differences-in-differences regression models. Ultimately, I settled on running the stepwise 
regression method for all countries in the study, along with varied models that included time 
lags, different time frames, and the difference-in-differences technique.  
Stepwise regressions were used because it is a statistical technique that is commonly used 
when there is a large pool of explanatory variables like in this study. The technique considers all 
the independent variables entered in the model while simultaneously removing the independent 
variables that are not statistically significant. The stepwise regression method allowed for the 
most uniformed analysis of all countries and variables in the study by allowing very similar 
models and variables to be used for all the countries.  
Table 1 displays the stepwise regression models performed for each country and region. 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Latin America each had 12 stepwise regressions 
performed with all available independent variables in the time frames stated. The lone exception 
was Nicaragua which only had eight stepwise regression models due to insufficient data for the 
first four stepwise regressions. The heading Stepwise Regression Number simply states which 
stepwise regression number the model is. On that same row, under the heading Time Frame and 
Method, is the time frame and method used for that specific stepwise regression. Although the 
Time Frame and Method is descriptive of the model, the last three columns under the headings 1-
Year Time Lag, Difference-in-Differences, and Number of Years attempt to better explain each 





regression model used a 1-year time lag or not. The Difference-in-Differences heading specifies 
if the stepwise regression model used a difference-in-differences technique or not. Lastly, the 
Number of Years heading, simply lets us know the number of years in the time frame of the 
model.  
To better explain, look at Stepwise Regression 4 in Table 1. This stepwise regression 
used the dependent and independent variables between the years 1982 and 2019, it used a 1-year 
time lag, it also employed the difference-in-differences technique, and lastly, it consisted of a 38-
year time frame (which corresponds to the time frame 1982-2019). Each country and region in 
the study, used these same models, time frames, and techniques unless specified. 
For all these models, the testing hypotheses was set at the p < = .05 level and relied on 
both t- and F-statistics to conduct the various tests of significance. To measure the extent of 
variation and variance explained by the models, R-squared and adjusted R-squared statistics 
were used. In addition, simple bivariate analyses were be conducted for a few interesting 
findings to provide some added detail and descriptive figures. All regressions and analyses were 
be done on SPSS software. Lastly, number of descriptive statistics such as tables and graphs 
were included in Appendices B, C, and D to show general trends, a summary of data, added 
perspective, and to provide a better understanding of independent variables and their association 






















1 1980-2018 No Time Lag No No 39 
2 1981-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
No Yes 38 
3 1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag  Yes No 39 
4 1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
Yes Yes 38 
5 1992-2018 No Time Lag No No 27 
6 1993-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
No Yes 26 
7 1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag Yes No 27 
8 1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
Yes Yes 26 
9 2000-2018 No Time Lag No No 19 
10 2001-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
No Yes 18 
11 2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag Yes No 19 
12 2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
Yes Yes 18 
 
Note. Since El Salvador began recording the homicides in 1994, which was later than the other countries 
in the study, El Salvador’s time frames had to be changed slightly to include homicide rate in as many 
stepwise regressions as possible. As a result, four of El Salvador’s stepwise regressions are 2 years shorter 
than the other countries. Stepwise Regression 5 is from 1994-2018 (25 years), Stepwise Regression 6 is 
from 1995-2018 (24 years), Stepwise Regression 7 is from 1995-2019 (25 years), and Stepwise 
Regression 8 is from 1996-2019 (24 years). Lastly, Nicaragua does not have Stepwise Regressions 1, 2, 3, 






Limitations and Significance of the Study 
 This study explored the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis from a macrolevel. In other 
words, it was not geared to explain regional socioeconomic shocks in originating countries that 
could impact unauthorized immigration. The same goes for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. 
It could be possible that regional policy changes in specific USBP sectors could potentially 
influence unauthorized migration through specific sectors. However, this study was not looking 
at those small regional-level effects. Because the flow of unauthorized immigration from Central 
America appears to be a macrolevel issue due to the large never-before-seen flows of 
unauthorized immigration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, it was fitting for this 
study to focused exclusively on macrolevel factors. Despite the decision to focus exclusively on 
macrolevel, it is important to note that potential important micro level changes could arguably 
limit the study’s overall robustness. 
Limitations of the Dependent Variable – Apprehensions  
It is important to note that using apprehensions as a measure for unauthorized 
immigration does have some limitations in this study. The most important limitation is that the 
data are not complete. There are a number of gaps in the apprehension statistics along the 
Southwest Border. From 1980 to 1985, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
accurately recorded apprehensions at the national level and along the Southwest Border for 
migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize/British West Indies, the Dominican Republic, and 
Canada. However, apprehensions from other North American countries were not recorded 
separately and all other North American apprehensions were thrown into a “other North 





and Central American nations. Therefore, exact Honduras apprehension data cannot be gathered 
from 1980 to 1985.  
That being said, numbers can be cross referenced with other INS statistics to arrive at 
reasonably accurate Honduran apprehension estimates. Although the estimates are not exact, 
estimates for Honduras should not vary much from the true numbers, and due to their small totals 
and small variances, these estimates should not create significant statistical changes in any times 
series or regression analysis.  
Another problem with the apprehension data set is the years between 1986 and 1991. For 
whatever reason, these 6 years resulted in a lapse of INS apprehensions data gathering where not 
even Southwest Border apprehensions were tracked, much less apprehensions broken down by 
specific country. National level apprehension data were recorded for OTMs and Mexican 
apprehensions, but not for the Southwest Border. However, using percent averages from 1980 to 
1985 and from 1992 to 1997, coupled with national-level data and other INS data, we can arrive 
at some reasonably accurate estimates for migrants apprehended along the Southwest Border 
from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Latin America.15 The same could not be 
said for Nicaragua. Because accurate numbers could not be gathered or estimated for Nicaragua 
from 1980 to 1992, it was decided to not include Nicaraguan models for the base year of 1980, 
resulting in Nicaragua only having eight stepwise regressions in contrast to all the other 
countries’ (and region) 12 stepwise regressions. 
Although some of the apprehension figures along the Southwest Border from 1980 to 
1991 are estimates, we do know the upper and lower limits of the apprehension data due to INS 
 
 






statistics. Due to the knowledge of that range between the upper and lower limits, the estimates 
did not create large variances in the data, so it was reasonable to use those estimates in some 
regression or time series analyses.  
Time Frame Limitations  
As mentioned in the Time Frame of the Study subsection, due to insufficient time series 
data and variables that do not stretch back to 1980, no regression included all the independent 
variables found in Tables 17–28. For example, models beginning in 1980, generally had fewer 
independent variables than models that started in 2000 because many variables simply were not 
recorded in the 1980s. In other words, models with longer time frames had fewer independent 
variables and that produced vastly different results than models with shorter time frames and 
more variables. In addition, time frame selection mattered in the models even if the variable is 
available for all the time frames. For example, measuring the effects of GDP growth on 
apprehensions from 1980–2018 produced vastly different results than measuring the effects of 
GDP growth on apprehensions from 2000–2018. It is important note such data limitations and 
time frame changes produced different results. However, because this study intended to make 
inferential robustness a focus, these limitations had to be risked.  
Missing Data Points 
 Many data sets were not used due to too many gaps in the time series. These variables 
were omitted for the stepwise regression models. On the other hand, many data sets with missing 
data points were still used in the models because estimation techniques were employed to fill in 
those missing gaps. Missing data points were filled using the SPSS estimation method linear 





Nevertheless, despite some data sets not being complete enough to be used in the 
regression models, these data sets were not completely omitted from the study. They were 
plotted in various graphs found in Appendices C and D. These figures provide the reader a 
much-needed perspective and frame of reference regarding the general trend and direction of 
many of these socioeconomic and immigration related variables.  
Nonoperational and Omitted Independent Variables  
 While this study attempted to gather the most comprehensive and relevant collection 
macrolevel variables seen in any study of its kind, it is likely some variables were missed. 
Although most critical macrolevel socioeconomic variables were taken into account, a few 
variables that fell within the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis were left out. The most important 
variable that was not included in the regression analyses was the credible fear and asylum 
variable.16  
According to those that work in the immigration enforcement realm, the credible fear and 
asylum loophole is key variable that has contributed to the increase in the flow of unauthorized 
immigration from Central America. However, attempting to create an adequate dummy variable 
or dummy variables proved impossible. Due to a large number of complex changes in asylum 
laws and polices overtime, proper dummy variables could not be created that would work in 
stepwise regression models that used yearly data.  
The complexity of changes in asylum laws and polices came in the form of legal and 
administrative changes created by Congress, the Supreme Court, district federal judges, the U.S. 
court of appeals, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Office of the White House, Department 
 
 
16 It is important to note that depending on how one defined and wanted to measure credible fear and asylum, it 





of Justice (DOJ), Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), DHS, INS, USBP, CBP, 
USCIS and ICE. Those laws and policies changed too frequently to properly track, and often 
contradicted and overlapped each other. In addition, the polices and guidance varied by area due 
to different field offices, sectors, and circuit courts, and were generally implemented unevenly 
and at different times across Southwest Border.  
In addition to the complexities previously mentioned above, the credible fear and asylum 
variable would have required to somehow take into account a well-documented and troubling 
issue regarding large variances in asylum grant and denial rates between immigration judges and 
immigration courts (Chen, 2010; Executive Office of Immigration Review, 2009; GAO, 2008; 
GAO, 2016; Legomsky, 2007; Ramji-Nogales et al., 2006; Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse Immigration, 2006; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 
2007; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2009a; Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2009b; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
Immigration, 2010, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2016, 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration, 2010). Despite this issue being well 
documented and acknowledged by government officials and legal scholars, it could not be 
operationalized for the purposes of this study.17  
Other important independent variables that were left out were detention space related 
variables. Due to similar legal and administrative issues seen with asylum and credible fear, 
 
 
17 To provide an example of the large variances in asylum grant rates consider the Los Angeles immigration court. 
Judge Hye Y. Chon denied asylum to 4.5% of the 378 cases she heard between 2014-2019. On the other hand, Judge 
Gita Vahid-Tehrani denied asylum to 65.9% of her 317 cases between the same time period. Such ranges in asylum 
grant/denial rates are common between immigration judges in the same courts. Between different courts similar 
variances are found. Between 2012 and 2017, the San Francisco immigration court denied 32.6% of asylum cases, 





arriving at yearly operational dummy variables could not be done in this study. There were 
simply too many changes, too close to each other, at too many agencies, at too many district 
courts, and in too many regions that resulted in too many polices that contradicted each other or 
that were quickly superseded or ignored. The contradicting policies and confusion lead to uneven 
and incomplete implementation of detention policies that created large tensions and operational 
issues between the numerous immigration agencies. Due to those issues, operationalizing yearly 
variables for detention space policy could not be done for this study.18 
Significance of the Study 
Currently empirical evidence is lacking for both hypotheses. This study intended to 
scrutinize both hypotheses. Therefore, there was a need for a large quantitative study such as this 
that analyzed the socioeconomic and immigration policy data available over various extended 
time frames to arrive at more inferentially robust conclusions regarding the cause of the surge of 
unauthorized immigration from Central America. This study intended to help policymakers and 
leaders make better decisions regarding the current Central American Migration Crisis, while at 











18 To illustrate this topic a little further consider the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) statutory detention 
framework. Despite clear laws regarding who should be detained, the INA detention statutes also grant DHS a large 
amount of discretion in basically every circumstance. This results in the opening of countless subjective 
discretionary decisions and policies at every level of government. Ultimately, discretion related decisions are based 
on a number of operational, executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative factors that are often times subjective 
in nature. In addition, there are usually no public laws or public policies that create some of these discretionary 
changes because most of the discretionary decisions are done internally behind closed doors resulting in very little 





CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
What Is the Universe of Data? 
The first research question asked: What is the universe of poverty and violence data for 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras? This question was partially covered in the Methodology 
chapter. To reiterate, to answer the first research question, I attempted to find as much 
socioeconomic data as possible for the countries in this study. Data were gathered from large 
reputable international organizations and U.S. agencies whose data are commonly used and 
widely cited.  
Admittingly, the universe of data on poverty was quite extensive. Depending on how 
narrow one wanted to get regarding socioeconomic indicators, and how much one expanded 
what constituted a poverty related variable, it was easy to come up with poverty related variables 
that numbered in the thousands. However, drawing on a lot of those variables would not have 
been appropriate for this level of analysis as previously stated. This study intended to look at 
large-level effects at a country level, not at small regional effects in small sectors and industries. 
For example, cereal yield per hectare could have been included as a socioeconomic indicator 
related to poverty if one assumes a change in the yield of cereal could result in more poverty and 
hunger. However, if one focused on such a small sector, one could get caught up in very narrow 
indicators that could incorrectly impact any macrolevel analysis. Delving this much into 
narrower and narrower variables would result in hundreds, if not thousands, of marginal 
variables changing the level of analysis of a study. Moreover, variables like cereal yield per 
hectare are included in larger aggregate indicators, such as the food production index or 






Conversely, violence related variables were extremely limited. Ultimately, homicide rate 
was the most reliable metric of violence. There were data on assaults, rapes, and robberies, but 
that data were very inconsistent and unreliable. The underreporting of crime is well known in the 
region, and data tracking for many crimes was simply too unreliable to include in the study. Take 
violent assault as an example. According to the UNODC, the serious assault rate in the United 
States is 4 times worse than El Salvador, 11 time worse than Honduras, and 22 times worse than 
Guatemala. Those data suggest something that is completely inaccurate, especially if one 
believes that the Northern Triangle is a hotbed of gangs and violence and that is why people are 
fleeing the region. Other crimes like robbery, rape, and theft showed similar differences between 
the United States and the Northern Triangle. Worldwide Governance Indicators tracked by the 
World Bank such as Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism and Rule of Law 
metrics could be used as proxies for violence, but they do not quite measure violence per se. 
Regardless, these Worldwide Governance Indicators were included in the models and analysis 
because they are the best measures out there for political stability, rule of law, corruption, and 
governmental effectiveness. Despite these proxy Worldwide Governances Indicators, when all 
things are considered, the universe of data related to violence was basically limited to homicide 
rate and the subsection Independent Variable 55 – Homicide Rate will elaborate on this variable. 
All selected variables were categorized and divided into 12 different tables found in 
Appendix A. The tables were titled based on their categorization. In addition, the notes below the 
tables indicate whether they were independent variables associated with the Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis or the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In all there were 12 categories 
which corresponded with the 12 tables. To add some clarity to the tables, a brief explanation of 





Table 17 is made up of seven USBP, CBP and ICE related variables and it includes the 
dependent variable of Southwest Border USBP apprehensions. This table demonstrates variables 
associated with immigration enforcement efforts over time by the primary immigration 
enforcement agencies of the DHS.19 Independent Variables 4, 5, and 6 are all associated with the 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis because they partly deal with the removal polices of 
unauthorized migrants living in the United States. However, it is important to note that while 
these were associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, they are considered indirect 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables for the purpose of this study. As has been explained 
some and will be elaborated on in this chapter, this study’s focus were the four key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in Table 27. 
Table 18 consists of 48 variables related to gross domestic product, gross national 
income, and inflation over time. These measures are large macrolevel economic variables that 
measure the overall value, production, and output of goods and services of a country. These 
independent variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. 
Table 19 includes 33 indicators that have to do with life and well-being over time. Some 
of these variables include indicators such as life expectancy, malnutrition, infant mortality rate, 
immunization, and homicides. These independent variables were all associated with the Poverty 
and Violence Hypothesis. The homicide variable required special attention so it will be further 
explained in the subsection titled Independent Variable 55 – Homicide Rate. 
Table 20 includes 13 variables associated with the internal infrastructure of each country 
and region. Indicators looking at access to electricity, sanitation, access to water, and cell phone 
 
 
19 Ultimately, despite being in the table, Nationwide Apprehensions, Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied 
Children Apprehensions, and Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) were not used in the models 





subscriptions are all included in this category. In a sense, this table’s variables look to see how 
these countries have been doing from an infrastructure standpoint over time. These independent 
variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. 
Table 21 focuses on education. Some of the 13 indicators include the education index, 
literacy rates, pupil teacher ratios, and school enrollment. This table’s variables look to see the 
education status of each country overtime and were all associated with the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis. 
Table 22 includes only three variables. These variables have to do with legal migration to 
the United States. These variables look to see if there have been limits or expansions on legal 
migration from the originating countries to the United States. In addition, the number of people 
from each country that naturalize is also in this table. The reason to include naturalization is 
because naturalized immigrants open legal migration pathways for families and relatives. These 
independent variables were all associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis but are 
considered indirect variables for the purposes of this study. 
Table 23 is made up of 39 variables that consist of industry, agriculture, and business-
related indicators. These variables consist of a wide range of industries and businesses including, 
banking, access to credit, tourism, manufacturing, food production, and even the ease of doing 
business. The shared variables dealing with worldwide coffee pricing are also included in this 
table. These variables look to see how these nations are doing from an industrial and business 
standpoint in range of sectors over time. These independent variables were all associated with 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. 
Table 24 focuses on poverty and inequality. Some of the 14 variables consist of the Gini 





look to assess the state of poverty and inequality in each country over time and were all 
associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. 
Table 25 looks at 12 different government related variables. These variables simply look 
to see the state of each countries’ respective governments over time in important factors such as 
stability, corruption, rule of law, and overall government effectiveness. These independent 
variables were all associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. 
Table 26 includes six variables associated with the U.S. immigration court system. It 
includes immigration court case backlogs, percentage of cases granted relief (allowed to stay in 
the United States) and number of days an immigration case takes to complete. These variables 
look to see if whether immigration court issues such as backlogs are creating some of the 
immigration system loopholes many immigration experts often mention. These independent 
variables were all associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis but are considered 
indirect variables for the purposes of this study. 
Table 27 consists of four dummy variables created for this study. These dummy variables 
looked at key policy changes that many immigration officials blame for creating to the surge of 
unauthorized immigration from Central American. Due to the complexity of these variables, the 
subsection, Independent Variables 188–191 – Immigration Policy and Law Changes, in the 
Methodology chapter, provided a detailed explanation and use of these variables. 
Lastly, Table 28 adds four more Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables. 
These variables are pull factor variables associated with the U.S. economy. These independent 
variables are not country specific and apply equally to all countries in the study. Some key 





Independent Variable 55 – Homicide Rate 
According to most scholars, homicides20 have historically served as the best proxy for 
violence and crime in a country. Writing in his provocative analysis about the history of violence 
in The Better Angels of Our Nature, Pinker (2011) stated:  
Homicide is the crime of choice for measures of violence because regardless of how the 
people of a distant culture conceptualize crime, a dead body is hard to define away, and it 
always arouses curiosity about who or what produced it. Records of homicide are 
therefore a more reliable index of violence than records of robbery, rape, or assault, and 
they usually (though not always) correlate with them. (p. 62) 
Simply put, while homicide rate data from Central America have their limitations, they are the 
best data available to analyze trends in violence. In addition, other studies looking at Northern 
Triangle migration and violent crime have used homicides as the proxy for violent crime 
(Clemens, 2017).  
 It is important to note that El Salvador and Guatemala experienced prolonged civil wars 
that limited the accurate data gathering of homicide statistics until their civil wars began to wind 
down and then, end. In Guatemala, for example, accurate data, according to the UN’s Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), stretches back to 1992. For El Salvador, the most recent data 
stretch back to only 1994. For Honduras, UNODC’s data only start in 1999. However, there are 
reliable homicide data gathered by Honduran scholars going back to 1990 that are often used in 









All things considered, it is technically possible to take the number of people that were 
killed in the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran civil wars and average them out over the 1980s and 
early 1990s to draw a more seemingly complete homicide picture for those countries.21 However, 
because death by violence during the civil wars varied from year to year and are themselves 
estimates, coupled with the fact that apprehension data for some of those years in the 1980s are 
estimates and not official numbers,22 careful consideration must be given to any regression 
analysis that combines homicide and apprehension data prior to 1992.  
Which of the Two Hypothesis Are Supported by the Models? 
The goal of this study was to determine to what extent were each of the two competing 
hypotheses supported by the universe of available data. Producing a series of inferentially robust 
models would either support both hypotheses, neither hypotheses, or one of the hypotheses. The 
universe of data allowed each country and region in the study to have 12 different stepwise 
regressions, except for Nicaragua which only had eight. In total, 68 different stepwise 
regressions were produced. In this section, each stepwise regression was explored and 
summarized along with some key findings from each of the stepwise regression models. Because 
the stepwise regressions produced findings that answered the remaining two research questions 
simultaneously, this section combined the last two research questions into one section. Once 
again, the last two research questions asked: 
2. To what extent, if any, is the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis supported by the 
available data in an inferentially robust way? 
 
 
21 Refer to Appendix D Figures 46 and 47 to see how that data would look on a graph. 
22 The limitation of apprehensions numbers for certain years is explained in the “The Limitations of the Dependent 





3. To what extent, if any, does the immigration Policy and Loophole Hypothesis explain 
the recent surge in Central American migration? 
This section will be broken down into subsections divided country. Each of the 
subsections will provide two different tables aimed at trying to simplify and summarize the 
findings into an easy to consume analysis.23 Although a lot of detail and nuance will be missing 
from this chapter, the Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusion chapter will provide some 
necessary detail and nuance to better explain the study’s findings, short comings, and future 
research implications. 
El Salvador – The Models 
 El Salvador was the first country explored. To better explain how tables like Table 2 
work in the study, we will use the first stepwise regression (Stepwise Regression 1) found in 
Table 2 to explain. The heading Stepwise Regression Number is the number of each stepwise 
regression. Under the heading Time Frame and Method is the label 1980-2018 No Time Lag. 
This label corresponds to the time frame used in the model (1980 to 2018) and it informs us that 
there was no time lag applied to the model. In addition, because this stepwise regression does not 
include the label Difference-in-Differences that tells us the difference-in-differences technique 
was not used in the regression. The Number of Candidate Variables used in the model was 92 
and the Number of Years, which corresponds to the time frame of 1980 to 2018, was 39 years. 
Lastly, and maybe most important, the Number of Significant Variables, was three. In other 
words, out of 92 independent variables that went into the model, only three variables were 
statistically significant.  
 
 
23 Each stepwise regression model will have accompanying tables in Appendix B. These tables will provide all the 





Table 2  




Time Frame and Method Number of 
Candidate Variables 
Number 
of Years  
Number of 
Significant Variables  
1 1980-2018 No Time Lag 92 39 3 
2 1981-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
74 38 4 
3 1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag  92 39 2 
4 1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
74 38 2 
5 1994-2018 No Time Lag 140 25 4 
6 1995-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
104 24 1 
7 1995-2019 1-Year Time Lag 140 25 3 
8 1996-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
104 24 0 
9 2000-2018 No Time Lag 175 19 4 
10 2001-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
139 18 5 
11 2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag 175 19 3 
12 2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
139 18 7 
  
Total Number of Significant 
Variables 
    38 
 
 
 As shown in Table 2, there is a trend in which the Number of Candidate Variables 
increase as the time frames decrease. As we will see, this was the general trend for all the 
countries in the study. This trend occurs because the number of available indicators increased in 
more recent years, expanding the number of potential candidate variables. As more candidate 
variables became available and were entered into the models, so did generally the Number of 
Significant Variables. However, the Number of Significant Variables alone does not suggest 
support of any hypothesis. What exactly these significant variables mean in the models must be 





To provide a summary of all 12 stepwise regressions for any given country, tables like 
Table 3 were created for each country and region. Although there is a lot of nuance missing from 
the tables, their intention was to provide a general overview of the findings regarding each 
stepwise regression model’s support for each hypothesis. Accompanying tables in Appendix B 
will provide more detail for each model, and the commentary in this chapter and the next chapter 
will provide some much-needed nuance for the models and findings. 
Table 3 summarizes all 12 stepwise regressions models ran for El Salvador. The first 
three columns of Table 3 contain the same data as the columns found in Table 2. The last four 
columns attempt to summarize the stepwise regression models and their support for each 
hypothesis. The heading labeled Number of Variables Showing Support has two subheadings. 
These subheadings labeled Poverty & Violence and Policy & Loophole, take the significant 
variables, and associate them with either the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis or the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis. In addition, these same subheadings specify how many of the significant 
variables support each of the hypotheses. Under the heading, Level of Support, two more 
subheadings also labeled Poverty and Violence and Policy and Loophole break down whether 








El Salvador – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary  
 
  Number of Variables 
Showing Support 
Level of Support  
Stepwise 
Regression  
# of Candidate 
Variables 










1 92 3 1 of 2 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
2 74 4 1 of 2 2 of 2 Contradictory Support 
3 92 2 1 of 1 1 of 1 Support Support 
4 74 2 1 of 2 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
5 140 4 2 of 3  1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
6 104 1 1 of 1 0 of 0 Support None 
7 140 3 0 of 2 1 of 1a Contradictory Supporta 
8 104 0 0 of 0 0 of 0 None None 
9 175 4 1 of 3 1 of 1b Contradictory Supportb 
10 139 5 2 of 3  0 of 2c Contradictory Contradictoryc  
11 175 3 3 of 3 0 of 0 Support None 
12 139 7 2 of 4 2 of 3d Contradictory Contradictoryc 
Total   38 15 of 26 9 of 12 3 of 12 6 of 12 
 
Note. This table shows a summary of findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 29–40 of Appendix 
B. Another important note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables produced 
unforeseen results in the tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were 
included in the study and models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables as possible, they produced unintended and unexpected support and contradictory results in the tables. 
This study intended to focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, 
TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. 
However, the inclusion of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced 
tables that somewhat clouded the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables. Consequently, an additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing 
the indirect variables from the El Salvadoran models would result in 5 out of 12 models supporting the Policy 
and Loopholes Hypothesis. None of the models would have produced contradictory results, and seven models 
would have had no support. In addition, 6 of the 6 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables found 





a This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed with 
Noncriminal Status. 
b This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Cases Resulting in Stay in 
United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed). 
c Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Average Number of 
Days an Immigration Case is Open and Cases Resulting in Removal or VR. 
d. Two of the 3 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Immigration Court 
Case Backlog and Cases Resulting in Removal or VR.  
 
To better illustrate this breakdown, look at Stepwise Regression 1 in Table 3. Under the 
heading Number of Significant Variables, we see that the stepwise regression found three 
significant variables out of 92 candidate variables that went in the model. Under the heading 
Number of Variables Showing Support, of the three significant variables, two were associated 
with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and one was associated with the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis. Under the subheading Poverty and Violence, we see that only one of the two 
significant variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis gave support for the 
Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. The other significant variable did not give support, and in fact 
provided contradictory support. Under the Policy and Loophole subheading, the only significant 
variable associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis supported the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis.  
To reiterate, the last two columns under the heading Levels of Support attempt to 
summarize the findings by showing if there was total support for the hypothesis, contradictory 
support for the hypothesis, or showed no support for the hypothesis. In Stepwise Regression 1, 
the first model showed contradictory support for Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, while 





support for a hypothesis, all the significant variables associated with a hypothesis must support 
the hypothesis. If one or more significant variables contradict the hypothesis, then level of 
support for the hypothesis will be labeled as contradictory. If the hypothesis had no significant 
variables, it will be labeled none.  
Tables 29–96 in Appendix B will help us understand exactly how we arrived at those 
support, contradictory, or none findings by showing the estimated coefficient of each significant 
variable found in each stepwise regression. Table 29 in the Appendix B corresponds to Stepwise 
Regression 1. The two significant variables associated with the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis 
were Manufacturing, Value Added (% GDP) and Agriculture Forestry and Fishing, Value Added 
(Annual % Growth). Although both variables were significant, both variables do not support the 
Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. The variable Manufacturing Value Added (% GDP) 
suggested, as the value added from manufacturing to the El Salvadoran GDP increased, fewer El 
Salvadorans illegally migrated. This makes logical sense because one would assume that as an 
important economic indicator such as manufacturing output improves, the economic situation 
also improves hence fewer people should migrate out of El Salvador. On the other hand, another 
important economic variable, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % 
Growth) suggests as the value-added growth of agriculture, forestry, and fishing improves, more 
El Salvadorans illegally migrate. This is the complete opposite effect one would expect. For this 
reason, while there were two significant variables associated with the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis, they in fact contradict each other, resulting in an overall contradictory finding for 
this model (see Table 3). Conversely, DACA, which is 1 of 4 key Policy and Loophole 





Hypothesis. DACA in Stepwise Regression 1 suggests once the DACA policy took effect, more 
El Salvadorans illegally migrated to the United States. 
 To reiterate once again, these tables attempt to simplify very complex and nuanced 
models and variables into an easy to digest analysis. In other words, these tables do not tell a 
complete picture, they only intend to provide an overall analysis of the models’ findings. With 
this in mind, what do the 12 stepwise regressions say about unauthorized immigration from El 
Salvador? Simply put, looking at the last two columns in Table 3 under the heading Level of 
Support, we arrive at the conclusion that there appears to be more support for the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Of the 12 stepwise regressions, 
only three of the stepwise regressions found complete support for the Poverty and Loophole 
Hypotheses, while eight of the stepwise regressions produced contradictory results, and one 
found no support. In other words, while some of the models had a number of variables that 
supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, some of the same models also had variables that 
contradicted the hypothesis. Only three models, Stepwise Regressions 3, 6 and 11, produced 
significant variables that all supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.  
In contrast, 6 of the 12 stepwise regression models supported the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis, and two of the stepwise regressions provided contradictory results and four found no 
significant variables. However, it must be noted that although this may appear to suggest the 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis had much greater support than the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis, the overall picture is not so clear when one digs into the details. To begin with, the 
support is not overwhelming because half of the models did not support the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis. In addition, in Stepwise Regressions 7, 9, and 10, the Policy and Loophole 





key variables this study meant to focus on. The same goes for Stepwise Regression 12, where 
two of the three were indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables (refer to the note 
section of Table 3 for more details). 
Another finding that came about from the analysis of the stepwise regressions had to do 
with variable interpretation. In the study, a number of variables could be interpreted several 
different ways which could result in changes to the models’ findings and analysis. One of the 
variables that was difficult to interpret, and that was seen in multiple models for other countries, 
was Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People), which appeared in Stepwise Regression 2. 
If one looks at this variable from an infrastructure point of view like this study did, then Fixed 
Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) is interpreted to mean that more telephone 
subscriptions (or access) suggest improvements in infrastructure and wealth. So, increases in 
Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) should not led to more unauthorized 
immigration. In Stepwise Regression 2, the variable Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 
People) suggested that as more people got fixed telephone subscriptions, more people migrated 
out of El Salvador, contradicting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. However, another well-
known theory, which was briefly discussed in the Literature Review chapter, suggests social 
networks and the facilitation of communication between those social networks drives a 
significant portion of migration (Curran et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2002; De Jong et al., 1996; 
Donato & Sisk, 2015; Garip, 2008; Massey & Espinosa, 1997; Massey & García-España, 1987; 
Massey et al., 1994; Rosenblum & Brick, 2011; Winters et al., 2001). Hence, it could be 
hypothesized using that social network theory that as more people have telephone access, they 
will have more contact with relatives and friends and any potential migration trip will be 





subscriptions are leading to more unauthorized immigration might be due to simply facilitating 
social network communication and might not have anything not do with the infrastructure aspect 
of the Poverty and Loophole Hypothesis. In this study, this variable along with other similar 
variables like Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) and Internet User, Total (% of 
Population), were associated with Poverty and Violence Hypotheses but it is important to note 
that applying another theory or interpretation on these variables could result in a different 
analysis. 
Similarly, other variables that could be interpreted differently are indirect variables 
associated with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. For example, Nonimmigrant Visas Issued, 
People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status, and Persons Naturalized could be interpreted 
differently if one applies a different hypothesis, such as the social network theory. In this study 
they are interpreted to mean that an increase in nonimmigrant visas issued, an increase in more 
people obtaining legal resident status, or an increase in people receiving U.S. citizenship, should 
result in fewer unauthorized immigration. The Policy and Loophole Hypothesis suggests 
increasing legal migration pathways, should decrease unauthorized migration. However, as 
previously discussed, a social network theory approach suggests increasing the number social 
networks in United States could increase unauthorized migration. The formation of more 
concrete migrant social networks of family and friends with legal status could in theory have a 
pulling effect on potential migrants. Although this study used the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis, this other interpretation and analysis must be considered when conducting an 
analysis.  
Nevertheless, using the analysis of the study, the evidence supports the Policy and 





significant that support for each hypothesis is not so clear due to methodological choices. In 
addition, questions remain about the inferential robustness supporting each hypothesis. The 
Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusions chapter intends to look at some of those issues 
and try dig into some of the nuance needed to better understand the study’s findings. 
Guatemala – The Models 
 The 12 stepwise regressions for Guatemala resulted 88 significant variables (see Table 4). 
Despite Guatemala having fewer candidate variables than El Salvador, Guatemala had 50 more 
significant variables than El Salvador. The main reason for Guatemala having fewer candidate 
variables is because Guatemala falls slightly behind its neighbors regarding its data gathering 
capabilities. Additionally, they gather data slightly differently, producing arguably better but less 
consistent data.24 However, despite the large number of variables that were found to be 
significant, the overall findings regarding the two competing hypotheses in Guatemala, were not 




24 El Salvador and Honduras gather data using yearly income-based surveys allowing for consistent, but less 
comprehensive and complete, yearly data points. In contrast, Guatemala gathers more comprehensive and complete 
consumption survey data, but they gather it much less frequently, usually every 4 or 5 years. Ultimately, Guatemala 
is missing too many data points in their time series to use some of their data in a regression analysis despite their 
data being considered more comprehensive and complete. Regardless, it is important to note, despite these 
limitations and a need for improvement in several areas, all three countries were said to “adhere to international best 

















Number of Significant 
Variables  
1 1980-2018 No Time Lag 97 39 3 
2 1981-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
70 38 4 
3 1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag  97 39 1 
4 1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
70 38 5 
5 1992-2018 No Time Lag 115 27 13 
6 1993-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
79 26 9 
7 1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag 115 27 1 
8 1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
79 26 9 
9 2000-2018 No Time Lag 153 19 4 
10 2001-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
117 18 5 
11 2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag 153 19 17 
12 2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
117 18 17 
  Total Models     88 
 
 
Overall, of the 12 stepwise regressions only two of the models supported the Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis, and 10 of the models produced contradictory findings (see Table 5). 
However, it is important to explain some of the models because while labeled contradictory, that 
does not tell the whole story. Stepwise Regression 6 for example, had 5 of 7 significant variables 
support the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Stepwise Regression 8 similarly had 6 of 7 
significant variables support the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. In other words, despite being 
labeled contradictory in the table due to the methodology used, it could be argued that these two 





 At the same time, the Policy and Loophole Hypotheses had more overall support with 6 
of the 12 stepwise regressions supporting the hypothesis. However, that did not mean that the 
support was conclusive. That still left six stepwise regressions that found contradictory support 
or no support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. Although it must be noted that some of 
the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables in Guatemala’s stepwise 
regressions skewed the findings somewhat against the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis (refer to 
the notes section of Table 5).  
Another interesting finding was found in Stepwise Regression 11. This stepwise 
regression had DACA contradicting the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This was the only time 
in any of the 36 Northern Tringle countries’ stepwise regressions where any of the four key 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. To 
add to the confusion, also in Stepwise Regressions 1 and 5, DACA was found to support the 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In other words, in one of the stepwise regressions DACA 
contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, while in two other stepwise regressions it 








Guatemala – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary 
 
 
  Number of Variables 
Showing Support 
Level of Support  
Stepwise 
Regression  
# of Candidate 
Variables 










1 97 3 0 of 2 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
2 70 4 2 of 2 2 of 2 Support Support 
3 97 1 0 of 1 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
4 70 5 2 of 3 2 of 2 Contradictory Support 
5a 115 13 6 of 12a 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
6 79 9 5 of 7 2 of 2 Contradictory Support 
7 115 1 0 of 1 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
8 79 9 6 of 7 2 of 2 Contradictory Support 
9 153 4 2 of 3 0 of 1b Contradictory Contradictoryb 
10 117 5 3 of 3 0 of 2c Support Contradictoryc 
11* 153 17 8 of 13 1 of 4d Contradictory Contradictoryd 
12e 117 17 6 of 15 1 of 2f Contradictory Contradictoryf 
Total   88 41 of 69 12 of 19 2 of 12 6 of 12 
 
Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 41–52 of 
Appendix B. Another important note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables 
produced unforeseen results in the tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables 
were included in the study and models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables as possible, they produced unintended and unexpected support and contradictory results in the tables. 
This study intended to focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, 
TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. 
However, the inclusion of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced 
tables that somewhat clouded the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables. Consequently, an additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing 
the indirect variables from the Guatemalan models would result in the same overall level of support with 6 of 
12 models supporting the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis. Only one model would have produced 





Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in the models would have supported the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis. 
a Stepwise Regression 5 produced five distinct models with a total of 12 different significant variables. Internet 
Users, Total (% of Population) contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in 2 of the 5 models but 
supported the hypothesis in 1 of the 5 models. Due to the fact that it flip-flopped it was counted as an 
additional significant variable for a total of 13. 
b This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed Total 
(Criminal and Noncriminal Status). 
c Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Aliens Removed 
Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) and Cases Resulting in Removal or VR. 
d. Three of the 4 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Immigration Court 
Case Backlog, Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed) and Cases Resulting in 
Removal or VR.  
e Stepwise Regression 12 produced two distinct models with a total of 17 significant variables. 
f Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Aliens Removed Total 
(Criminal and Noncriminal Status) and Immigration Court Cases in Backlog. 
*DACA contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis in Stepwise Regression 11. This is the only time in 
all the stepwise regressions for the Northern Triangle where any of the four key Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis variables contradicts the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.  
 
 Another very important finding to note is that Stepwise Regressions 5 and 12 produced 
multiple independent models (see Tables 45 and 52 in Appendix B). Generally, in most of the 
stepwise regressions, models are built by adding one significant variable to each model in the 
stepwise regression, ultimately producing one model with several significant variables and the 
highest R2. This was not the case in Stepwise Regressions 5 and 12. Stepwise Regression 5 had 





better explain this anomaly, which is repeated in every country except El Salvador, let us look at 
the first two models of Stepwise Regression 5 in Table 45 in Appendix B.  
The first model in Stepwise Regression 5 included Mean Years of Schooling and Internet 
Users for an R2 of 0.89, but the second model used slightly different variables. It used Internet 
Users and DACA for an R2 of 0.903. In other words, it kept one variable, threw out one variable, 
and added a new variable. Ultimately, five distinct models were created for Stepwise Regression 
5. Overall, all the five models contained a combined 13 significant variables, but not all the 
models shared the exact same significant variables. Similarly, Stepwise Regression 12 produced 
two distinct models with a combined 17 significant variables (see Table 52 in Appendix B).  
 The difficult interpret variables of Internet Users Total (% of Population), Fixed 
Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) and Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) 
appeared extensively in the Guatemalan stepwise regressions. However, what is most interesting 
is that depending on the stepwise regression, some of these variables both supported and 
contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypnosis. Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 
People) always supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in all four stepwise regressions it 
was significant in (Stepwise Regressions 4, 6, 8, and 11).25 But on the other hand, Mobile 
Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) and Internet Users Total (% of Population) flip flopped 
depending on the model. 
  Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People) supported the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis in Stepwise Regressions 5 (see Table 45) and 9 (see Table 49), but it contradicted it 
in Stepwise Regression 4 (see Table 44). The variable Internet Users Total (% of Population) is 
 
 





even more peculiar supporting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in six of the stepwise 
regressions (Stepwise Regressions 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8)26 but contradicted it in four (Stepwise 
Regressions 1, 3, 5, and 7).27 Interestingly, Stepwise Regression 5 produced five total models as 
previously discussed, and in two of those models Internet Users Total (% of Population) 
contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis and supported it in one of the models. In other 
words, even in the same stepwise regression, this variable was found to support and contradict 
the hypothesis depending on what other variables were in the model. So, not only could these 
variables be interpreted differently using another hypothesis as previously discussed, but in the 
Poverty and Violence Hypothesis some of these variables both support and contradict the 
hypotheses. 
 Ultimately, using the methodology of this study, there was more support for the Policy 
and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Six stepwise regressions 
supported the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis versus two stepwise regressions that supported 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. However, like with El Salvador, there are several issues 
that make this analysis lacking the inferential robustness this study intended. The Discussion, 
Recommendations, and Conclusion chapter will explore those issues more and attempt to 
provide some much-needed nuance.  
Honduras – The Models 
 Honduras is the last of the three Northern Triangle countries. Thus far, using the analysis 
of this study, the stepwise regressions for El Salvador and Guatemala have provided more 
overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Loophole 
 
 
26 Refer to Tables 42, 44, 45, 46, and 48 in Appendix B. 





Hypothesis. However, just how inferentially robust those finding are is not so clear. As we will 
see, Honduras will provide similar results as the other Northern Triangle countries.  
Like with El Salvador and Guatemala, a total of 12 stepwise regressions were performed 
(see Table 6). Overall, Honduras had more candidate variables than Guatemala but fewer than El 
Salvador. In total, 62 significant variables were found, placing Honduras between El Salvador’s 
38 and Guatemala’s 88 significant variables.  
 
Table 6 











Significant Variables  
1 1980-2018 No Time Lag 95 39 3 
2 1981-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
68 38 9 
3 1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag  95 39 3 
4 1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
68 38 3 
5 1992-2018 No Time Lag 133 27 5 
6 1993-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
97 26 2 
7 1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag 133 27 6 
8 1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
97 26 3 
9 2000-2018 No Time Lag 170 19 10 
10 2001-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
134 18 8 
11 2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag 170 19 3 
12 2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
134 18 7 









Much like with El Salvador and Guatemala, the stepwise regressions for Honduras 
provided more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis. Of the 12 stepwise regressions, only one, Stepwise Regression 11, 
supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, as seen in Table 7. Out of the 12 stepwise 
regressions, 11 had contradictory findings for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Once again, 
like with the other Northern Triangle countries, plenty of significant variables in each stepwise 
regression supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, but plenty other significant variables 
contradicted it, resulting in an overall Contradictory finding. Although support for the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis was once again stronger with 8 of the 12 stepwise regressions supporting 
the hypothesis, it must be noted that there were a lot of indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 
related variables in the models.  
As previously stated, this study’s intended focus were the four key Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis related variables of DACA, TVPRA, TVPRA Expansion, and the Mexican Migration 
Law. Although most of the stepwise regressions for Honduras supported the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis, 4 of the 8 stepwise regressions were only represented with indirect Policy 
and Loophole Hypothesis variables. Although results in the tables support the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis, those results somewhat miss the goal of the study and skew the study’s 
analysis (see notes section of Table 7 for more detail).  
One key finding was that whenever any of the four key Policy and Loopholes variables 
were found in the Honduran stepwise regressions, they supported the Policy and Loophole 
Hypothesis. This is a key finding in the study. Only once did any of these four key variables in 
any of the Northern Triangle stepwise regressions ever contradict the Policy and Loophole 





 Similar to two of Guatemala’s stepwise regressions, Honduras’s Stepwise Regressions 1, 
7, and 9 all produced multiple models in each stepwise regression (see Tables 53, 59, and 61 in 
Appendix B). Stepwise Regression 1 produced two different models using a total of three 
significant variables, Stepwise Regression 7 produced two different models using six different 
significant variables, and Stepwise Regression 9 produced three different models using 10 
different significant variables. As we will see with the countries and region left in the study, 
stepwise regressions producing multiple models in the same stepwise regression is the norm and 
not the exception. In fact, El Salvador is the only country that did not produce multiple models in 
any stepwise regression. 
 Taken together, findings for the Honduran stepwise regressions were not too different 
from the other two Northern Triangle countries. Based on this study’s analysis, there was more 
support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. 
Although more discussion is needed to fully explain these findings, it is telling that in all three 
Northern Triangle countries, while running independent regressions that used independent data 
sets (aside for the shares variables the study identified), there was more overall support for the 








Honduras – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary 
 
 
  Number of Variables 
Showing Support 
Level of Support  
Stepwise 
Regression 
# of Candidate 
Variables 










1a 95 3 0 of 2 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
2 68 9 4 of 8 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
3 95 3 0 of 3 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
4 68 3 1 of 2 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
5 133 5 2 of 4 1 of 1b Contradictory Supportb 
6 97 2 1 of 2 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
7c 133 6 2 of 5 1 of 1d Contradictory Supportd 
8 97 3 0 of 1 2 of 2e Contradictory Supporte 
9f 170 10 5 of 8 1 of 2g Contradictory Contradictoryg 
10 134 8 1 of 4 2 of 4h Contradictory Contradictoryh 
11 170 3 1 of 1 2 of 2i Support Supporti 
12 134 7 3 of 5 2 of 2j Contradictory Supportj 
Total   62 20 of 45 14 of 17 1 of 12 8 of 12 
 
Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 53–64 of 
Appendix B. Another important note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables 
produced unforeseen results in the tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables 
were included in the study and models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables as possible, they produced unintended and unexpected support and contradictory results in the tables. 
This study intended to focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, 
TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. 
However, the inclusion of the indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced 
tables that somewhat clouded the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables. Consequently, an additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing 
the indirect variables from the Honduran models would result in 6 out of 12 models supporting the Policy and 
Loopholes Hypothesis. None of the models would have produced contradictory results, and six models would 
have had no support. In addition, 6 of the 6 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in the 





a Stepwise Regression 1 produced two distinct models with a total of three significant variables.  
b This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Nonimmigrant Visas Issued. 
c Stepwise Regression 7 produced two distinct models with a total of six significant variables. 
d. This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Nonimmigrant Visas Issued.  
e One of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables is an indirect variable – Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued. 
f Stepwise Regression 9 produced three distinct models with a total of 10 significant variables. 
g One of the two Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed 
With Criminal Status. 
h Three of the 4 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Average Number of 
Days an Immigration Case is Open, Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) and Percentage 
of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closure). 
i Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Immigration Court 
Cases in Backlog and Nonimmigrant Visas Issued. 
j Both of these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued and Persons Naturalized. 
 
Mexico – The Models 
 The first thing to note about Mexico’s stepwise regressions is how Mexico had the most 
candidate variables in the study. Mexico’s proximity to the United States and its economically 
advanced status, at least by Latin American standards, resulted in a larger number of 
socioeconomic indicators being tracked early on relative to other Latin American nations. As a 
result, there was much more data available for Mexico than its neighbors to the south. Mexico 
had a total of 97 significant variables as seen in Table 8. In addition, Mexico had more candidate 
variables than every other country in 10 of the 12 stepwise regressions while sharing an equal 















of Years  
Number of 
Significant Variables  
1 1980-2018 No Time Lag 102 39 6 
2 1981-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
75 38 1 
3 1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag  102 39 8 
4 1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
75 38 4 
5 1992-2018 No Time Lag 140 27 12 
6 1993-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
105 26 22 
7 1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag 140 27 7 
8 1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
105 26 4 
9 2000-2018 No Time Lag 183 19 9 
10 2001-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
144 18 4 
11 2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag 179 19 4 
12 2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
144 18 16 
 Total Significant Variables     97 
 
 
 Four of the step regressions produced multiple models in each stepwise regression. 
Stepwise Regressions 1, 3, and 6 each produced two models a piece, and Stepwise Regression 5 
produced five different models.28 Stepwise Regression 6 was particularly interesting because it 
had 22 significant variables, the most out of any stepwise regression in the study. However, 
despite the large number of candidate variables and significant variables found in all these 
stepwise regressions, we do not get any solid support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. 
 
 





The Poverty and Violence Hypothesis should in theory have produced a similar impact 
on Mexican migration as what was predicted for the Northern Triangle. However, we find, in 11 
of the 12 stepwise regressions, there was contradictory support for the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis (see Table 9). However, it must be noted Stepwise Regression 1 had 4 of 5 
significant variables supporting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis suggesting more support 
for the hypothesis than not. Regardless, the fact that so many significant Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis related variables contradicted the hypothesis was unexpected. In fact, in all 12 
stepwise regressions, more candidate variables contradicted the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis than supported it. The only stepwise regression that had full support for the 
hypothesis was Stepwise Regression 2, which had only one significant variable. 
As stated in the Methodology chapter, the purpose of including Mexico and Nicaragua in 
the study was to provide some points of comparison between the Northern Triangle and their 
neighbors to the north and south. According to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, the policies 
and loopholes that immigration officials blame for causing the surge of unauthorized immigrants 
from the Northern Triangle should not have influenced the flow of unauthorized immigrants 
from Mexico. The reasoning according to the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis was that such 
policies and loopholes only benefited non-Mexican migrants (OTMs). In other words, as 
explained in the Methodology chapter, policies like TVPRA and TVPRA Expansion, created 
beneficial policies and loopholes for individuals from all countries except Mexico and Canada 
(noncontiguous countries). By this rationale, the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 









Mexico – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary 
 
 
  Number of Variables 
Showing Support 
Level of Support  
Stepwise 
Regression  
# of Candidate 
Variables 










1a 102 6 4 of 5 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
2 75 1 1 of 1 0 of 0 Support None 
3b 102 8 2 of 7 0 of 1c Contradictory Contradictoryc 
4 75 4 2 of 4 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
5d 140 12 6 of 12d 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
6e 105 22 12 of 21 1 of 1f Contradictory Supportf  
7 140 7 3 of 7 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
8 105 4 1 of 4 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
9 183 9 4 of 8 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
10 144 4 1 of 4 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
11 179 4 2 of 3 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
12 144 16 6 of 13 3 of 3 Contradictory Support 
Total   97 44 of 89 7 of 8 1 of 12 5 of 12 
 
Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 65–76 of 
Appendix B. Table 9 for Mexico is interpreted differently than the Tables 3, 5, and 7 for Northern Triangle 
countries. Primarily, the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables are not supposed to support the 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis because in theory these four policies and loopholes were only supposed to 
impact non-Mexican nationals. Second, despite unintended and unexpected results around indirect Policy and 
Loopholes Hypothesis related variables with the Northern Triangle tables, indirect Policy and Loopholes 
Hypothesis related variables are supposed to have a similar impact on Mexican migration as on the Northern 
Triangle. Table 9 will be discussed in the narrative to clarify how it should be interpreted and analyzed.  
a Stepwise Regression 1 produced two distinct models with a total of six significant variables.  
b Stepwise Regression 3 produced two distinct models with a total of eight significant variables. 
c TVPRA contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. TVPRA is one of the four key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables. However, unlike with the Northern Triangle, these four key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables are not supposed to support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. 
TVPRA in theory is not supposed to impact Mexican apprehensions because the policy only impacted people 





d. Stepwise Regression 5 produced five distinct models with a total of 12 significant variables. 
e Stepwise Regression 6 produced two distinct models with a total of 22 significant variables. 
f The Mexican Migration Law supports the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. The Mexican Migration Law is 
one of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables and it is not supposed to support the 
Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. However, upon second analysis, it could be argued that quite possible the 
Mexican Migration Law also made it easier for regular Mexicans to migrate because some of the protections 
intended for migrants crossing through Mexico could have extended to Mexican migrants also.  
 
 However, there are some issues with the theory that suggests the four key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables were exclusive to non-Mexicans and could not have 
impacted unauthorized Mexican migration. For instance, DACA could theoretically have 
impacted Mexican migration because it was not specific to any migrant group, unlike TVPRA. 
DACA, according to immigration policy officials, created misinformation which resulted in 
migrants coming to the United States with the wrong assumption that they were eligible for 
DACA. Although only OTMs (mainly children and families) at the border were allowed into the 
United States due to TVPRA and TVPRA Expansion, DACA could have theoretically 
contributed to at least some Mexican migration due to misinformation. A similar assessment 
could be made regarding the Mexican Migration Law. The Mexican Migration Law was created 
for foreign migrants traveling through Mexico. However, the new legislation eradicated some 
dubious practices and implemented some general protections that also helped Mexican migrants 
traveling through Mexico. For example, the common practice of municipal police setting up 
check points and doing arbitrary shake downs under the guise of immigration enforcement was 
curbed by the new legislation. Shady police shakedowns did not just focus on non-Mexicans; 





made it safer for Mexican migrants to travel, thereby arguably influencing some Mexican 
migration.  
 However, despite the possibility that some key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables could have influenced Mexican migration, findings do not support that they did. 
Although 5 of 12 stepwise regressions supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, only in 
two stepwise regressions were any of the four key variables significant. In Stepwise Regression 3 
(see Table 67), TVPRA was significant but contradictory. In other words, interpreting this 
variable with Mexico in mind it supported the hypothesis that TVPRA, a key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variable, did not cause more Mexican migration. On the other hand, 
Stepwise Regression 6 (see Table 70) found the Mexican Migration Law did increase the number 
of Mexican apprehensions, contradicting the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. However, as 
previously stated, the Mexican Migration Law could have theoretically impacted Mexican 
migration. 
Regardless, the overall findings suggest the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis did not play 
much of a role on Mexican migration. In all 12 stepwise regressions, the only key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variable that was found to have influenced Mexican apprehensions 
was the previously discussed Mexican Migration Law, and it was found in only one stepwise 
regression. Conversely, in Northern Triangle countries, these four key variables were significant 
and supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis in numerous stepwise regressions. The fact 
that in the Northern Triangle these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables 
were so prolific while not important at all in Mexico’s models, adds support to the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis. As previously stated, these four key variables were supposed to impact the 





The remaining stepwise regressions that supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 
(Stepwise Regressions 1, 9, 11 and 12) did so only with indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 
related variables.29 These indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were in 
theory supposed to be as impactful on Mexican migration as on the Northern Triangle.  
 Overall, there was a lack of support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, and this 
was an unexpected and a surprising finding. One would have predicted much more support for 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis than what was found. At the same time, there was 
considerable support for the theory that the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables were mostly specific to OTMs and specifically the Northern Triangle. However, that is 
not the whole story, and as will be discussed in the Discussion, Recommendations, and 
Conclusions chapter, there is a lot of nuance that needs to be explained to truly conclude one 
hypothesis had a larger impact than the other. 
Nicaragua – The Models 
Nicaragua is the Northern Triangle’s southern neighbor. As shown in Table 10 and as 
previously discussed in the Methodology chapter, Nicaragua only had eight stepwise regressions. 
In addition, due to Nicaragua’s substandard data collection methods, it had the fewest overall 
candidate variables. Despite so few candidate variables, Nicaragua’s stepwise regressions did 




















of Years  
Number of 
Significant Variables  
1 1992-2018 No Time Lag 110 27 3 
2 1993-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
88 26 3 
3 1993-2019 1 Year Time Lag 110 27 5 
4 1994-2019 1 Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
88 26 3 
5 2000-2018 No Time Lag 151 19 11 
6 2001-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
116 18 12 
7 2001-2019 1 Year Time Lag 151 19 5 
8 2002-2019 1 Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
116 18 15 
  Total Significant Variables     57 
 
Note. Nicaragua only had eight stepwise regressions due to limited data regarding the dependent 
variable. 
 
 According to both hypothesis Nicaraguan migration should have been impacted similarly 
as the Northern Triangle. In other words, we should have seen Poverty and Violence Hypothesis 
and Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables impact migration from Nicaragua in a 
similar matter as what was predicted by each hypothesis. Interestingly, that was not found. Much 
like in Northern Triangle countries, the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis had very little overall 
support. In fact, only 1 of the 8 stepwise regressions had overall support for the Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis (see Table 11). The other seven stepwise regressions had contradictory 
support. However, what makes Nicaragua different is that unlike the other three Northern 






Only 1 of the 8 stepwise regressions produced overall support for the Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis, and in three of the models the overall findings were contradictory due to 
indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. To put it another way, one would 
have expected more overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, and it should have 
been similar as the support found in other Northern Triangle countries.  
Be that as it may, the two times a key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable 
appeared in the models, they supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. In other words, 
both times TVPRA Expansion appeared in Stepwise Regressions 3 and 8 (see Tables 79 and 84 
in Appendix B), the variable supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This finding is 
important because it follows the same trend as what has been seen with the rest of Northern 
Triangle countries. Except for one occasion (Stepwise Regression 11 for Guatemala), every time 
any of the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were significant in a 
Central American model, they supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis as predicted. 
Overall, while this analysis is missing some much-needed nuance, the overwhelming support by 
these four key variables for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis is one of the most consistent 







Nicaragua – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary 
 
 
  Number of Variables 
Showing Support 
Level of Support  
Stepwise 
Regression  
# of Candidate 
Variables 










1 110 3 3 of 3* 0 of 0 Support None 
2 88 3 1 of 3 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
3a 110 5 2 of 4 1 of 1 Contradictory Support 
4 88 3 2 of 3 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
5 151 11 6 of 9 1 of 2b Contradictory Contradictoryb 
6 116 12 4 of 10 1 of 2c Contradictory Contradictoryc 
7 151 5 2 of 5 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
8 116 15 9 of 12 2 of 3d Contradictory Contradictory 
Total   57 29 of 49 5 of 8 1 of 8 1 of 8 
 
Note. This table should be interpreted similarly to the Northern Triangle country tables. This table shows a 
summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 77–84 of Appendix B. Another important 
note is that indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables produced unforeseen results in the 
tables. Although indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables were included in the study and 
models to provide as wide a range of Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables as possible, they 
produced unintended and unexpected support and contradictory results in the tables. This study intended to 
focus on the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables (DACA, TVPRA, TVPRA Extension, 
and the Mexican Migration Law) and their impact on unauthorized immigration. However, the inclusion of the 
indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables ultimately produced tables that somewhat clouded 
the true impact of these four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables. Consequently, an 
additional breakdown is needed which tries to pull out these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables to see the true impact of just the four key variables. In short, removing the indirect variables from the 
Nicaraguan models would result in 2 out of 8 models supporting the Policy and Loopholes Hypothesis. None 
of the models would have produced contradictory results, and six models would have had no support. In 
addition, 2 of the 2 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables found in the models would have 
supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.  





b Both Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable are indirect variables – Average Number of Days an 
Immigration Case is Open and Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/ Terminated/ Closed). 
c Both Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable are indirect variables – Average Number of Days an 
Immigration Case is Open and Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status) 
d Two of the 3 Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables are indirect variables – Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued and Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status). 
 
 
Latin America – The Models 
 Latin America was also included to see whether the Northern Triangle varied from the 
larger overall region. Unfortunately, Latin America did not provide the adequate point of 
comparison the study hoped for as was alluded to in the Comparing the Northern Triangle to its 
Neighbors section. As was predicted, the biggest issue was that Mexico dominated the 
apprehension data (the dependent variable) from 1980 to the early 2000s. Mexico after all 
accounted for over 98% of all apprehension along the Southwest Border for a large majority of 
the time frame in this study. Due to that, Mexican apprehensions likely skewed the data and 
findings for a lot of the models with longer time frames. The same could be said about the 
impact of Northern Triangle apprehensions on the stepwise regressions after 2000. Regardless, 
Latin America was included to demonstrate that multiple bases were covered to provide as 
complete a picture and as robust a finding as possible. 
 Overall, Latin America had the least number of candidate variables and second least 
number significant variables with 44 (see Table 12). This was largely due to data gathering 
difficulties in Latin America. For the Word Bank to have region wide data, it requires that each 
country track and provide their data. If one or more countries fail to provide the required data, 





only country specific and cannot be extrapolated to a large region like Latin America ultimately 
resulting in fewer candidate variables. 
 
Table 12 









of Years  
Number of 
Significant Variables  
1 1980-2018 No Time Lag 87 39 5 
2 1981-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
70 38 5 
3 1981-2019 1-Year Time Lag  87 39 3 
4 1982-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
70 38 1 
5 1992-2018 No Time Lag 113 27 4 
6 1993-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
85 26 2 
7 1993-2019 1-Year Time Lag 113 27 5 
8 1994-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences  
85 26 2 
9 2000-2018 No Time Lag 138 19 2 
10 2001-2018 No Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
105 18 7 
11 2001-2019 1-Year Time Lag 138 19 5 
12 2002-2019 1-Year Time Lag 
Difference-in-Differences 
105 18 3 
  Total Significant Variables     44 
 
  
Using this study’s analysis, the 12 stepwise regressions found more overall support for 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis than the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis (see Table 13). 
This is the first time in the study where the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis had more support 
than the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. However, these findings are not as straightforward as 









Latin America – Stepwise Regression Level of Support Summary 
 
 
  Number of Variables 
Showing Support 
Level of Support  
Stepwise 
Regression  
# of Candidate 
Variables 










1 87 5 2 of 4 0 of 1a Contradictory Contradictorya 
2 70 5 3 of 5 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
3 87 3 2 of 2 0 of 1a Support Contradictorya 
4 70 1 1 of 1 0 of 0 Support None 
5 113 4 3 of 4 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
6 85 2 2 of 2 0 of 0 Support None 
7 113 5 3 of 4 1 of 1b Contradictory Supportb 
8 85 2 1 of 2 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
9 138 2 1 of 2 0 of 0 Contradictory None 
10c 105 7 2 of 5 1 of 2d Contradictory Contradictoryd 
11 138 5 1 of 3 1 of 2e Contradictory Contradictorye 
12 105 3 1 of 2 0 of 1f Contradictory Contradictoryf 
Total   44 22 of 36 3 of 8 3 of 12 1 of 12 
 
Note. This table shows a summary of the findings and estimated coefficients found in Tables 85–96 of 
Appendix B. Table 13 is meant to be interpreted differently than the Northern Triangle, Mexico and Nicaragua. 
The main issue is that the dependent variable, Latin American apprehensions, include Northern Triangle 
apprehensions and Mexican apprehensions. Mexico dominated the apprehension data from 1980 to the early 
2000s skewing the data. After the early 2000s, apprehensions from the Northern Triangle begin to supersede 
Mexican apprehensions skewing the data the other way. Ultimately this resulted in difficult to analyze models. 
The narrative elaborates on this issue, but overall, findings in this table should be ignored.  
a TVPRA contradicted the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. TVPRA is one of the four key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables. However, unlike with the Northern Triangle, these four key Policy and 
Loophole Hypothesis related variables are not supposed to support the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This 
is especially true in the earlier models because of how Mexican apprehensions dominated Latin American 
apprehensions skewing the data.  
b This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – People Obtaining Legal 
Resident Status.  





d One of the two Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Aliens Removed 
Total (Criminal and Noncriminal Status).  
e Both Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable are an indirect variable – Aliens Removed With 
Criminal Status and People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status. 
f This Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable is an indirect variable – Persons Naturalized. 
 
Only 3 of the 12 stepwise regressions supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, 
and nine stepwise regressions had contradictory support. Once again like with the other 
countries, there were plenty of variables that supported the Poverty and Loophole Hypothesis, 
however, in those same models there were other variables contradicting it resulting in an overall 
contradictory finding.  
The Policy and Loophole Hypothesis findings require a little more explanation. To begin 
with, only Stepwise Regression 7 supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis, and five 
stepwise regressions had contradictory findings and six had no support. However, those stepwise 
regression must be examined to see what exactly the variables suggest. First, Stepwise 
Regressions 7, 11, and 12 were only made up of indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables and did not include the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables this 
study focused on. As previously stated, these indirect Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables should have had a similar effect on all countries in the study.  
Second, while Stepwise Regressions 1 and 3 show contradictory support for the Policy 
and Loophole Hypothesis, due to the methodology of the table, it actually supports the Policy 
and Loophole Hypothesis. The Policy and Loophole Hypothesis variables in both of those 
stepwise regressions is the variable TVPRA, 1 of our 4 key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 





Latin American apprehensions, especially in the early years, it skewed the Latin American 
apprehension data. Under these conditions, TVPRA should not have had much support for 
increasing Latin American apprehensions. In other words, this contradictory finding in fact 
supports with the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.  
Third, in Stepwise Regression 10, two Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables 
are significant, with TVPRA Expansion showing support while Aliens Removed with Criminal 
Status (an indirect variable) showing contradictory support. The time frame for Stepwise 
Regression 10 was 2001–2018. Due to this time frame, and the fact that Northern Triangle 
apprehensions began to make up a larger share of Latin American apprehensions in the 2000s 
and 2010s, it is conceivable this key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable could have 
had a positive impacted on overall Latin American apprehensions.  
 Ultimately, the stepwise regressions for Latin America did not provide much overall 
support for either hypothesis. Ideally, Latin America should have been dropped from the 
stepwise regression section of the study. The overall findings associated with Latin America 
should be ignored as they add nothing new and in fact muddy the waters by requiring a lot of 
debatable and problematic interpretations. Although it is possible to interpret individual variables 
in certain ways to arrive at a conclusion that supports or contradicts your hypothesis of choice 
like I did above, it is not the proper way to conduct a robust policy analysis.  
Conclusion 
In brief, using this study’s analysis and methodology, this study found there was more 
overall support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis. Simply put, more models supported the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis than the 





dismiss the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. Despite there being fewer stepwise regressions 
supporting the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, there were plenty of stepwise regressions that 
showed support for it. In addition, even in the models that had contradictory overall findings for 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, there were a considerable number of variables in the 
models that supported the hypothesis. Moreover, with regard to the second research question 
which attempted to find whether the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis was supported by the 
available data in an inferentially robust way, the simple answer is no. There was no inferential 
robust support to back up the claims that poverty and violence were responsible for driving 
people out of the Northern Triangle and into the United States. Conversely, regarding the third 
research question which looked to see to what extent the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 
explained the recent surge in Central America migration, the study found there appears to be a 
modest amount of support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis.  
All in all, where this study had its greatest strength was in providing evidence for the 
importance for the often-dismissed Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. This analysis provided 
significant evidence that the four key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables this 
study identified may have had a moderate impact on the flow of unauthorized immigration from 
the Northern Triangle. Although the findings supporting the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis are 
not inferentially robust either, they nonetheless suggest they matter and at the very least should 









CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion 
Despite this study’s overall finding that suggests key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis 
related variables impacted the flow of Central American migration, the study could not 
confidently determine exactly how much those variables impacted those migration flows. Simply 
put, this study could not make confident claims or determinations as to the extent or impact of 
each key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variable. In addition, the study’s empirical 
support for Policy and Loophole Hypothesis did not produce results that confidently dismissed 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis. What this study confidently did was show that often-cited 
Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables and narratives were likely overstated and 
exaggerated and that the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis is a relevant evidence-based theory 
that must be included and acknowledged in all studies and analyses that look at the topic of 
Central American migration.  
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient, R2, and Adjusted R2 values produced from the 
models fall way short of what could ever be claimed to be as definitive or conclusive. The fact 
that simply changing time frames or techniques produced such vastly different significant 
variables and estimated coefficient values casts uncertainty on much weight one should place on 
these values. This is especially true of the R2 and Adjusted R2 values. Most models had several 
contradicting variables that contributed to the R2 and Adjusted R2, making those values highly 
flawed and of little worth. Even if all the variables were pointing in right direction, the fact that 
so many models had such high R2 (0.80 and above) should be raise red flags. Simply put, very 
little (if anything) in the social sciences, especially in macroeconomics, produces R2 that high. 





provide direction as to where future research should go, one should not take the values 
themselves too seriously. 
However, that is not to say that these variables cannot be looked at in a different way in 
other to inform the reader as to what exactly is going on with these indicators. The stepwise 
regressions left out a lot of nuance, and the various tables of numbers and estimated coefficients 
unfortunately did not convey to the reader exactly what was going on with the socioeconomic 
indicators overtime in the Northern Triangle or its neighbors. It is quite conceivable that many 
readers still believe the situation in Central America is as bad as ever, or maybe even worse. 
What has been presented to the reader to challenge the notion of worsening conditions besides a 
few critiques of the literature and narrative explanations of the quantitative data? Is that enough 
to covey what is really going on with the socioeconomic data? According to cognitive scientist 
Steven Pinker (1990), “A striking fact about human cognition is that we like to process 
quantitative information in graphic form . . . [and] both introspection and experimental evidence 
(citing Carter, 1947; Culbertson & Powers, 1959; Schutz, 1961a, 1961b; Washburne, 1927) 
suggest that, in fact, graphic formats present information in a way that is easier for people to 
perceive and reason about” (p. 73). This visual representation of the time series data for both 
immigration and socioeconomic variables was provided in 197 graphs found in Appendices C 
and D. 
As the graphs will convey in graphic format, one key finding not discussed in the models 
was the direction of the socioeconomic data. The universal direction of socioeconomic trends 
found in the data was one of general improvement. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, by 
almost every metric, improved overtime and are doing better today than in the past. The 





have outperformed their neighbors to the north and south, and the overall region of Latin 
America, on a large number of indicators. The notion that the Northern Triangle sank into a hole 
of poverty and violence in recent years is simply not supported by the available evidence. Almost 
every indicator is pointing in a general positive direction and there has been no major collapse or 
crash in any major indicator to suggest otherwise. Although many might argue the improvements 
have not been large or comprehensive enough, they are improvements none the less, and those 
overall improvements do not support the notion that socioeconomic changes were responsible for 
a sudden spike of unauthorized immigration. Simply put, there was no increasing poverty and 
violence at any significant scale as has been suggested in much of the literature. Although it is 
possible to go into very specific sectors or pick out specific and narrow indicators that support 
the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, that evidence is in no way inferentially robust. The 
overwhelming majority of indicators show improvements in wealth, living conditions, health, 
infrastructure, safety, education, and well-being. This is not an anomaly either, the general 
improvement of the human condition has been the general trend around the world as documented 
in two extremely detailed and highly cited books by Pinker (2011, 2018). The Northern Triangle 
is not an exception. The figures in the Appendices C and D will help readers understand the 
quantitative data better and help them understand why the stepwise regression models found so 
little support for the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.  
What Happened to Violence?  
One specific variable that required a deeper look was violence. Violence was maybe the 
variable that was mentioned the most by the mainstream media and in the academic literature. 
According to numerous studies and news stories, Central Americans were fleeing escalating 





Although homicide rate was not in all the models because data were not available before the 
early 1990s as the Results chapter detailed, it was still included in eight models for each of 
Northern Triangle countries. Yet, despite being in 24 total stepwise regressions, it was only 
significant in one of them, and in that model, it contradicted the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis.30 The lack of support for homicide rates as an explanatory variable added to the 
issues this study had with the literature surrounding the Central American Migration Crisis. If the 
homicides rate could only be found to be significant in one model for the three different Northern 
Triangle countries while using various techniques and time lags, then why were so many experts 
supportive of the notion that homicides were driving the migration from the Northern Triangle?  
 I looked deeper into homicide rate for each country to see if there was something missing 
or if there was even a correlation between apprehensions and homicides for each country as 
many experts and news sources claimed. I conducted a simple bivariate analysis between 
apprehensions and the homicide rate for each country and found not only was there no 
correlation, but if anything, there tended to be more of a negative correlation. In other words, 
apprehensions increased as homicides decreased.  
 Figure 7 shows El Salvador’s Southwest Border USBP apprehensions and its respective 
homicide rate. Immediately noticeable is the light grey line that represents the homicide rate for 
El Salvador from 1994 to 2019. The line shows how the homicide rate was actually worse in the 
mid-1990s and visually there appears to be very little correlation with the dark black line that 




30 Refer to Table 40 in Appendix B. In this model there is a negative correlation between El Salvadoran 





Figure 7  




Not only was the homicide rate higher in the mid-1990s, but homicides also began to 
rapidly decline in 2015 while at the same time apprehensions spiked, dropped, then spiked again. 
Coincidently, the lack of correlation one can visually notice in Figure 7 is supported by the 
correlation coefficient as displayed in Table 14. Without using a time lag, the correlation 
between these two variables is -0.34. Furthermore, adding a 1-year time lag, found similar results 
with a correlation coefficient of -0.31. Even with the difference-in-differences technique, the 
correlation coefficient with no time lag was almost zero at -.07. Adding the 1-year lag and the 
difference-in-differences resulted in a very weak 0.16 correlation. In other words, not only was 

























































































El Salvador  - Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate 1994-2019






El Salvador – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation 
 
  No Difference-in-Differences Difference-in- Differences 
 No Lag 1-Year Lag No Lag 1-Year Lag 
Correlation 
Coefficient -0.34 -0.31 -0.07 -0.16 
 
 The negative correlation for Guatemala was even more pronounced and the lack of 
overall correlation is evident by simply looking at Figure 8. Not only have homicide rates been 
higher in the past, but Guatemala’s homicide rate has been in a steady decline since 2009 and in 
2019 it reached its lowest number on record. However, despite that declining homicide rate, 


































































































Guatemala - Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate 1980-2019





 Once again, the correlation coefficient reflects what the eye can clearly see from Figure 
8. According to Table 15, not only was there no correlation, but there was an overall moderate 
negative correlation suggesting that as homicides declined apprehension increased. The exact 
opposite effect of what the media and many experts have suggested. There was a negative 
correlation of -0.43 with no time lag and a negative correlation of -0.37 with a 1-year time lag, as 
Table 15 shows. Adding the difference-in-differences technique reduced that negative correlation 
a little but it was still -0.20 with no time lag and -0.24 with a 1-year time lag. 
 
Table 15  
Guatemala – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation 
 
  No Difference-in-Differences Difference-in- Differences 
 No Lag 1-Year Lag No Lag 1-Year Lag 
Correlation 
Coefficient -0.43 -0.37 -0.20 -0.24 
 
 Honduras produced similar results. Figure 9 shows an increase in the homicide rate from 
through the 1990s into the 2010s. However, apprehensions did not really increase much relative 
to the increase in homicides. What is interesting is homicides hit a peak in 2011 and 2012, and 
since then, they steadily and rapidly declined. In 2019 the homicide rate was the same as in 2006 












The correlation coefficients displayed in Table 16, once again suggests there is no 
evidence to support the notion that the homicide rate and apprehensions are closely correlated. 
The correlation coefficient with no time lag was nearly zero with 0.04 and it had a very weak 
positive correlation of 0.11 when adding a 1-year time lag. The difference-in-differences 
technique with no time lag sank the correlation deeper into the negative department with -0.12 
and -0.15 with a 1-year time lag. 
There is no doubt a bivariate correlation misses on a lot because it does not consider other 
variables that could potentially be impacting the dependent variable. But as we just saw in this 


























































































Honduras Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate 1980-2019





frames and techniques, and the independent variable of homicide rate was only found to be 
significant in one of the models, and it contradicted the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis.31  
The only country besides El Salvador that found homicide rate to be significant in a 
stepwise regression was Nicaragua. But even that significance was contradictory. Although 
homicide rate was significant in Stepwise Regressions 7 and 8 for Nicaragua, the homicide rate 
variable only supported the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis in Stepwise Regression 7 (see 
Table 83). In Stepwise Regression 8 (see Table 84) it contradicted the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis. In other words, a mixed finding that provides little support for the hypothesis. 
 
Table 16 
Honduras – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions and Homicide Rate Correlation 
 
  No Difference-in-Differences Difference-in- Differences 
 No Lag 1-Year Lag No Lag 1-Year Lag 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.04 0.11 -0.12 -0.15 
 
 Ultimately, what is most concerning is the fact the homicide rate has been touted as a key 
push factor by the news media and many experts. Simply graphing each country’s homicide rate 
over time would show it was very unlikely homicides could have been that critical of a factor on 
unauthorized immigration from the Northern Triangle as many suggest. Although it is common 
to cherry pick single year data points to back up the claims that homicides are an explanatory 
variable, that is a journalism tactic not a proper social science methodology. Furthermore, 
narratives that ignore overall downward trends in variables such as homicides in favor of single 
 
 
31 Interestingly, the homicide rate was also not found to be significant in any of Mexico’s stepwise regressions, and 






data points must be looked at with suspicion. Moving forward, careful consideration must be 
made looking at studies that put a large emphasis on homicide rates, unless they delve deeply 
into small regional areas.  
The Mid-2000 OTM Spike  
As can be seen in Figure 1, there was a spike of OTM apprehensions in the mid-2000s 
composed of mostly Northern Triangle migrants that by the end of 2005 constituted 13% of all 
Southwest Border apprehensions.32 The spike begins to be noticed around 2003, hitting a peak in 
2005, and then dropping back down, but never to the levels seen before 2003. This spike has not 
been discussed in this study and is surprisingly absent from the academic literature. However, 
there was one Congressional Research Service report (Nunez-Nieto et al., 2005) along with 
several Congressional hearings in 2005 that directly looked at this spike of OTM apprehensions 
(Coping With Unauthorized Immigration on the Southwest Border, 2005; The Southern Border 
in Crisis: Resources and Strategies to Improve National Security, 2005). Two main issues 
emphasized by immigration officials were interconnected and related to loopholes in 
immigration policy and bed space issues.  
 The bedspace issue pertained to legal requirements regarding removal procedures. Unlike 
Mexicans who could be returned to Mexico via Voluntary Return (VR), prior to fiscal year 2006 
OTMs apprehended between port of entry (USBP apprehensions) were required to be removed 
by an immigration judge. This meant OTMs had to be held in detention facilities until their 
immigration hearing. However, despite increases in bed space capacity, the years of 
compounding immigration case backlogs led to a severe shortage in bed space in immigration 
 
 





detention facilities.33 Insufficient bed space problems eventually led to more and more OTMs 
being released on their own recognizance or on bond in the early 2000s. According to 
immigration officials at the time, word of the loophole spread through the migrant social 
networks and smuggling networks to such extent that by 2005 a record number of OTMs were 
apprehended along the Southwest Border. Even Brazilians came to represent a significant 
number of OTM apprehensions.34 According to immigration officials, these OTMs would 
usually simply give up to USBP, knowing they would be released into the country soon after 
their arrest due to the loophole (Coping With Illegal Immigration on the Southwest Border, 
2005; Nunez-Nieto et al., 2005). 
According to Nunez-Nieto et al. (2005), the proportion of OTMs released on their own 
recognizance had increased to 50% by 2004. By 2005, that percentage had swelled to 72% and in 
some sectors like Del Rio and McAllen, it had reached over 90%. Furthermore, of those released 
on their own recognizance, only 30% made their immigration hearing and “only 15 percent of 
those who appeared at their hearings and [were] ordered removed, but [were] not detained, 
appeared for their removal” (The Southern Border in Crisis: Resources and Strategies to Improve 
National Security, 2005). Seeing a need to end this loophole, DHS began to implement initiatives 
to end what many critics called “catch and release.” At the beginning of fiscal year 2005, “DHS 
announced plans to detain 100% of removable non-Mexicans apprehended at the border until 
their removal orders could be finalized and executed” (Rosenblum, 2012, p. 9). Although DHS 
increased bed space temporarily slowing down the immediate release of migrants who were 
waiting to see an immigration judge, they more importantly tried to eliminate the “catch and 
 
 
33 Refer to Figure 29 in Appendix C for some additional detail. 





release” loophole by expanding on another program aimed at expediting the formal removal of 
unauthorized migrants. 
 Expedited removals (ERs) became part of the INA in 1996 under IIRIRA, but the policy 
was limited to the ports of entry (Rosenblum, 2012). In other words, the ER program was not an 
option for migrants apprehended by USBP. OTMs apprehended by USBP along the Southwest 
Border were placed in formal removal proceedings, which resulted in extended detention times 
to await an immigration hearing, ultimately resulting in large numbers of OTMs being released 
on their own recognizance.  
ERs, on the other hand, allowed for “certain aliens to be formally removed from the 
United States without appearing before an immigration judge” (Rosenblum, 2012, p. 8). ERs 
essentially carried all the same penalties as a formal removal order by an immigration judge, but 
they were faster because they were done by the agency at the time of arrest, and they did not 
allow for releases into the United States under most circumstances. The most important policy 
implication in the eyes of immigration officials was that ERs allowed for the mandatory 
detention of the migrants until removal.35 According to Nunez-Nieto et al. (2005):  
As part of the ER process, the OTMs must be mandatorily detained. Once an OTM is 
placed in the ER process, on average it takes 32 days for that alien to be removed. This 
compares to an average of 89 days for an alien who has been detained and is in the 
regular removal process. (p. 8) 
As a result of this OTM spike in the mid-2000s, then USBP Chief Aguilar and 
immigration officials pushed for the inclusion of ERs for migrants apprehended between the 
 
 
35 It is important to note that mandatory detention was full of caveats and exceptions that over the years expanded 
eroding the mandatory detention requirement. Today, the release of a migrant under ER is common and it appears 





ports of entry. ERs were expanded to include “aliens who had entered the United States within 
the previous two weeks and who were apprehended anywhere within 100 miles of a US land or 
coastal border” (Rosenblum, 2013, p. 7). USBP began the implementation of ERs in Laredo and 
Tucson in late fiscal year of 2005. By fiscal year 2006, USBP finally used the ER program with 
OTMs fully.36 Migrants removed under an ER were forced to remain in DHS custody until their 
removal back to their home country, thereby eliminating the mandatory release of OTM migrants 
into the United States. Much like the word had spread when the “catch and release” loophole 
existed, this shift in policy quickly spread among the migrant social networks leading to a drop 
in OTM apprehensions of over 62% from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007. 
 While one cannot be certain whether this loophole in the immigration policy was the 
cause of the mid-2000s OTM apprehension surge, it was largely supported by immigration 
officials. More importantly, the policy changes pushed by immigration officials appear to 
provide solid evidence that detention space and policy loopholes might have been a large cause 
of the mid-2000 surge. Ultimately, after the policy changes and increases in temporary detention 
space, OTM apprehensions declined until they reversed trend in 2012. 
 Notwithstanding, it is important to note OTM apprehensions did not drop to pre-2003 
levels despite the introduction of ERs. Why that is it is not exactly clear. Apprehensions from 
Central America had been rising slowly since the 1990s, so ERs might just have temporarily 
slowed a growing problem. However, it could also be ERs were a temporary fix to one loophole 
out of many existing loopholes. Many immigration officials today suggest even with the 
implementation of ER, there were several other loopholes that were not closed, such as the 
 
 
36 ERs were allowed for Mexican migrants, that practice was very limited because Mexican migrants were usually 






asylum loophole, and new loopholes were created with policies like TVPRA in 2008. In 
addition, the bedspace issue was never resolved. Although DHS increased bedspace, that 
increase had a temporary impact. Over a short time, frame bedspace reached maximum capacity 
again resulting in the release migrants on bond or on their own recognizance a few years after 
ERs were implemented.  
In short, this section looked to provide an explanation for the 2005 OTM spike. Although 
academic literature investigating this mid-2000 spike is nonexistent, we are unfortunately left 
with the immigration officials’ hypothesis to formulate an explanation. However, as previously 
stated, there is evidence to support this hypothesis. Moreover, the mid-2000 OTM spike does 
appear to mirror somewhat the current Central American Migration Crisis. Ultimately, such close 
parallels could provide further support for the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis. Regardless, 
without a proper statistical analysis, it is hard to arrive at a strong conclusion for the mid-2000s 
spike. 
Recommendations 
Study Limitations and Concerns  
The methodology used in any study could drastically change the outcomes of a study. 
This study is no different. In the process of formulating, conducting, and running countless 
models, stepwise regressions, and multivariate regression analyses it became apparent it was 
possible to fit or create a model or methodology that supported whatever point of view or 
hypothesis one liked. This fact was especially troubling because due to the field being so 
politically and ideologically charged, any researcher could potentially come up with a study to 
influence policy based on their inclinations. In my analysis of the academic literature, it became 





the insistence of many researchers to ignore immigration officials concerns regarding the policy 
and loopholes issues. However, not including immigration officials’ concerns was not the only 
place to manipulate the findings. Other ways models and studies could be manipulated ranged 
from time frame selection to independent variable selection.  
 For example, this study used three different times frames and those reasons were 
provided in the Methodology chapter. But just changing the time frames from a start of 1980 to a 
start of 1992 or 2000, produced different results. Models that used the time frames from 2000 to 
2018 varied greatly from the ones that used the time frames from 1980 to 2018. The same goes 
for selecting other time frames. In other words, looking at Guatemala using the exact same data 
but switching the time frames to 1998 to 2015 would produce different results. As to why one 
would select a time frame from 1998 to 2015, I am not sure, but I am certain it would not be hard 
to justify that selection. Another easy way to change the results is to simply select variables that 
suit what you are trying to find. If the goal of a study is to find a model that works to support 
your hypothesis, simply running several different models with cherry-picked variables would 
ultimately produce a model with the right combination of variables that fits one’s hypothesis. 
Another way is to include different time lags. This study used a 1-year time lag in some of the 
models. As seen in the stepwise regressions for each country, they produced very different 
results. So, changing time lags around or lagging some variables but not others would ultimately 
produce completely different findings making it possible to fit a model into almost any 
hypothesis one likes. Lastly, simply eliminating a country from the study that does not fit a 
specific hypothesis could also produce findings one prefers.  
Ultimately, the different ways one could manipulate findings was concerning and created 





the idea of why inferential robustness is needed and why inferential robustness was not only 
wanted in this study but required. Although undoubtedly more needs to be done to get the 
inferential robustness needed to conclusively support or dismiss any of these two hypotheses, 
this study is a step in the right direction.  
Variable Interpretation  
Variable interpretation was one aspect this study admittedly overlooked. Only after the 
stepwise regressions were ran did the interpretation of many variables begin to shift in their 
association to the hypotheses. Some variables briefly that could be interpreted differently were 
some Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables such as Immigration Court Cases in 
Backlog, Days an Immigration Case if Open, Cases Resulting in Removal or VR, Percentage of 
Cases Resulting in Removal or VR, Cases Resulting in Stay in United States 
(Relief/Terminated/Closed), and Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States 
(Relief/Terminated/Closure). The biggest issue with these variables was they could be 
interpreted to mean they were part of the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis or just a byproduct of 
increased unauthorized immigration. In other words, determining which was the causal factor 
was not so clear and it could always be questioned.  
 Variable interpretation also applied to numerous Poverty and Violence Hypothesis 
related variables. For example, due to the complexity of macroeconomics, macrolevel indicators 
such as Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Value Added (% of GDP) could be interpreted to 
mean a decline in the indicator is a bad thing or a good thing. In this study, it was interpreted to 
mean it was a bad thing because this sector is an important part of the Northern Triangle’s 
economy. However, it could be interpreted to mean the decline of this indicator is a good thing. 





have moved away from these types of sectors and toward other sectors such as services. Simply 
put, it can get very complicated and different researchers can interpret variables differently. 
Regardless, while this study remains firm on the interpretation of its variables, it is important for 
researchers and consumers to note just how important variable interpretation is because different 
interpretation can impact the analysis.  
Implications for Future Research  
This study showed the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis is a relevant empirically 
supported hypothesis that helps explain the surge of unauthorized immigration from the Northern 
Triangle. Simply put, the Policy and Loophole Hypothesis must be considered in all research 
exploring the topic of Central American migration. Simply ignoring these variables or ignoring 
immigration officials’ statements should not be an accepted practice in the field. Future research 
must take these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables into account, and ideally 
should create some additional Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables this study 
missed, such as asylum and detention (next subsection will discuss).  
All things considered, I believe combining these Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related 
variables along with monthly data that extends years, preferably back to 1980 or the early 1990s, 
is the best way to arrive at an inferentially robust finding. Monthly data would allow for the 
largest number of data points for each variable and would allow for researchers to track monthly 
changes in socioeconomic and policy variables. However, the main issue with formulating a 
study that uses monthly data is for most of variables, such as those used in this study, the data 





dependent variable) simply does not exist prior to 2007.37 Unfortunately, that impediment does 
not allow for the extended time frames required to conduct a proper analysis. Regardless, 
researchers must make an effort to figure out how to make inferential robustness the gold 
standard in this area of research. 
Asylum and Detention Space Need to be Operationalized 
Future researchers must find a way to create usable independent variables for asylum and 
detention space. These two variables have been key according to immigration officials as far 
back as the 1980s. As previously discussed in the Omitted Independent Variables subsection, this 
will be a difficult task due to the numerous hard-to-track policy and legal changes. But as Figures 
25, 29, 36, 37, and 38 in Appendix C show, immigration officials appear to have some basis 
concern. The data suggest credible fear and asylum claims have increased, the number of cases in 
backlog have increased year over year, the lack of bed space has resulted in large numbers of 
migrants being released into the country, and the number of migrants not showing up to their 
immigration hearings is remarkably high in the eyes of most immigration officials. If the goal is 
to get a complete picture of what is causing the surge in Central American migration, researchers 
must make an effort to quantify and consider asylum and bedspace in their analysis and models. 
Ignoring these variables is leaving a large gap in the research.  
Conclusion 
 The main take away from this study is Policy and Loophole Hypothesis must be 
considered when trying to understand the Central American Migration Crisis. Although this 
study did not provide conclusive evidence to dismiss the Poverty and Violence Hypothesis, it did 
 
 





show key Policy and Loophole Hypothesis related variables may have had more of an impact on 
Central American migration than Poverty and Violence Hypothesis related variables. Another 
key take away is there simply is no inferentially robust support for the Poverty and Violence 
Hypothesis as many experts and news sources have long claimed.  
Regardless, the field is a long way from coming up with inferentially robust findings for 
either hypothesis, but researchers must make a greater effort considering the claims and 
hypotheses of immigration officials and practitioners. Although immigration officials could be 
wrong, it falls on the researchers to take their hypotheses into account in the research. In 
addition, researchers must do a better job ignoring personal ideology and feelings in favor of 
rigorous objective social science research. Although this is unlikely today due to how politicized 
the topic of immigration has become, the pursuit of truth should be the goal of the research. In 
addition, and maybe more importantly, CBP and DHS must do a better job producing the data 
researchers require. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) data requests are absurdly cumbersome, 
and they take months to get if even approved. Much of these data should be readily available on 
open-source DHS maintained websites. This will reduce the backlog of FOIA requests, and it 
will allow researchers to conduct better research that could ultimately produce better research.38 
Taxpayer funded immigration data should not be a highly guarded government secret or hidden 
behind “law enforcement sensitive” classifications. DHS must do a better job.  
 
 
38 Despite CBP and DHS’s improvements in making data available compared to a decade ago, they are still way 
behind where they should be. DHS lacks the data not because it does not exist, but because until recently they did 
not record a lot of the necessary data in a data base. In other words, the needed data regarding apprehensions for 
example, is locked away in physical files that require someone to go through boxes and files in storage to record by 
hand in a data base or spreadsheet demographic information such as country of citizenship, age, gender, location of 
apprehension, etc. This tedious work should ultimately help researchers and government officials because this data 





Ultimately, like most social science research, more research is needed. Future research in 
this area should be ambitious and researchers should strive to make inferential robustness the 
gold standard. That is not to say that research that falls short on inferential robustness is useless, 
but it also should not be treated as conclusive. It should be used as a jumping off point for other 
researchers. But most importantly, research that does not meet the standards of inferential 
robustness should be treated with skepticism, and it should never drive policy. Edward Leamer 
(1983) believed “the consuming public [was] hardly fooled by [the] chicanery” of researchers 
selecting one or several of the thousands of statistical models they ran on their computer 
terminals (pp. 36–37). But he was wrong. The consuming public is fooled, and more troubling is 
many are happily fooled when the models and findings support their set of beliefs or ideology. 
Researchers must do better for this very reason. The idea of a researcher “pull[ing] from the 
bramble of computer output the one thorn of a model he likes best, the one he chooses to portray 
as a rose” (Leamer, 1983, p. 37) simply will not do in this area of study. There is simply too 
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Variables: USBP, CBP, and ICE Related Variables  
 
Variable Number Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variable 1* Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions Department of Homeland Security 
Independent Variable 1 Nationwide USBP Apprehensions Department of Homeland Security 
Independent Variable 2 Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied 
Children Apprehensions 
Department of Homeland Security 
Independent Variable 3 Inadmissible Aliens at Southwest Field 
Offices (Port of Entry) 
Department of Homeland Security 
Independent Variable 4 Aliens Removed Total (Criminal and 
Noncriminal Status) 
Department of Homeland Security 
Independent Variable 5 Aliens Removed With Criminal Status  Department of Homeland Security 
Independent Variable 6 Aliens Removed With Noncriminal Status  Department of Homeland Security 
 
Note. This table consists of seven variables associated with immigration enforcement efforts over time by the 
primary immigration enforcement agencies of the DHS. USBP enforcement efforts account for dependent variable 1 
and independent variables 1 and 2. CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) enforcement efforts, OFO operates at 
the ports of entry, account for independent variable 3. Lastly, ICE accounts for independent variables 4, 5, and 6.  
*This is the dependent variable. Despite being the dependent variable, it was included in this table because the 
Southwest Border USBP apprehensions of each country are a result of immigration enforcement efforts. These 






Variables: Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income-Related Variables 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
7 GDP Real per Capita Growth (Annual %) IMF 
8 GDP Growth (Annual %) World Bank 
9 GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %) World Bank 
10 GDP per Capita (Constant 2010 USD)  World Bank 
11 GDP (Constant 2010 USD)  World Bank 
12 GDP (Current USD)  World Bank 
13 GDP per Capita (Current USD) World Bank 
14 GDP per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 International $) World Bank 
15 GDP per Capita PPP (Current International $) World Bank 
16 GDP PPP (Constant 2011 International $) World Bank 
17 GDP PPP (Current International $)  World Bank 
18 GDP per Person Employed (Constant 2011 PPP $)  World Bank 
19 GDP Per Capita as a % of USA GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 USD)  World Bank 
20 GDP as a % of USA GDP (Constant 2010 USD)  World Bank 
21 GDP Per Capita PPP as a % of U.S. GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 
USD) 
IMF 
22 GDP PPP Current Prices in Billions of Dollars IMF 
23 GDP (Constant LCU) World Bank 
24 GDP (Current LCU)  World Bank 
25 GDP Deflator (Base Year Varies by Country) World Bank 
26 GDP per Capita (Constant LCU) World Bank 
27 GDP per Capita (Current LCU)  World Bank 
28 Inflation (% Change in Average CPI) IMF 
29 Personal Remittances, Received (Current USD)  World Bank 
30 Remittances as a Share of GDP World Bank 
31 GDP Per Capita PPP Constant Prices in 2011 Dollars  IMF 
32 Total Investment (% of GDP)  IMF 
33 Gross National Savings (% of GDP) IMF 
34 Gross Savings (% of GDP)  World Bank 
35 Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)  World Bank 
36 Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) World Bank 
37 Trade (% of GDP) World Bank 
38 Trade in Services (% of GDP)  World Bank 
39 GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (Current USD)  World Bank 
40 GNI per Capita PPP (Current International $)  World Bank 
41 GNI, Atlas Method (Current USD) World Bank 
42 GNI (Current USD)  World Bank 
44 GNI (Constant 2010 USD) World Bank 
45 GNI per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 International $) World Bank 
46 GNI per Capita Growth (Annual %) World Bank 
47 GNI per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. $) World Bank 
48 GNI Growth (Annual %) World Bank 
49 GNI PPP (Constant 2011 International $) World Bank 
50 Gross Savings (% of GNI)  World Bank 
51 GNI (Constant LCU) World Bank 
52 GNI (Current LCU) World Bank 
53 GNI per Capita (Constant LCU) World Bank 






Note. IMF = International Monetary Foundation. This table consists of 48 variables associated with macrolevel 
economic indicators over time (e.g., gross domestic product, gross national income, inflation). Independent variables 
in this table are considered pushed factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 




















Variables: Life and Well-Being Related Variables  
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
55 Homicide Rate (per 100,000 People)  United Nations, 
World Bank, 
Insight Crime 
56 Human Development Index  United Nations 
57 Child Mortality Rate Under-5 Years (per 1,000 Live Births) World Bank 
58 Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Live Births)  World Bank 
59 Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman) World Bank 
60 Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births per 1,000 Women Ages 15-19) World Bank 
61 Population Growth (Annual %) World Bank 
62 Life Expectancy World Bank 
63 Death Rate, Crude (per 1,000 People) World Bank 
64 Malnutrition Prevalence, Height for Age (% of Children Under 5) World Bank 
65 Malnutrition Prevalence, Weight for Age (% of Children Under 5)  World Bank 
66 Prevalence of Overweight (% of Adults) World Bank 
67 Global Hunger Index  Global Hunger 
Index 
68 Contraceptive Prevalence Any Method (% of Women Ages 15-49)  World Bank 
69 Immunization BCG (Tuberculosis) (% of 1-Year-Old Children) World Bank 
70 Immunization Measles (% of Children 12-23 Months) World Bank 
71 Immunization HepB3 (% of 1-Year-Old Children) World Bank 
72 Immunization, DPT (% of Children 12-23 Months) World Bank 
73 Immunization, Hib3 (% of Children 12-23 Months)  World Bank 
74 Immunization, Polio (% of 1-Year-Old Children) World Bank 
75 Hospital Beds (per 1,000 People)  World Bank 
76 Physicians (per 1,000 People) World Bank 
77 Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of Current 
Health Expenditure) 
World Bank 
78 Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of GDP)  World Bank 
79 Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP)  World Bank 
80 Current Health Expenditure per Capita (Current USD)  World Bank 
81 Current Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current International $) World Bank 
82 Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP 
(Current International $)  
World Bank 
83 Domestic Private Health Expenditure (% of Current Health 
Expenditure)  
World Bank 
84 Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita  World Bank 
85 Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General 
Government Expenditure)  
World Bank 
86 Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working-Age Population) World Bank 
87 Age Dependency Ratio, Young (% of Working-Age Population) World Bank 
 
Note. This table consists of 33 variables associated with life and well-being over time. Independent variables in this 
table are considered pushed factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, 








Variables: Infrastructure Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
88 People Practicing Open Defecation (% of Population) World Bank 
89 People Using Basic Drinking Water Services (% of Population) World Bank 
90 Access to Electricity (% of Population)  World Bank 
91 Secure Internet Servers (per 1 Million People)  World Bank 
92 Internet Users Total (% of Population) World Bank 
93 Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (per 100 People) World Bank 
94 Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People)  World Bank 
95 Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People)  World Bank 
96 People Using Basic Sanitation Services (% of Population)  World Bank 
97 Electric Power Consumption (kWh per Capita) World Bank 
98 Agricultural Irrigated Land (% of Total Agricultural Land) World Bank 
99 Agricultural Land (% of Land Area)  World Bank 
100 Arable Land (% of Land Area) World Bank 
 
Note. This table consists of 13 variables associated with the internal infrastructure of each country and region over 
time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, 































Variables: Education Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
101 Education Index United Nations 
102 Mean Years of Schooling  United Nations 
103 Literacy Rate Adult Total (% of People Ages 15 and Above) World Bank 
104 School Enrollment Ratio, Primary (% Gross) World Bank 
105 School Enrollment Ratio, Secondary (% Gross)  World Bank 
106 School Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary (% Gross)  World Bank 
107 Persistence to Last Grade of Primary, Total (% of Cohort)  World Bank 
108 Primary Completion Rate (% of Relevant Age Group)  World Bank 
109 Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Primary (% of Cohort) World Bank 
110 Government Expenditure on Education (% of GDP)  World Bank 
111 School Enrollment, Primary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI) World Bank 
112 School Enrollment, Secondary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI) World Bank 
113 School Enrollment, Tertiary (Gross), Gender Parity Index (GPI) World Bank 
 
Note. This table consists of 13 variables associated with education by each country and region over time. 
Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, 






Variables: Legal Immigration to the United States Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
114 Nonimmigrant Visas Issued U.S. Department of State 
115 People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status Department of Homeland Security 
116 Persons Naturalized  Department of Homeland Security 
 
Note. This table consists of three variables associated with legal migration and naturalization in the United States 
from each country and region over time. Independent variables in this table are considered pull factor migratory 














Variables: Industry, Agriculture, and Business-Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
117 Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60 KG Bags) U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 
118 Coffee (Green) Supply (in 1,000 60 KG Bags) U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 
119 Worldwide Coffee Average Closing Price Intercontinental Exchange 
120 Worldwide Coffee Price Year Open Intercontinental Exchange 
121 Worldwide Coffee Price Year High Intercontinental Exchange 
122 Worldwide Coffee Price Year Low  Intercontinental Exchange 
123 Worldwide Coffee Price Year Close Intercontinental Exchange 
124 Worldwide Coffee Price Annual % Change  Intercontinental Exchange 
125 Food Production Index (2004-2006=100)  World Bank 
126 Manufacturing Value Added (Annual % Growth) World Bank 
127 Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 of USD) World Bank 
128 Manufacturing Value Added (% of GDP)  World Bank 
129 Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual % 
Growth)  
World Bank 
130 Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 
2010 USD)  
World Bank 
131 Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (% of GDP) World Bank 
132 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Annual % 
Growth) 
World Bank 
133 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (Constant 
2010 USD) 
World Bank 
134 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value Added (% of GDP) World Bank 
135 International Tourism, Receipts (in Current USD) World Bank 
136 International Tourism, Number of Arrivals  World Bank 
137 Ease of Doing Business Ranking World Bank 
138 Ease of Doing Business Score World Bank 
139 Ease of Starting a Business Score  World Bank 
140 Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total Population 
Ages 15+) (National Estimate) 
World Bank 
141 Female Labor Force Participation Rate, Total (% of Total 
Population Ages 15+) (National Estimate) 
World Bank 
142 Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP) World Bank 
143 Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP)  World Bank 
144 Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)  World Bank 
145 Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP) World Bank 
146 Economic Fitness Metric (Legacy) World Bank 
147 Economic Fitness Ranking  World Bank 
148 Exports of Goods and Services (Annual % Growth) World Bank 
149 Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 USD) World Bank 
150 Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank 
151 Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
World Bank 
152 Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) (Modeled 









Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
153 Employment in Services (% of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate) 
World Bank 
154 Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National 
Estimate) 
World Bank 




Note. This table consists of 39 variables associated with business and industry related indicators from each country 
over time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Latin America. These variables are associated to the Poverty and 
Violence Hypothesis. Coffee price variables are set by the commodities market (futures contracts) and serve as the 
basis for all countries’ coffee prices. Better coffees at are a premium and while inferior coffees are at a discount. 















Variables: Poverty and Inequality Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
156 GINI Coefficient  World Bank 
157 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) World Bank 
158 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) World Bank 
159 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) World Bank 
160 Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Poverty Line) World Bank 
161 Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Poverty Line) World Bank 
162 Poverty Gap at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Poverty Line) World Bank 
163 Income Share Held by Lowest 20% World Bank 
164 Income Share Held by Second 20% World Bank 
165 Income Share Held by Third 20% World Bank 
166 Income Share Held by Fourth 20% World Bank 
167 Income Share Held by Highest 20% World Bank 
168 Income Share Held by Lowest 10%  World Bank 
169 Income Share Held by Highest 10% World Bank 
 
Note. This table consists of 14 variables associated with poverty and inequality related indicators from each country 
over time. Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, 


















Variables: Government Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
170 Control of Corruption: Estimate World Bank 
171 Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank World Bank 
172 Government Effectiveness: Estimate World Bank 
173 Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank World Bank 
174 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism: Estimate World Bank 
175 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism: Percentile Rank World Bank 
176 Regulatory Quality: Estimate World Bank 
177 Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank World Bank 
178 Rule of Law: Estimate  World Bank 
179 Rule of Law: Percentile Rank World Bank 
180 Voice and Accountability: Estimate World Bank 
181 Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank World Bank 
 
Note. This table consists of 12 variables associated with government related indicators from each country over time. 
Independent variables in this table are considered push factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, 






Variables: Immigration Court Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
182 Immigration Court Cases in Backlog Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
183 Average Number of Days an 
Immigration Case is Open 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
184 Cases Resulting in Removal or 
Voluntary Return  
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
185 Percentage of Cases Resulting in 
Removal or Voluntary Return  
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
186 Cases Resulting in Stay in United States 
(Relief/Terminated/ Closed)  
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
187 Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in 
United States 
(Relief/Terminated/Closure)  
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
 
Note. This table consists of six variables associated with the U.S. immigration court system from each country over 
time. Independent variables in this table are considered pull factor migratory variables for all countries and regions 








Variables: Immigration Policy Changes and Loophole Related Variables  
 
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
188 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
2008-2019 
Created Variable – Dummy Variable 
189 Deferred Action Childhood Arrivals 2012-2019  Created Variable – Dummy Variable 
190 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Expansion 2015-2019 
Created Variable – Dummy Variable 
191 Mexican Migration Law 2011-2019  Created Variable – Dummy Variable 
 
Note. This table consists of four dummy variables associated with key policy changes and loopholes that many 
immigration officials blame for creating to the surge of Central American unauthorized migration. Independent 




Variable: United States Related Pull Factors  
Independent Variable Variable Description Source 
192 U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %) World Bank 
193 U.S. GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %) World Bank 
194 U.S. Inflation (% Change in Average CPI) International Monetary Fund 




Note. This table consists of four variables associated with the U.S. economy. All the independent variables in this 
table are considered pull factor migratory variables for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and 










The Stepwise Regression Models 
Table 29 
 






B SE R2  Adjusted R2  F p 
(Constant) 60523.71 19287.67 0.004 0.772 0.752 38.412 0.000 
DACA 32955.34 4312.79 0.000 
    
Manufacturing, Value 
Added (% of GDP)  
-2.65E+05 1.07E+05 0.018 
    
Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishing, Value 
Added (Annual % 
Growth)  
75979.24 31785.29 0.023 
        
 












B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 41944.00 6366.30 0.000 0.731 0.698 22.364 0.000 
DACA  19986.59 4724.03 0.000 
  
    
Prevalence of 
Overweight (% of 
Adults)  
-5.37E+06 8.21E+05 0.000 
  
    
Fixed Telephone 
Subscriptions (Per 100 
People)  
5294.89 1720.51 0.004 
      
TVPRA Expansion  15552.77 6446.94 0.022         
 









El Salvador – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables       B     SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 29217.18 7133.00 0.000 0.742 0.728 51.835 0.000 
Mexican Migration Law 32440.92 6362.79 0.000 
      
Coffee (Green) 
Production (in 1,000 60 
KG Bags) 
-8.46 3.31 0.015 
    
    
 





El Salvador – 1982–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression 
Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables       B SE R2  Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -4628.53 3637.69 0.212 0.238 0.194 5.455 0.009 
GNI, Atlas Method 
(Current US$) 
3.015E-05 0.00 0.002 
    
GNI Per Capita (Current 
LCU) 
-123.78 51.82 0.022 
    
    
 










El Salvador – 1994–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 1.75E+05 45342.91 0.001 0.874 0.849 34.728 0.000 
DACA  35532.97 5964.50 0.000 
  
    
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing, Value Added 
(Annual % Growth) 
2.25E+05 42993.74 0.000 
  
    
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 
1,000 60 KG Bags) 
-23.13 5.40 0.000 
      
Manufacturing, Value 
Added (Constant 2010 of 
USD) 
-4.14E-05 1.32E-05 0.005 
        
 





El Salvador – 1995–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 3288.94 2596.00 0.218 0.300 0.268 9.440 0.006 
Persistence to Last 
Grade of Primary, Total 
(% of Cohort) 
-1.65E+05 53679.22 0.006 
        
 










El Salvador – 1995–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -88961.78 33360.11 0.014 0.800 0.772 28.075 0.000 
International Tourism, 
Receipts (in Current U.S. 
$)  
8.865E-05 0.00 0.000 
    
Employment in Agriculture 
(% of Total Employment) 





    
Aliens Removed With 
Noncriminal Status  
-1.44 0.64 0.035 
    
    
 












B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
No Significant Variables      
 









El Salvador – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 51961.82 36724.16 0.179 0.935 0.917 50.424 0.000 




3.34 0.32 0.000 
  
    
Immunization, BCG 
(Tuberculosis) (% of 1-
Year-Old Children)  
-2.22E+05 29405.54 0.000 
  
    
Immunization, Measles (% 
of Children 12–23 Months)  
1.88E+05 35452.37 0.000 
      
Control of Corruption: 
Estimate  
51301.60 13798.95 0.002 
        
 





El Salvador – 2001–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -53432.95 31708.57 0.118 0.924 0.893 29.380 0.000 
Average Number of 
Days an Immigration 
Case is Open 
-112.46 21.47 0.000 
    
Immunization, BCG 
(Tuberculosis) (% of 
1-Year-Old Children) 
-134546.99 22421.91 0.000 
    
Prevalence of 
Overweight (% of 
Adults)  
-3211134.50 607440.80 0.000 
    
Cases Resulting in 
Removal or VR 
0.67 0.15 0.001 
    
Immunization, Hib3 
(% of Children Ages 
12-23 Months)  
87973.45 34458.16 0.025 
        
 








El Salvador – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 323793.45 69372.53 0.000 0.858 0.830 30.245 0.000 
Coffee (Green) 
Production (in 1,000 
60 KG Bags) 
-44.67 5.60 0.000 
    
Voice and 
Accountability: 
Percentile Rank  
-4834.56 1368.15 0.003 
  
    
USA GDP Per Capita 
Growth (Annual %) 
382636.76 161297.28 0.031 
    
    
 













B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 25789.42 6445.24 0.003 0.966 0.942 40.541 0.000 
Voice and 
Accountability: Estimate 
-1.83E+05 16216.53 0.000 
  
    
Homicide Rate -411.79 105.33 0.003 
    
Primary Completion 
Rate, (% of Relevant 
Age Group)  
-4.25E+05 70132.80 0.000 
    
Domestic General 
Government Health 
Expenditure Per Capita 
(Current USD) 
1023.32 158.56 0.000 
    
Cases Resulting in 
Removal or VR 
-0.66 0.15 0.002 
    
Immigration Court 
Cases in Backlog 
-0.88 0.23 0.004 
    
Mexican Migration Law  12221.01 4988.71 0.034         
 













      B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 3321.42 1623.48 0.048 0.930 0.924 154.031 0.000 
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population)  
42427.07 19792.89 0.039 
    
DACA 33967.49 6081.54 0.000 
  
    
Personal Remittances, 
Received (Current U.S. $)  
2.88E-06 0.00 0.006 
    
    
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 1537.80 1289.59 0.242 0.645 0.602 15.005 0.000 
Mexican Migration Law 15560.48 3946.34 0.000 
  
    
Internet Users, Total (% 
of Population)  
-1.74E+05 31436.67 0.000 
  
    
TVPRA Expansion 23916.14 6022.33 0.000 
      
Immunization, Polio (% 
of 1-Year-Old Children) 
-24607.59 11362.04 0.038 
        
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 2153.43 3421.31 0.533 0.846 0.841 202.685 0.000 
Internet Users, Total (% 
of Population)  
2.73E+05 19165.57 0.000 
        
 














B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 4534.13 2977.40 0.138 0.738 0.697 17.991 0.000 
TVPRA Expansion 93459.41 13504.76 0.000 
    
Fixed Telephone 
Subscriptions (Per 100 
People)  
-18885.31 3446.78 0.000 
    
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population)  
-2.69E+05 68059.45 0.000 
    
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (Per 100 
People)  
828.83 275.48 0.005 
    
Mexican Migration Law  19056.71 8506.80 0.032         
 







































B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) -50519.33 14993.30 0.003 0.890 0.881 97.367 0.000 
Mean Years of 
Schooling  
15722.42 4090.24 0.001 
    
Internet Users, 
Total (% of 
Population)  
63668.72 25188.64 0.018 
  
    
2 (Constant) 6982.37 2260.31 0.005 0.903 0.895 112.273 0.000 
Internet Users, 
Total (% of 
Population)  
80269.46 18856.85 0.000 
  
    
DACA 35811.27 7995.57 0.000       
3 (Constant) -2.68E+05 96355.79 0.011 0.957 0.949 121.581 0.000 
DACA 22389.51 6364.94 0.002 
  
    
GNI, Atlas Method 
(Current USD)  
6.75E-06 1.27E-06 0.000 
  
    
GDP (Current 
LCU) 
-6.01E-07 1.29E-07 0.000 
      
Population Growth 
(Annual %)  
1.01E+05 39451.99 0.018 
    
4 (Constant) -3.11E+05  82319.82 0.001 0.969 0.963 170.182 0.000 
Atlas Method 
(Current USD)  
7.35E-06 1.01E-06 0.000 
  
    
GDP (Current 
LCU)  
-5.77E-07 1.08E-07 0.000 
  
    
Population Growth 
(Annual %)  
1.45E+05 34841.65 0.000 
      
Immunization 
Polio (% of 1-
Year-Old 
Children) 
-92099.81 18231.42 0.000 
    
5 (Constant) -3.36E+05 32733.34 0.000 0.998 0.997 910.634 0.000 
Internet Users, 
Total (% of 
Population) 
-1.23E+05 8095.30 0.000 
  
    
GNI, Atlas Method 
(Current USD)  
9.71E-06 4.75E-07 0.000 
  







-5.56E-07 5.90E-08 0.000 
      
Population Growth 
(Annual %)  
1.01E+05 18424.82 0.000 
    
Immunization 
Polio (% of 1-
Year-Old 
Children) 
-92426.62 8560.75 0.000 
    
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 
100 People)  
-384.72 37.92 0.000 
    




-8.80E-06 9.61E-07 0.000 




(% of Children 
Ages 12-23 
Months) 
33651.82 10168.20 0.004 
    
GDP Growth 
(Annual %)  
1.02E+05 30410.83 0.004 




Index (GPI)  
1.40E+05 61354.66 0.036 
        
 



















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 2402.43 1185.81 0.060 0.938 0.903 26.761 0.000 
Mexican Migration Law  17537.04 2587.47 0.000 
  
    
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population)  
-1.92E+05 19716.21 0.000 
   
    
TVPRA Expansion  23568.68 4409.24 0.000 
       
Immunization, Polio (% of 
1-Year-Old Children)  
-1.35E+05 17286.26 0.000 
    
Fixed Telephone 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People)  
-5351.17 1095.44 0.000 
    
Immunization, DPT- 
Diphtheria, Tetanus, 
Pertussis (% of Children 
Ages 12-23 Months)  
1.26E+05 24887.10 0.000 
    
Gross Domestic Savings 
(% of GDP)  
-2.25E+05 79028.14 0.012 
    
Employment in Industry 
(% of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
-2.90E+05 89864.89 0.005 
    
Domestic Credit Provided 
by Financial Sector (% of 
GDP) 
1.13E+05 49666.28 0.038 
        
 





Guatemala – 1993–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 497.86 5326.09 0.926 0.833 0.826 124.733 0.000 
Internet Users, Total 
(% of Population)  
2.77E+05 24824.89 0.000 
    
    
 















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 26797.91 5939.50 0.000 0.971 0.954 58.889 0.000 
TVPRA Expansion 93112.50 6788.99 0.000 
    
Fixed Telephone 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People)  
-24040.69 1848.97 0.000 
    
Mean Years of Schooling  -38352.29 5461.28 0.000 
    
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population)  
-2.87E+05 31522.25 0.000 
    
Employment in Industry (% 
of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
-7.43E+05 1.44E+05 0.000 
    
Mexican Migration Law  18011.45 4702.34 0.001 
    
Gross Capital Formation (% 
of GDP)  
3.37E+05 86444.23 0.001 
    
Gross Domestic Savings (% 
of GDP)  
-3.56E+05 1.28E+05 0.013 
    
Child Mortality Rate Under 5 
Years (per 1,000 Live Births) 
5822.30 2608.78 0.040 
        
 









Guatemala – 2000–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variable B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -33359.83 2174.54 0.000 0.993 0.991 470.937 0.000 
GNI, Atlas Method 
(Current USD) 
4.00E-06 7.51E-07 0.000 
  
    
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People) 
-499.04 33.91 0.000 
   
    
Aliens Removed Total 
(Criminal and 
Noncriminal Status) 
1.19 0.14 0.000 
       
GNI (Current USD) -2.03E-06 6.75E-07 0.009         
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 43238.29 5714.54 0.000 0.969 0.956 75.491 0.000 
Aliens Removed Total 
(Criminal and Noncriminal 
Status) 
1.70 0.11 0.000 
    
Fertility Rate, Total (Births 
per Woman) 
3.06E+05 30706.61 0.000 
    
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population)  
-97361.13 14290.53 0.000 
    
Cases Resulting Removal or 
VR 
1.13 0.36 0.009 
    
Age Dependency Ratio, 
Young (% of Working-Age 
Population)  
6.40E+05 2.32E+05 0.017 
        
 
















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 74317.55 2.74 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.82E+11 0.000 
Immigration Court Cases 
in Backlog  
2.59 0.00 0.000 
  
      




-8.95 0.00 0.000 
    
    
Employment in Industry 
(% of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
-1.08E+06 12.62 0.000 
        
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population) 
-1.94E+05 1.18 0.000 
    
    
Worldwide Coffee 
Average Closing Price 
-26920.07 0.34 0.000 
    
    
Access to Electricity (% of 
Population) 
3.87E+05 4.62 0.000 
        
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Primary (% Gross) 
-1588.41 0.03 0.000 
        
Worldwide Coffee Price 
Annual % Change 
-28561.48 0.75 0.000 
        
Worldwide Coffee Price 
Year Close 
26734.13 0.61 0.000 
        
Regulatory Quality: 
Estimate 
-22844.85 0.73 0.000 
        
Unemployment, Total (% 
of Total Labor Force) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate) 
4827.63 0.15 0.000 
        
Domestic General 
Government Health 
Expenditure (% of General 
Government Expenditure)  
2.64E+05 14.68 0.000 
        
DACA  -9149.25 0.56 0.000 
        
Worldwide Coffee Price 
Year Open 
-11516.37 1.01 0.000 
        
Gross National Savings as 
a % of GDP 
13322.51 5.97 0.000 






Subscriptions (per 100 
People) 
-23.66 0.06 0.002 
        
Aliens Removed with 
Criminal Status 
4.52E-03 4.40E-05 0.006 
        
 
































B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) -51712.79 7793.56 0.000 0.996 0.993 305.535 0.000 
Immigration 
Court Cases in 
Backlog   
2.38 0.12 0.000 
  




8.39 0.40 0.000 
  
    
Immunization, 
Polio (% of 1-
Year-Old 
Children)  
1.97E+05 11421.34 0.000 





Pertussis (% of 
Children Ages 
12-23 Months) 
-1.90E+05 18132.38 0.000 
    
Infant Mortality 
Rate per 1,000 
Live Births 
-33304.72 6895.21 0.001 






4.23E+05 51213.95 0.000 





-4.43E+05 83477.87 0.000 
    
USA Inflation 
(% Change in 
Average CPI) 
3104.39 1102.27 0.020 
    
2 (Constant) 12384.81 0.35 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.71E+11 0.000 
Immigration 
Court Cases in 
Backlog  
1.85 0.00 0.000 
  




9.24 0.00 0.000 
    






Polio (% of 1-
Year-Old 
Children) 
1.87E+05 0.86 0.000 





Pertussis (% of 
Children Ages 
12-23 Months) 
-1.93E+05 1.00 0.000 






4.10E+05 1.42 0.000 





-1.19E+06 25.34 0.000 
        
U.S. Inflation 
(% Change in 
Average CPI) 
3044.67 0.05 0.000 







1.71E+06 287.23 0.000 
        
GNI growth 
(Annual %) 
7.19E+05 10.48 0.000 
        
GDP Per Capita 
as a % of USA 
GDP Per Capita 
(Constant 2010 
USD) 
3.27E+06 523.89 0.000 
        
Coffee (Green) 
Production (in 
1,000 60 KG 
Bags) 
5.44 0.00 0.000 
        
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of 
GDP) 
-25032.95 2.30 0.000 









466.32 0.14 0.000 




45800.62 31.89 0.000 
        
Persistence to 
Last Grade of 
Primary, Total 
(% of Cohort) 
485.16 0.73 0.001 
        
Age 
Dependency 
Ratio (% of 
Working-Age 
Population) 
-32202.65 266.10 0.005 
        
 













B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) -19807.12 6699.33 0.005 0.78 0.77 65.076 0.000 




5.76E-06 1.24E-06 0.000 
        
DACA  25062.14 6730.04 0.001         
2 (Constant) 29.22 2383.92 0.990 0.821 0.811 82.607 0.000 
DACA  36136.16 4635.48 0.000 
    
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of 
GDP) 
3.62E+05 62446.46 0.000 
        
 















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 2322.97 1625.96 0.164 0.805 0.742 12.852 0.000 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net Inflows 
(% of GDP)  
1.09E+06 1.41E+05 0.000 
  
    
Gross Capital Formation 
(% of GDP)  
-1.02E+06 1.94E+05 0.000 
   
    
Total Investment as a % 
of GDP  
6.61E+05 1.44E+05 0.000 
       
Gross National Savings 
as a % of GDP  
195431.82 53299.17 0.001 
    
TVPRA Expansion  23908.06 4982.66 0.000 
    
Internet Users, Total (% 
of Population)  
-3.92E+05 93461.16 0.000 
    
School Enrollment 
Ratio, Primary (% 
Gross)  
-1422.75 488.54 0.007 
    
Fixed Telephone 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People) 
-5121.99 2069.36 0.020 
    
Food Production Index 
(2004-2006 = 100) 
831.59 359.50 0.028 
        
 





























B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -5.45E+05 1.67E+05 0.002 0.677 0.649 24.440 0.000 
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population)  
5.68E+05 83445.16 0.000 
    
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Primary (% Gross)  
5042.67 1547.73 0.002 
  
    
U.S. Inflation (% Change 
in Average CPI) 
5387.25 2286.07 0.024 
    
    
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -2530.64 3880.63 0.519 0.657 0.627 21.726 0.000 
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Tertiary (% Gross)  
16826.65 4234.34 0.000 
    
TVPRA Expansion  48802.33 14419.48 0.002 
    
Coffee (Green) Supply 
(in 1,000 60 KG Bags) 
-18.54 6.40 0.007 
        
 

























B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 5.42E+05 2.13E+05 0.019 0.883 0.855 31.563 0.000 
Exports of Goods and 
Services (constant 2010 
USD)  
1.58E-05 2.67E-06 0.000 
    
Primary Completion 
Rate, (% of Cohort) 
-3.05E+05 57884.73 0.000 
    
Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate, Total 
(% of Total Population 
Ages 15+) (National 
Estimate) 
3.28E+05 67693.90 0.000 
    
Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued  
-0.84 0.32 0.016 
    
School Enrollment, 
Primary (Gross), Gender 
Parity Index (GPI)  
-4.95E+05 2.05E+05 0.025 
        
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 1444.24 3422.17 0.677 0.437 0.388 8.935 0.001 
Primary Completion Rate, 
(% of Cohort) 
-4.17E+05 1.03E+05 0.001 
    
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Tertiary (% Gross)  
7329.83 3002.38 0.023 
    
    
 























B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 





2010 USD)  
1.50E-04 2.25E-05 0.000 
    
School Enrollment 
Ratio, Primary (% 
Gross) 
8425.56 1981.85 0.000 
  
    
Labor Force 
Participation Rate, 




6.43E+05 2.47E+05 0.016 
  
    






2.61E-04 2.62E-05 0.000 
    
Labor Force 
Participation Rate, 




6.22E+05 1.96E+05 0.005 
    
Nonimmigrant 
Visas Issued  
-4.38 0.57 0.000 
    
Food Production 
Index (2004-2006 = 
100) 
-2825.20 519.84 0.000 
    
Income Share Held 
by the Highest 20% 
5.31E+05 1.81E+05 0.008 
        
 
















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -6125.65 5762.76 0.299 0.723 0.685 19.122 0.000 
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Tertiary (% Gross) 
15599.12 5482.09 0.009 
    
Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued  
-2.83 0.84 0.003 
  
    
Mexican Migration Law  22859.99 10176.56 0.035         
 
































B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) 36873.50 22584.34 0.123 0.779 0.735 17.618 0.000 
DACA  32389.20 6362.97 0.000 
    
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of 
GDP)  
5.33E+05 1.86E+05 0.012 
  
    
Regulatory 
Quality: 
Percentile Rank  
-1.16E+05 51215.44 0.038 
  
    
2 (Constant) 87317.46 13805.80 0.000 0.920 0.897 40.150 0.000 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of 
GDP)  
4.95E+05 1.17E+05 0.001 
  
    
Regulatory 
Quality: 
Percentile Rank  
-2.49E+05 34623.12 0.000 
  
    
Aliens 
Removed With 
Criminal Status  
4.58 0.52 0.000 
      
Worldwide 
Coffee Price 
Year Open  
-15579.24 5467.10 0.013 
    




-1.44E+05 18718.25 0.000 
  




6.76 0.39 0.000 
    
Worldwide 
Coffee Price 
Year Open  
-14825.46 2127.23 0.000 











1.24E+06 1.12E+05 0.000 




30342.16 13124.84 0.043 
    
Unemployment, 





4.68E+05 1.00E+05 0.001 
    
Arable Land (% 
of Land Area) 
-1.31E+06 3.47E+05 0.004 
    
Inflation (% 
Change in 
Average CPI)  
1.23E+05 44970.66 0.021 
        
 















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 7949.298 3703.874 0.060 0.993 0.987 160.159 0.000 
Average Number of Days 
an Immigration Case is 
Open) 
-219.221 17.756 0.000 
    
TVPRA Expansion  28082.738 2809.370 0.000 
    
Percentage of Cases 




79542.650 11364.700 0.000 
    
Immunization, DPT – 
Diphtheria, Tetanus, 
Pertussis (% of Children 
Ages 12-23 Months)  
2.50E+05 30796.171 0.000 
    
Current Health 
Expenditure Per Capita, 
PPP (Current 
International $)  
258.201 60.180 0.002 
    
Employment in Industry 
(% of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
3.82E+05 6.85E+04 0.000 
    
Aliens Removed Total 
(Criminal and 
Noncriminal Status) 
0.463 0.156 0.016 
    
Infant Mortality Rate per 
1,000 Live Births 
9449.609 3998.071 0.042 
        
 


















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -6200.06 40956.74 0.882 0.901 0.882 45.717 0.000 
Immigration Court Cases 
in Backlog  
2.13 0.20 0.000 
    
Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued  
-4.76 0.72 0.000 
  
    
Rule of Law: Estimate  -1.74E+05 50869.61 0.004         
 












B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 60185.57 4543.23 0.000 0.991 0.985 165.110 0.000 
Nonimmigrant Visas 
Issued  
-5.37 0.29 0.000 
    
Agricultural Land (% of 
Land Area) 
-8.14E+06 5.45E+05 0.000 
    
Poverty Headcount 
Ratio at $5.50 a Day 
(2011 PPP) (% of 
Population) 
4.14E+05 45037.82 0.000 
    
GDP Deflator (Base 
Year Varies by 
Country) 
-2733.19 447.89 0.000 
    
International Tourism, 
Receipts (in Current 
US$)  
-2.96E-04 4.13E-05 0.000 
    
Persons Naturalized 3.73 0.90 0.002 
    
School Enrollment 
Ratio, Primary (% 
Gross)  
2326.13 631.16 0.004 
        
 








Mexico – 1980–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 




B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) 1.04E+06 2.36E+05 0.000 0.861 0.849 72.376 0.000 
Internet Users, Total 
(% of Population)  
-2.66E+06 2.79E+05 0.000 
    
Exports of Goods and 
Services (% of GDP) 
2.67E+06 7.95E+05 0.002 
  
    
Unemployment, Total 
(% of Total Labor 
Force) (National 
Estimate)  
-62047.17 19092.74 0.003 
  
    
2 (Constant) 2.41E+06 3.31E+05 0.000 0.914 0.901 70.142 0.000 
Internet Users, Total 
(% of Population) 
-2.02E+06 1.30E+05 0.000 
        
U.S. Unemployment, 
Total (% of Total 
Labor Force) 
(National Estimate)  
-68872.57 15354.52 0.000 
        
U.S. Inflation (% 
Change in Average 
CPI) 
-29671.09 12467.52 0.023 
        
Persons Naturalized  1.28 0.45 0.007         
Gross Capital 
Formation (% of 
GDP)  
-3.56E+06 1.52E+06 0.025 
        
 












B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -5167.80 28942.63 0.859 0.118 0.094 4.823 0.035 
Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (% of GDP)  
-2.01E+06 9.17E+05 0.035 
        
 








Mexico – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 




B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) -2.25E+06 6.75E+05 0.002 0.937 0.925 79.307 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 
100 People)  
-22083.32 1369.41 0.000 
  
    
Persistence to Last 
Grade of Primary, 
Total (% of Cohort)  
9.96E+05 6.22E+05 0.119 
  
    
Worldwide Coffee 
Price Year Close 
2.05E+05 51002.04 0.000 
      
Primary Completion 
Rate (% of Cohort)  
2.45E+06 8.53E+05 0.007 
    
Inflation (% Change 
in Average CPI)  
-3.10E+05 1.07E+05 0.007 
    
Exports of Goods 
and Services (% of 
GDP)  
1.75E+06 7.59E+05 0.027 
    
2 (Constant) -1.38E+06 5.87E+05 0.025 0.956 0.946 96.510 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 
100 People)  
-20303.46 1610.76 0.000 
    
    
Worldwide Coffee 
Price Year Close  
2.79E+05 47102.20 0.000 
    
    
Primary Completion 
Rate (% of Cohort)  
2.21E+06 6.94E+05 0.003 
        
Inflation (% Change 
in Average CPI)  
-5.27E+05 7.48E+04 0.000 
        
Exports of Goods 
and Services (% of 
GDP) 
2.66E+06 5.57E+05 0.000 
        
Real GDP Growth 
(Annual % Change) 
-2.21E+06 6.05E+05 0.001 
        
TVPRA -1.85E+05 87929.31 0.043         
 
















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 52354.30 30240.15 0.093 0.514 0.456 8.742 0.000 
Immunization, Measles (% 
of Children 12-23 Months)  
4.58E+05 2.22E+05 0.047 
    
    
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People)  
-24822.45 7489.90 0.002 
    
    
Immunization, BCG 
(Tuberculosis) (% of 1-
Year-Old Children) 
-9.27E+05 2.44E+05 0.001 
        
Domestic Credit Provided 
by Financial Sector (% of 
GDP) 
9.29E+05 3.87E+05 0.022 
        
 




































B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) -7.05E+06 2.16E+06 0.004 0.969 0.963 169.103 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 
100 People)  
-18603.76 1438.84 0.000 
  
    
Employment in 





-3.97E+06 1.53E+06 0.016 
  
    
Labor Force 
Participation 





1.33E+07 3.17E+06 0.000 
    
Employment in 





6.11E+06 2.43E+06 0.019 
    
2 (Constant) -3.36E+05 1.97E+06 0.866 0.998 0.997 1142.33 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 
100 People)  
-10690.22 1105.15 0.000 
  
    
Labor Force 
Participation 





1.55E+07 1.05E+06 0.000 
  
    
Employment in 





1.33E+07 8.29E+05 0.000 






to Private Sector 
by Banks (% of 
GDP) 
-2.59E+06 3.07E+05 0.000 




3.78E+05 1.61E+05 0.031 
    
Physicians (per 
1,000 People)  
1.78E+05 21155.19 0.000 




-2.15E+07 5.62E+06 0.001 
    
Education Index  8.14E+06 3.18E+06 0.020     
3 (Constant) -3.36E+05 1.97E+06 0.866 0.998 0.997 1142.33 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 
100 People)  
-1.07E+04 1105.152 0.000 
  
    
Labor Force 
Participation 





1.55E+07 1.05E+06 0.000 
  
    
Employment in 





1.33E+07 8.29E+05 0.000 
    
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
by Banks (% of 
GDP) 
-2.59E+06 3.07E+05 0.000 





3.78E+05 1.61E+05 0.031 
    
Physicians (per 
1,000 People)  
1.78E+05 21155.193 0.000 




-2.15E+07 5.62E+06 0.001 
    










100 People)  
-14558.35 699.31 0.000 
  
    
Employment in 





1.55E+07 5.94E+05 0.000 
  
    
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
by Banks (% of 
GDP) 
-1.81E+06 1.62E+05 0.000 
      
Physicians (per 
1,000 People)  
1.75E+05 15107.53 0.000 




-3.41E+07 2.36E+06 0.000 
    
Education Index  1.16E+07 1.25E+06 0.000 









1.27E+07 4.67E+05 0.000 




(% of GDP)  
-6.51E+05 1.65E+05 0.001 
    
5 (Constant) 8.93E+06 9.99E+05 0.000 0.999 0.999 2761.85 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 
100 People)  
-13943.24 646.01 0.000 
    
    
Employment in 





1.59E+06 5.95E+05 0.016 
    











1.59E+07 5.41E+05 0.000 
        
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
by Banks (% of 
GDP) 
-2.04E+06 1.65E+05 0.000 
        
Physicians (per 
1,000 People)   
1.71E+05 13104.83 0.000 




-3.20E+07 2.18E+06 0.000 
        
Education Index 1.11E+07 1.10E+06 0.000 









1.29E+07 4.12E+05 0.000 




(% of GDP)  
-6.95E+05 1.43E+05 0.000 
        
 

















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) -1.37E+05 17041.23 0.000 0.999 0.998 9.1E+02 0.000 
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
(% of GDP)  
-3.00E+06 71166.87 0.000 
  
    
Labor Force 
Participation 





1.68E+07 3.18E+05 0.000 
  
    
Employment in 





1.29E+07 3.60E+05 0.000 
    
Physicians (per 
1,000 People)  
1.51E+05 4244.29 0.000 
    
Trade in Services 
(% of GDP)  
9.53E+06 3.59E+05 0.000 
    
Fixed Telephone 
Subscriptions 
(per 100 People)  
-16131.69 3201.54 0.001 




Added (% of 
GDP) 
-1.38E+07 8.68E+05 0.000 
    
Mexican 
Migration Law  
81447.17 5768.82 0.000 
    
Poverty Gap at 
$1.90 a Day 
(2011 PPP) (%) 
2.09E+06 1.77E+05 0.000 
    
Income Share 
Held by Second 
20%  
1.23E+07 1.25E+06 0.000 










-5.14E+05 81049.57 0.000 
    
Internet Access, 
Total (% of 
Population)  
-4.35E+05 76136.84 0.000 
    
U.S. 
Unemployment, 




11352.88 1898.84 0.000 
    




0.00 0.00 0.001 
    
U.S. Inflation (% 
Change in 
Average CPI) 
6945.69 2951.58 0.040 
    
2 (Constant) -1.61E+05 786.39 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.79E+05 0.000 
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
(% of GDP)  
-2.83E+06 4231.10 0.000 
    
    
Labor Force 
Participation 





1.55E+07 29035.61 0.000 
        
Employment in 





1.35E+07 22258.78 0.000 
        
Physicians (per 
1,000 People)  
1.59E+05 222.74 0.000 
        
Trade in Services 
(% of GDP) 
9.47E+06 18049.45 0.000 
        
Fixed Telephone 
Subscriptions 
(per 100 People) 
-7564.42 190.56 0.000 








Added (% of 
GDP) 
-1.29E+07 52972.85 0.000 
        
Mexican 
Migration Law 
91119.60 273.84 0.000 
        
Income Share 
Held by Second 
20%  
1.57E+07 1.41E+05 0.000 






-4.46E+05 3681.29 0.000 
        
Internet Users, 
Total (% of 
Population)  
-4.33E+05 3974.65 0.000 
        
U.S. 
Unemployment, 




14978.98 93.42 0.000 
        




0.00 0.00 0.000 
        
U.S. Inflation (% 
Change in 
Average CPI) 
15223.37 176.73 0.000 
        
Poverty 
Headcount Ratio 
at $1.90 a Day 
(2011 PPP) (% of 
Population) 
2.39E+06 45177.09 0.000 
        
Adolescent 
Fertility Rate 
(Births per 1,000 
Women Ages 15-
19) 
19886.32 370.44 0.000 
        
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of 
GDP) 
-4.57E+05 11108.60 0.000 





Poverty Gap at 
$3.20 a Day 
(2011 PPP) (%) 
-1.47E+06 53403.00 0.000 
        
Income Share 
Held by the 
Lowest 10%  
1.83E+06 1.38E+05 0.000 
        
Gross Domestic 
Savings (% of 
GDP) 
-87214.44 9087.90 0.001 
        
Income Share 
Held by the 
Highest 10%  
-92225.93 23431.81 0.017 
        
 












Mexico – 1992–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 





B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -3.15E+06 8.37E+05 0.001 0.993 0.990 381.801 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People) 
-30361.06 1546.88 0.000 
    
    
Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate, Total 
(% of Total Population 
Ages 15+) (National 
Estimate) 
1.26E+07 1.78E+06 0.000 
    
    
Trade (% of GDP)  1.12E+06 2.49E+05 0.000 
        
Manufacturing, Value 
Added (% of GDP)  
-1.04E+07 1.52E+06 0.000 
        
Coffee (Green) Supply 
(in 1,000 60 KG Bags) 
176.02 29.06 0.000 
        
Industry (Including 
Construction), Value 
Added (% of GDP)  
-3.96E+06 8.94E+05 0.000 
        
GDP per Person 
Employed (Constant 
2011 PPP $)  
45.75 15.27 0.007 
        
 















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 8778.22 30924.63 0.779 0.700 0.642 12.225 0.000 
Coffee (Green) 
Supply (in 1,000 60 
KG Bags) 
114.26 37.84 0.007 
  
    
Domestic Credit 
Provided by 
Financial Sector (% 
of GDP)  
1.72E+06 4.68E+05 0.001 




-18816.63 6179.42 0.006 
    
Trade (% of GDP) 9.83E+05 4.33E+05 0.034         
 




































B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -1.95E+07 5.74E+05 0.000 1.000 0.999 2484.200 0.000 
Age Dependency Ratio 
(% of Working-Age 
Population) 
1.35E+07 3.35E+05 0.000 
    
    
Employment in 
Industry (% of Total 
Employment) (Modeled 
ILO Estimate) 
6.65E+06 6.39E+05 0.000 
    
    
Labor Force 
Participation Rate, 
Total (% of Total 
Population Ages 15+) 
(National Estimate) 
2.06E+07 1.14E+06 0.000 
        
Physicians (per 1,000 
People) 
2.08E+05 18112.47 0.000 
        
Total Investment as a % 
of GDP 
-7.58E+06 8.28E+05 0.000 
        
Trade (% of GDP) 1.26E+06 1.39E+05 0.000 
        
Domestic General 
Government Health 
Expenditure (% of 
General Government 
Expenditure) 
-5.86E+06 1.25E+06 0.001 
        
Industry (Including 
Construction), Value 
Added (% of GDP) 
-1.07E+06 4.05E+05 0.026 
        
Percentage of Cases 
Resulting in Stay in 
United States (Relief/ 
Terminated/ 
Closure) 
39652.43 16356.17 0.038 
        
 















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -1.10E+05 16937.87 0.000 0.902 0.872 30.043 0.000 
Labor Force Participation 
Rate, Total (% of Total 
Population Ages 15+) 
(National Estimate) 
2.57E+07 3.15E+06 0.000 
    
    
International Tourism, 
Number of Arrivals 
0.04 0.01 0.000 
        
Physicians (per 1,000 
People) 
86652.21 26239.71 0.006 
        
Mean Years of Schooling -2.02E+05 79535.50 0.025         
 












B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 3.55E+05 150595.86 0.034 0.987 0.983 267.976 0.000 
Fixed Broadband 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People) 
-89356.30 4670.25 0.000 
    
    
Exports of Goods and 
Services (% of GDP) 
2.80E+06 4.94E+05 0.000 
        
Inflation (% Change in 
Average CPI)  
3.46E+06 8.41E+05 0.001 
        
People Obtaining Legal 
Permanent Resident 
Status 
-1.21 0.49 0.028 
        
 



















        B  SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -12665.57 1.01 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.0E+11 0.000 
People Obtaining Legal 
Permanent Resident Status  
-1.54 0.00 0.000 
  
      
Exports of Goods and 
Services (% of GDP)  
1.99E+06 7.68 0.000 
    
    
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People)  
-15268.20 0.04 0.000 
        
Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate, Total (% 
of Total Population Ages 
15+) (National Estimate)  
5.08E+06 28.68 0.000 
        
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued -0.14 0.00 0.000 
        
Worldwide Coffee Price 
Annual % Change 
-95499.97 0.54 0.000 
        
Domestic Credit Provided by 
Financial Sector (% of GDP) 
-1.19E+06 9.23 0.000 
        
Domestic General 
Government Health 
Expenditure (% of General 
Government Expenditure)  
1.55E+06 18.71 0.000 
        
Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day 
(2011 PPP) (%) 
-1.37E+06 37.72 0.000 
        
Employment in Agriculture 
(% of Total employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
2.26E+06 54.25 0.000 
        
GNI Growth (Annual %)  -58602.06 60.77 0.001 
        
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing, Value Added (% of 
GDP) 
1.48E+06 176.97 0.000 
        
Real GDP Growth (Annual 
% Change)  
2.13E+05 70.53 0.000 
        




0.04 0.00 0.001 





Age Dependency Ratio, 
Young (% of Working-Age 
Population)  
36090.51 106.19 0.002 
        
Industry (Including 
Construction), Value Added 
(% of GDP) 
-1299.36 24.30 0.012 
        
 


























B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -380.93 317.93 0.244 0.520 0.454 7.932 0.001 
GDP as a % of U.S. GDP 
(Constant 2010 USD) 
-2.04E+07 4.90E+06 0.000 
        
Employment in Industry 
(% of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
62762.75 22393.00 0.010 
        
Mean Years of Schooling  6615.95 3186.86 0.050         
 












B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -380.93 317.93 0.244 0.520 0.454 7.932 0.001 
GDP as a % of U.S. 
GDP (Constant 2010 
USD) 
-2.04E+07 4.90E+06 0.000 
        
Employment in 




62762.75 22393.00 0.010 
        
Mean Years of 
Schooling  
6615.95 3186.86 0.050 
        
 
















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) 1932.943 555.492 0.002 0.684 0.627 11.926 0.000 
TVPRA Expansion  3539.07 967.70 0.001 
  
    
Real GDP Growth 
(Annual % 
Change) 
-75922.01 17274.59 0.000 
  





27053.46 10644.60 0.019 
      
U.S. GDP per 
Capita Growth 
(Annual %) 
57589.11 22718.19 0.019 
    
2 (Constant) 8594.73 1504.58 0.000 0.719 0.668 14.061 0.000 
Real GDP Growth 
(Annual % 
Change) 
-93527.10 15665.26 0.000 





25484.16 10086.06 0.019 
        
U.S. GDP per 
Capita Growth 
(Annual %) 
69539.55 21367.71 0.004 
        
Unemployment, 




-89906.24 21364.61 0.000 
        
 















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 592.11 149.61 0.001 0.896 0.882 63.451 0.000 
GDP as a % of U.S. GDP 
(Constant 2010 USD) 
-1.22E+08 1.23E+07 0.000 
        
GDP Per Capita as a % of 
U.S. GDP Per Capita 
(Constant 2010 USD)  
2.37E+06 440413.26 0.000 
        
Immunization, Polio (% of 
1-Year-Old Children)  
-19742.37 5787.68 0.003 
        
 
















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 14855.16 3707.60 0.005 0.999 0.999 1143.99 0.000 
Remittances as a Share of 
GDP  
1.07E+05  2302.37 0.000 
    
Child Mortality Rate Under 
5 Years (per 1,000 Live 
Births) 
268.38 19.67 0.000 
    
Domestic Private Health 
Expenditure (% of Current 
Health Expenditure)  
-5951.93 664.80 0.000 
    
Average Number of Days an 
Immigration Case is Open  
-8.46 0.50 0.000 
    
People Using Basic 
Sanitation Services % of the 
Population  
61839.66 2818.48 0.000 
    
Access to Electricity (% of 
Population)  
-52149.61 2198.21 0.000 
    
Internet Users, Total (% of 
Population)  
34317.27 2199.00 0.000 
    
Mean Years of Schooling  -4577.50 379.96 0.000 
    




0.41 0.07 0.000 
    
Coffee (Green) Supply (in 
1,000 60 KG Bags) 
0.31 0.06 0.001 
    
Employment in Industry (% 
of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
-6733.63 2542.06 0.033 
        
 















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 13386.88 137.29 0.000 1.000 1.000 9762.167 0.000 
Average Number of 
Days an Immigration 
Case is Open  
-13.40 0.09 0.000 
    
    
Population Growth 
(Annual %)  
-8779.79 96.78 0.000 
    
    
Access to Electricity (% 
of Population)  
-26259.04 568.99 0.000 
        
GDP Deflator (Base 
Year Varies by Country)  
-120.89 1.87 0.000 
        
Aliens Removed Total 
(Criminal and 
Noncriminal Status) 
-0.68 0.02 0.000 
        
Coffee (Green) Supply 
(in 1,000 60 KG Bags) 
0.86 0.01 0.000 
        
Gross National Savings 
as a % of GDP 
9843.32 596.05 0.000 
        
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net Inflows 
(% of GDP) 
-7504.59 281.31 0.000 




-29.42 0.96 0.000 
        
Internet Users, Total (% 
of Population) 
8407.00 524.97 0.000 
        
Mean Years of 
Schooling  
-702.50 102.94 0.001 
        
Gross Domestic Savings 
(% of GDP)  
4111.67 844.02 0.005 
        
 









Nicaragua – 2001–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -34797.22 9976.73 0.004 0.958 0.943 60.036 0.000 




-254.99 36.19 0.000 
        
Homicide Rate  -348.71 91.00 0.002 
        
Agricultural Land (% of 
Land Area)  
1.15E+05  19262.75 0.000 
        
Unemployment, Total (% 
of Total Labor Force) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate)  
-56927.71 14376.27 0.002 
        
Rule of Law: Estimate -5735.00 1978.57 0.012         
 




























Nicaragua – 2002–2019 1-Year Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 3090.21 4.07 0.000 1.000 1.000 7.56E+06 0.000 
GDP as a % of U.S. GDP 
(Constant 2010 USD)  
-1.85E+08 94201.56 0.000 
    
GDP Per Capita as a % of 
U.S. GDP per Capita 
(constant 2010 USD) 
4.34E+06 3157.54 0.000 
    
Immunization, HepB3 (% of 
1-Year-Old Children)  
-23530.88 29.44 0.000 
    
People Using Basic 
Sanitation Services % of the 
Population  
-1.63E+05 7475.97 0.002 
    
Homicide Rate  867.58 0.74 0.000 
    
Domestic Credit Provided 
by Financial Sector (% of 
GDP)  
10678.05 22.59 0.000 
    
Employment in Services (% 
of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate) 
-32212.77 55.36 0.000 
    
Immunization, Measles (% 
of Children 12-23 Months)  
-6401.62 14.88 0.000 
    
Nonimmigrant Visas Issued 0.23 4.26E-04 0.000 
    
Gross Capital Formation (% 
of GDP)  
-2077.51 12.48 0.000 
    
Aliens Removed Total 
(Criminal and Noncriminal 
Status)  
-0.10 0.00 0.000 
    
Life Expectancy  -404.57 17.78 0.002 
    
TVPRA Expansion  88.75 1.56 0.000 
    
Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (% of GDP) 
-575.60 18.06 0.001 
    
People Practicing Open 
Defecation (% of 
Population) 
1.14E+05 13247.87 0.013 
        
 







Latin America – 1980–2018 No Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -1.36E+06 9.56E+05 0.164 0.898 0.882 57.877 0.000 
TVPRA  -6.08E+05 7.17E+04 0.000 
        
USA Inflation (% Change 
in Average CPI)  
-3.31E+04 1.07E+04 0.004 
        
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Primary (% Gross)  
3.33E+04 7.72E+03 0.000 
        
Gross National Savings as 
a % of GDP  
-7.37E+06 1.49E+06 0.000 
        
GNI Growth (Annual %)  3.71E+06 9.97E+05 0.001         
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -1.4E+05 44855.67 0.005 0.63
9 
0.583 11.350 0.000 
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Primary (% Gross)  
22057.62 7227.37 0.005 
  
    
Agricultural Land (% of Land 
Area)  
8.06E+07 1.81E+07 0.000 
  
    
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing, Value Added (Annual 
% Growth)  
-4.10E+06 9.34E+05 0.000 
      
U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %)  4.40E+06 1.20E+06 0.001 
  
    
Immunization, Polio (% of 1-
Year-Old Children) 
-1.49E+06 5.98E+05 0.018 
    
    
 












Latin America – 1981–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 2.20E+06 3.68E+05 0.000 0.763 0.742 37.466 0.000 
TVPRA -6.54E+05 7.74E+04 0.000 
    
Gross National Savings as a % 
of GDP  
-6.55E+06 1.85E+06 0.001 
  
    
U.S. GDP Growth (Annual %)  4.99E+06 1.87E+06 0.012         
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 15243.06 28980.59 0.602 0.278 0.258 13.871 0.001 
School Enrollment Ratio, 
Secondary (% Gross)  
-20686.84 5554.45 0.001 
    
    
 

















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -1.28E+06 9.84E+05 0.206 0.964 0.958 148.373 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People)  
-11846.16 655.11 0.000 
    
    
Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishing, Value 
Added (% of GDP)  
-2.75E+07 3.41E+06 0.000 
    
    
Employment in Industry 
(% of Total 
Employment) (Modeled 
ILO Estimate) 
1.94E+07 4.86E+06 0.001 
        
U.S. GDP Growth 
(Annual %) 
3.68E+06 1.35E+06 0.012 
        
 





Latin America – 1993–2018 No Time Lag Difference-in-Differences Stepwise Regression Model 
 
  Unstandardized Coefficients 
p 
Model Summary 
Significant Variables B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -54283.62 27101.91 0.057 0.441 0.392 9.059 0.001 
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing, Value Added (% of 
GDP)  
-2.39E+07 6.31E+06 0.001 
    
Labor force Participation Rate, 
Total (% of Total Population 
Ages 15+) (National Estimate)  
-7.47E+06 3.13E+06 0.025 
    
    
 








Latin America – 1993–2019 1-Year Time Lag Stepwise Regression Model 





B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -2.12E+07 4.72E+06 0.000 0.957 0.947 93.020 0.000 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People)  
-13068.47 1726.29 0.000 
    
U.S. GDP per Capita 
Growth (Annual %)  
4.05E+06 1.82E+06 0.037 
    
Agricultural Land (% of 
Land Area)  
7.03E+07 1.49E+07 0.000 
    
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing, Value Added 
(Constant 2010 USD) 
-1.11E-05 0.00 0.007 
    
People Obtaining Legal 
Permanent Resident Status 
-0.92 0.42 0.038 
        
 












B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -11565.88 49196.04 0.816 0.315 0.256 5.299 0.013 
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions (per 100 
People) 
-19759.22 6887.39 0.009 
    
Arable Land (% of 
Land Area)  
8.65E+07 3.80E+07 0.032 
        
 




















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -3.80E+07 8.34E+06 0.000 0.927 0.918 101.167 0.000 
Age Dependency 
Ratio (% of Working-
Age Population)  
2.44E+07 3.79E+06 0.000 
        
Agricultural Land (% 
of Land Area) 
6.89E+07 1.71E+07 0.001 
        
 

















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
1 (Constant) -1.213E+05 4.708E+04 0.023 0.814 0.756 14.204 0.000 
International 
Tourism, Number of 
Arrivals  
4.001E-02 6.275E-03 0.000 
  
    
Aliens Removed 
Total (Criminal and 
Noncriminal Status) 
3.387E+00 7.337E-01 0.000 
  
    
U.S. Inflation (% 
Change in Average 
CPI)  
-7.487E+04 2.141E+04 0.004 
      
Arable Land (% of 
land Area)  
5.135E+07 2.162E+07 0.034 
      
2 (Constant) -2.003E+05 2.684E+04 0.000 0.934 0.906 33.936 0.000 
International 
Tourism, Number of 
Arrivals  
2.821E-02 3.940E-03 0.000 
    
Arable Land (% of 
land Area)  
1.376E+08 1.582E+07 0.000 




Added (Annual % 
Growth)  
-3.293E+06 4.498E+05 0.000 
    
TVPRA Expansion  1.252E+05 3.566E+04 0.004 
    
Pupil-Teacher 
Ratio, Primary (% 
of Cohort)  
1.143E+05 4.678E+04 0.031 
        
 
















B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) -2.90E+07 4.97E+06 0.000 0.969 0.957 81.969 0.000 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions 
(per 100 People)  
-24281.89 2343.26 0.000 
        
Agricultural Land (% of Land 
Area)  
7.35E+07 1.06E+07 0.000 
        
Aliens Removed with 
Criminal Status 
2.49 0.84 0.011 
        
Immunization, Measles (% of 
Children 12-23 Months)  
4.80E+06 1.55E+06 0.008 
        
People Obtaining Legal 
Permanent Resident Status  
-0.94 0.35 0.019 
        
 











B SE R2 Adjusted R2 F p 
(Constant) 2.79E+05 65812.00 0.001 0.718 0.657 11.875 0.000 
School Enrollment 
Ratio, Tertiary (% 
Gross)  
-2.42E+05 41246.43 0.000 
    
Persons Naturalized  1.07 0.29 0.002 
    
Literacy Rate, Adult 
Total (% of people Ages 
15 and Above)  
3.27E+05 1.16E+05 0.013 
        
 








Immigration Related Figures 
Figure 10  
 




Note. Figure shows how Southwest Border USBP apprehensions account for between 90%–99% of all 
USBP apprehensions. Since 1986 Southwest Border USBP apprehensions account for over 97% of all 
nationwide USBP apprehensions. This is one of the key reasons why this study focused solely on 
apprehensions along the Southwest Border and why the Southwest Border is the focus of most studies and 



































































































Nationwide and Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions 1980-2019





Figure 11  
 
Mexico and Other Than Mexican – Nationwide USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Figure shows how nationwide apprehensions look no different than Southwest Border 
apprehensions. This figure looks almost identical to Figure 3 which has Mexican and OTM USBP 










































































































Mexico and OTM - Nationwide USBP Apprehensions 1980-2019







OTM and Northern Triangle – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)  
 
 
Note. This figure shows how OTMs have always been largely made up of Northern Triangle 











































































































OTM and Northern Triangle - Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions 1980-2019







Latin American – Southwest Border USBP Apprehensions (1980–2019)  
 
 
Note. This figure, coupled with Figures 10 and 11, shows how Latin American apprehensions along the 
Southwest Border have largely been made up from Mexican and Northern Triangle apprehensions. This is 
one of the reasons why historically Mexico, and more recently the Northern Triangle, are the focus of 









































































































Nicaragua – Southwest Border USBP Nicaragua (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Due to small apprehension numbers in comparison to Mexico and the Northern Triangle, Nicaragua 
is generally not a topic of great interest. However, as can be seen in this figure, the large spike in recent 







































































































El Salvador – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant 
out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to 
their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of 
more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to 
implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be 











































































Guatemala – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant 
out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to 
their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of 
more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to 
implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be 







































































Guatemala - Alien Removed by Criminal and Non-Criminal Status 1993-2019 











Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant 
out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to 
their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of 
more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to 
implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be 










































































Honduras - Aliens Removed by Non-Crimal or Crimal Status 1993-2019 







Mexico – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant 
out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to 
their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of 
more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that, in the mid-2000s, CBP began to 
implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be 
due to the use of ERs. ERs began to replace VRs for Mexican migrants in the mid-2000s suggesting the 















































































Nicaragua – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant 
out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to 
their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of 
more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that in the mid-2000s, CBP began to 
implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be 



































































Nicaragua - Aliens Removed by Non-Crimal or Crimal Status 1993-2019 







Latin America – Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Noncriminal Status (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Removals are the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable migrant 
out of the United States based on an order of removal. This figure shows formal removals of migrants to 
their country of citizenship. However, it is difficult to discern if removals are more of consequences of 
more apprehensions, of different policy, or both. It must be noted that in the mid-2000s, CBP began to 
implement ERs as part of the use removal process. This might suggest the increase in removals might be 
due to the use of ERs. On the other hand, apprehensions during that time from Central America (including 





































































Latin America - Aliens Removed by Non-Crimal or Crimal Status 1993-2019 







Northern Triangle – Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible at Ports of Entry (2005–2019) 
 
Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land 
borders and airports) by CBP’s Office of Field Operations. Like USBP apprehensions, the lion’s share of 
arrests occurs on the Southwest Border for migrants from the Northern Triangle. The purpose of this 
figure is to highlight that although most Northern Triangle apprehensions are USBP related, there are 
other DHS and CBP components that must deal with the influx of Northern Triangle immigrants at the 















































Northern Triangle - Aliens Inadmissible 2005-2019







Mexico – Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible at All Field Offices (2005–2019) 
 
Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land 
borders and airports) by CBP’s Office of Field Operations. The purpose of this figure is to highlight that 
while most Mexican apprehensions are USBP related, there are other DHS and CBP components that 
























































Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible by Southwest Border Field Office (2005–2019) 
 
Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land 
borders and airports) by CBP’s Office of Field Operations. These POEs are in field offices that are 
located along the Southwest Border. The purpose of this figure is to highlight that while most 
apprehensions along the Southwest Border are USBP related, there are other DHS and CBP components 














































Aliens Inadmissable by Southwest Border Field Office 2005-2019







Total Aliens Found to Be Inadmissible Along All Southwest Border Field Offices (2005–2019) 
 
Note. These are arrests at the ports of entry (POE). These arrests are done at POEs (which include land 
borders and airports) by CBP’s Office of Field Operations. These POEs are in field offices that are 
located along the Southwest Border. The purpose of this figure is to highlight that while most 
apprehensions along the Southwest Border are USBP related, there are other DHS and CBP components 





















































Credible Fear Cases and Percentage of Cases With Credible Fear Found (2007–2019) 
 
Note. This figure highlights the increase in credible fear claims and the high approval rates for credible 
fear claims by asylum officers. It must be noted that a credible fear claim being approved by an asylum 
officer is only the first step and does not grant a migrant asylum. After credible fear is found by an 
asylum officer for migrants apprehended at the border, they are referred to an immigration judge for an 
immigration hearing where they can petition for asylum. Many immigration officials argue the increase in 
credible fear claims and the low bar for credible fear approval burdens the court system creating a huge 
backlog of cases. As of 2020, 18.1% of Salvadorans, 14.2% of Guatemalans, 12.7% of Hondurans, and 
15% of Mexicans are granted asylum by immigration judges (Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse, 2020). In other words, despite the over 70% credible fear approval rate by asylum 
officers, only a fraction of those credible fear claims win their asylum cases. Many argue credible fear is 
used as a loophole that forces immigration agencies to release migrants into the country due to limited 
bedspace.  
















































Credible Fear Cases Completed and Credible Fear Approval Rate 2007-2019







Southwest Border USBP Family Unit Apprehensions (2012–2019) 
 
 
Note. CBP began officially recording family unit data in 2012. This is one of the reasons why strictly focusing on 
family units or UACs (began to be recorded in 2007) does not allow you to produce a long enough time series to 
adequately study the issue. Regardless, since CBP began to track this data, it is clear how the number of family unit 
apprehensions skyrocketed. Many immigration officials blame changes in policy, especially the expansion of 
TVPRA in 2015 which resulted in the release of family units similar to UACs. In other words, you could not detain 
family units resulting in their release. Other experts cite they are fleeing poverty and violence from their home 
countries. Something else of interest that is often highlighted by immigration officials is fraud. According to 
immigration officials, smugglers and migrants use children as a method gain entry and release into the country by 
claiming a child is their son or daughter. In April of 2019, ICE officials stated 101 family units suspected of fraud 
were referred for special investigation resulting in 28.7% (29 family units) of them being fraudulent (Long, 2019). 
In May of 2019, DHS conducted two internal investigation by collecting DNA samples of family units to get a better 
understanding of the issue. In Operation Double Helix 1.0, 19.0% of the samples (16 out of 84 family units) were 
found to be fraudulent based on DNA results. Similarly, Operation Double Helix 2.0 found 15.1% (79 out of 522 
family units), were fraudulent based on DNA results. However, it is important to note these were not random 



































Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions (2007–2019) 
 
Note. CBP began officially recording UAC data in 2007. This is one of the reasons why strictly focusing 
on UACs or family units (began to be recorded in 2012) does not allow you to produce a long enough 
time series to adequately study the issue. Regardless, since CBP began to track this data, it is clear how 
the number of UAC apprehensions from the Northern Triangle skyrocketed. Many immigration officials 
blame changes in policy, especially TVPRA in 2008 for the surge because it dramatically changed 
processing and detention guidelines for UACs from noncontiguous countries (all countries except Mexico 











































Southwest Border USBP UAC Apprehensions 2007-2019







Southwest Border USBP Unaccompanied Children Apprehensions (2007–2019) 
 
 
Note. Although it is hard to see there is a grey line touching the black line. The grey line is the total 
number of UACs apprehended who are from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. Simply put, 




















































Total Southwest Border USBP UAC Apprehensions 2007-2019











Note. Although bed space increased from 1980 to 2010, DHS has not added many beds since then. Also, 
it is important to consider these beds are for all immigrants, including family units and UACs. But due to 
regulation requiring special facilities for children and families, there are only approximately 3,300 beds 
for family units and UACs as of 2019. To provide some perspective as to the magnitude of the problem, 
USBP apprehended 473,682 family units along the Southwest Border in 2019 alone. That number does 
not include 76,020 UAC apprehensions made that same year or the other 126,001 family units and UAC 
apprehensions made by CBP (Office of Field Operations) at the ports of entry along the Southwest 
Border. In other words, in 2019 there were a total of 675,703 CBP related family unit and UAC 
apprehensions and there was only bedspace to detain about 3,300 of them. This is one of the main reasons 










































































































Nonimmigrant Visas Issued (1991–2018) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure show how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall 
region.  
*Nonimmigrants visa refers to visas issued foreign nationals lawfully admitted to the United States for a 
specific purpose and period of time, including tourists, diplomats, students, temporary workers, and 














































































Non-Immigrant Visas Issued 1991-2019







Nonimmigrant Visas Issued (1991–2018) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure show how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a 
closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*Nonimmigrants visa refers to visas issued foreign nationals lawfully admitted to the United States for a 
specific purpose and period of time, including tourists, diplomats, students, temporary workers, and 










































































Non-Immigrant Visas Issued 1991-2019







People Obtaining Legal Permeant Resident Status (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the 
figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Lawful (legal) permanent residents (LPRs), also known as “green card” holders, are noncitizens who are 
lawfully authorized to live permanently in the United States. LPRs may accept an offer of employment without 
special restrictions, own property, receive financial assistance at public colleges and universities, and join the 
Armed Forces. They also may apply to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain eligibility requirements. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides several broad classes of admission for foreign nationals to 
gain LPR status, the largest of which focuses on admitting immigrants for the purpose of family reunification. 
Other major categories include economic and humanitarian immigrants, as well as immigrants from countries 



























































































People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a 






































































































People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall 
region.  
*Naturalization confers U.S. citizenship upon foreign nationals who have fulfilled the requirements 
Congress established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). After naturalization, foreign-born 
citizens enjoy nearly all of the same benefits, rights, and responsibilities that the Constitution protects 











































































































Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a 
closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*Naturalization confers U.S. citizenship upon foreign nationals who have fulfilled the requirements 
Congress established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). After naturalization, foreign-born 
citizens enjoy nearly all of the same benefits, rights, and responsibilities that the Constitution protects 












































































































Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the 
figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because the overall 
number of immigration court cases contribute to overall backlog, the number of court cases from all countries 
is represented instead of just Latin America.  
*Pending Case Counts. Pending cases count all Immigration Court proceedings that remain open at a given 
point in time. The current pending case count represents the latest point in time available that is covered by the 
data. Earlier pending case counts are computed for the last day of the last month in each fiscal year (September 
30). Findings are based upon a detailed analysis of the millions of records covering each deportation 
proceeding initiated by the Department of Homeland Security and its predecessor agency, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, in the Immigration Courts. These individual case records were obtained through 
requests made by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) under the Freedom of Information 
Act to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a unit in the Department of Justice in which these 




















































Immigration Court Cases in Backlog 1998-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a 
closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries, Mexico, and Nicaragua. 
*Pending Case Counts. Pending cases count all Immigration Court proceedings that remain open at a 
given point in time. The current pending case count represents the latest point in time available that is 
covered by the data. Earlier pending case counts are computed for the last day of the last month in each 
























































Immigration Court Cases in Backlog 1998-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the 
figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because the overall 
number of days an immigration case is open contributes to overall backlog, the average number of days an 
immigration case is open for all countries is represented instead of just Latin America.  
*Average Days Pending. Average days measures the average length of time pending cases have been waiting. 
For example, for any case open at the end of a fiscal year, that date (September 30) is compared with the date 
the specific proceeding was opened and the number of days between these two dates is calculated. This is the 
number of days that case has been open. These individual time periods are then summed over all pending 
cases. This sum is finally divided by the number of pending cases to compute average days. For average days 
for a point in time other than at the end of the fiscal year, that date is substituted for September 30 and then the 
























































Average Number of Days an Immigration Case is Open 1998-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case 
backlog contributes to overall backlog, cases resulting in removal or voluntary return for all countries is 
represented instead of just Latin America.  
*Removal Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual 
and issues a removal order. The term “removal” is used in a generic sense and includes orders of 
deportation, exclusion, etc. A removal order bars the individual from returning to the U.S. for a period of 
years, or in some cases permanently. Voluntary Departure Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court 
judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues an order of voluntary departure. A so-called 
“voluntary departure” is when the individual is required to leave the country but is not legally barred from 



















































Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return 1998-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a 
closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua 
*Removal Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual 
and issues a removal order. The term “removal” is used in a generic sense and includes orders of 
deportation, exclusion, etc. A removal order bars the individual from returning to the U.S. for a period of 
years, or in some cases permanently. Voluntary Departure Orders. Cases in which an Immigration Court 
judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues an order of voluntary departure. A so-called 
“voluntary departure” is when the individual is required to leave the country but is not legally barred from 





















































Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return 1998-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the 
figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case backlog 
contributes to overall backlog, percentage cases resulting in removal or voluntary return for all countries is 
represented instead of just Latin America.  
*Share of total cases that resulted in Removal or Voluntary Removal Orders. Cases in which an Immigration 
Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues a removal order. The term “removal” is used 
in a generic sense and includes orders of deportation, exclusion, etc. A removal order bars the individual from 
returning to the U.S. for a period of years, or in some cases permanently. Voluntary Departure Orders. Cases in 
which an Immigration Court judge sustains the charges against the individual and issues an order of voluntary 
departure. A so-called “voluntary departure” is when the individual is required to leave the country but is not 

























































Percentage of Cases Resulting in Removal or Voluntary Return 1998-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the 
figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case backlog 
contributes to overall backlog, number cases resulting in stay in the United States for all countries is 
represented instead of just Latin America.  
*Terminated (no grounds for removal). Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the charges against 
the individual are not sustained and “terminates” the case. Situations where the migrant has established 
eligibility for naturalization can be grounds for termination. Relief Granted: Cases in which an Immigration 
Court judge finds the original charges are sustained but finds provisions in the immigration law entitle the 
individual to “relief” from removal, allowing them to remain in this country. Administrative/Other Closure: 
Cases in which an Immigration Court judge decides not to deport the individual for other unspecified reasons 
or closes the case administratively or because of the failure of the government to prosecute the case. This 
category also includes closures in which the individual is given temporary protected status (Transactional 





















































Cases Resulting in Stay in US (Relief/Terminated/Closed) 1998-2019







Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed) (1998–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. This figure takes a 
closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries, Mexico, and Nicaragua. 
*Terminated (no grounds for removal). Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the charges 
against the individual are not sustained and “terminates” the case. Situations where the migrant has 
established eligibility for naturalization can be grounds for termination. Relief Granted: Cases in which an 
Immigration Court judge finds the original charges are sustained but finds provisions in the immigration 
law entitle the individual to “relief” from removal, allowing them to remain in this country. 
Administrative/Other Closure: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge decides not to deport the 
individual for other unspecified reasons or closes the case administratively or because of the failure of the 
government to prosecute the case. This category also includes closures in which the individual is given 





















































Cases Resulting in Stay in US (Relief/Terminated/Closed) 1998-2019







Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in United States (Relief/Terminated/Closed) (1998–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. In addition, the 
figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors. Because total case backlog 
contributes to overall backlog, percentage cases resulting in stay in the United States for all countries is 
represented instead of just Latin America.  
*Share of total cases that resulted in relief, termination, or closure. Terminated (no grounds for removal). 
Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the charges against the individual are not sustained and 
“terminates” the case. Situations where the migrant has established eligibility for naturalization can be grounds 
for termination. Relief Granted: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge finds the original charges are 
sustained but finds provisions in the immigration law entitle the individual to “relief” from removal, allowing 
them to remain in this country. Administrative/Other Closure: Cases in which an Immigration Court judge 
decides not to deport the individual for other unspecified reasons or closes the case administratively or because 
of the failure of the government to prosecute the case. This category also includes closures in which the 
























































Percentage of Cases Resulting in Stay in US (Relief/Terminated/Closure) 1998-2019







Number of Immigration Judges (1998–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of immigration related indicators gathered for this study 
to get a better sense of immigration trends for the Northern Triangle. The number if immigration judges is 
important in the conversation because of the existing backlog of immigration cases (see Figure 36 and 
37). Despite the increase in immigration judges in recent years, as of 2019 there were 442 immigration 
judges handling a backlog of 1,023,767 immigration cases. One must also consider that, since 2018, there 





































































Socioeconomic Indicator Figures 
Figure 46 
 




Note. Data from 1980-1992 were calculated using total killed or forcefully disappeared count averaged over the 
length of the El Salvadoran Civil War (1979-1992) and 1992 population numbers. The homicide rate is on the 
conservative side because the population numbers used to measure the rate were from 1992 and not the 1980s when 
the population was smaller. Data for killed or disappeared comes from the Report on the UN Truth Commission on 
El Salvador (1993). 
*Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, 
interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory 
violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is 
usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in 
armed conflict is usually committed by cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and is thus usually 















































































































Guatemala – Homicide Rate Using Estimates Over Civil War (1980 – 2019) 
 
 
Note. Data from 1980-1991 were calculated using the total killed or forcefully disappeared count 
averaged over the length of the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996) and 1996 population numbers. The 
homicide rate is on the conservative side because the population numbers used to measure the rate were 
from 1996 and not the 1980s when the population was smaller. Data for killed or disappeared comes from 
Guatemala’s Commission for Historical Clarification (1994). 
*Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic 
disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or 
control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all 
intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups 
usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive 














































































































Homicide Rate for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico (1981–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic 
disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or 
control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all 
intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups 
usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive 





















































































































Real GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Gross domestic product is the most commonly used single measure of a country’s overall economic 
activity. It represents the total value at constant prices of final goods and services produced in a country 































































































Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change) 1980-2019







Real GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Gross domestic product is the most commonly used single measure of a country’s overall economic 
activity. It represents the total value at constant prices of final goods and services produced in a country 





































































































Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change) 1980-2019







GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region 
*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates 
are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 


























































































GDP Growth (Annual % Change) 1980-2019







GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates 
are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 





























































































GDP Growth (Annual % Change) 1980-2019







GDP Per Capita Growth (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. 




































































































GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GDP Per Capita Growth (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. 








































































































GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange 
rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative 







































































































GDP (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange 
rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative 








































































































GDP (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1990–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 

















































































GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 US $) 1990-2018







GDP PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1990–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
























































































GDP PPP (Constant 2011 US $) 1980-2018











Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
























































































GDP PPP (Constant 2011 US $) 1980-2018







GDP PPP Per Person Employed (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1991–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GDP per person employed is gross domestic product (GDP) divided by total employment in the 
economy. Purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP is GDP converted to 2011 constant international dollars 
using PPP rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP that a U.S. dollar has in 











































































GDP PPP Per Person Employed (Constant 2011 US $) 1991-2019







GDP Per Capita as a Percentage of USA Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. 
dollars. The corresponding countries’ GDP Per capita is divided into the U.S. GDP Per Capita to get the 




























































































GDP Per Capita as a % of USA GDP Per Capita (Contant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GDP Per Capita as a Percentage of U.S. GDP Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–
2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. 
dollars. The corresponding countries’ GDP Per capita is divided into the U.S. GDP Per Capita to get the 





























































































GDP Per Capita as a % of USA GDP Per Capita (Contant 2010 US $) 1980-2019






GDP as a Percentage of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region 
*GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange 
rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative 
conversion factor is used. The corresponding countries’ GDP is divided into the U.S. GDP to get the 



























































































GDP as a % of USA GDP (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GDP as a Percentage of U.S. GDP (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange 
rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative 
conversion factor is used. The corresponding countries’ GDP is divided into the U.S. GDP to get the 


























































































GDP as a % of USA GDP (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GDP Per Capita PPP as a Percentage of U.S. GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. 
Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
constant 2011 international dollars. The corresponding countries’ GDP Per Capita PPP s divided into the 
























































































GDP Per Capita PPP as a % of USA GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 US $) 
1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the country plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
constant 2011 international dollars. The corresponding countries’ GDP Per Capita PPP s divided into the 























































































GDP Per Capita PPP as a % of USA GDP Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 US $)   
1980-2019







GDP Deflator (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 




































































































Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Latin America and Mexico. Due to large 
differences in inflation, countries and regions had to be separated and put in different figures. 
*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country’s average level of prices based on the 
cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the 





































































































Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. Due to large 
differences in inflation, countries and regions had to be separated and put in different figures. 
*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country’s average level of prices based on the 
cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the 


































































































Inflation (% Change in Average CPI) 1980-2019







Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Nicaragua. Due to large differences in 
inflation, countries and regions had to be separated and put in different figures. 
*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country’s average level of prices based on the 
cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the 









































































































Personal Remittances Received (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers 
consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from 
nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and 
nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other 
short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents 
employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF’s 
Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees. Data are in current U.S. 





































































































Personal Remittances Received (Current US $) 1980-2019







Personal Remittances Received (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers 
consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from 
nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and 
nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other 
short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents 
employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF’s 
Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees. Data are in current U.S. 






































































































Personal Remittances Received (Current US $) 1980-2019







Remittances as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers 
consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from 
nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and 
nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other 
short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents 
employed by nonresident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the IMF’s 
























































































Remittances (% of GDP) 1980-2019







Total Investment as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. 
Investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total value of the gross fixed capital formation 
and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector (International 



























































































Total Investment (% of GDP) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. 
Investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total value of the gross fixed capital formation 
and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector (International 

































































































Total Investment (% of GDP) 1980-2019







Gross National Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Gross national saving is gross disposable income less final consumption expenditure after taking account 
of an adjustment for pension funds. [SNA 1993] For many countries, estimates of national saving are 
built up from national accounts data on gross domestic investment and from balance of payments-based 
































































































Gross National Saving (% of GDP) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Gross national saving is gross disposable income less final consumption expenditure after taking account 
of an adjustment for pension funds. [SNA 1993] For many countries, estimates of national saving are 
built up from national accounts data on gross domestic investment and from balance of payments-based 
































































































Gross National Saving (% of GDP) 1980-2019







Gross Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  



































































































Gross Savings (% of GDP) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
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Gross Domestic Savings as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption) 





































































































Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption) 
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Gross Capital Formation as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the 
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet 
temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and “work in progress.” According to the 

























































































Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the 
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet 
temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and “work in progress.” According to the 



























































































Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 1980-2019







Trade as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 




































































































Trade (% of GDP) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 
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Trade in Services as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Trade in services is the sum of service exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current 


































































































Trade in Services (% of GDP) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provide a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Trade in services is the sum of service exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current 


































































































Trade in Services (% of GDP) 1980-2019







GNI (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 














































































































GNI (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 















































































































GNI (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GNI Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars) (1990–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the 
same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added 
by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output 
plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data 









































































GNI Per Capita PPP (Constant 2011 US $) 1990-2018







GNI Per Capita Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure looks at how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Annual percentage growth rate of GNI per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. 
GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 
































































































GNI Per Capita Growth (Annual % Change) 1980-2019







GNI Per Capita Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Annual percentage growth rate of GNI per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. 
GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 































































































GNI Per Capita Growth (Annual % Change) 1980-2019







GNI Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum 
of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the 
valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property 






























































































GNI Per Capita (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GNI Per Capita (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*GNI per capita is gross national income divided by midyear population. GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum 
of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the 
valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property 

































































































GNI Per Capita (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







GNI Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 
































































































GNI Growth (Annual % Change) 1980-2019







GNI Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 
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GNI PPP (Constant 2011 Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*PPP GNI (formerly PPP GNP) is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. 
dollar has in the United States. Gross national income is the sum of value added by all resident producers 
plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary 
income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2011 
























































































GNI PPP (Constant 2011 US $) 1990-2018







GNI PPP (Constant 2011 Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*PPP GNI (formerly PPP GNP) is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. 
dollar has in the United States. Gross national income is the sum of value added by all resident producers 
plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary 
income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in constant 2011 
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Gross Savings as a Percentage of GNI (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
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Gross Savings as a Percentage of GNI (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
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Human Development Index (1990–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of achievements in three key dimensions 
of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The 
health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of 
years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of 
school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. 
The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing 
GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using 







































































Human Development Index 1990-2019







Child Mortality Rate for Children Under 5 Years of Age (Per 1,000 Live Births) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Under-5 mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age 5, if 


































































































Child Mortality Rate for Children Under 5 Years (Per 1,000 Live Births) 1980-2019







Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1,000 Live Births) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching 1 year of age, per 1,000 live births in 




































































































Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1,000 Live Births) 1980-2019







Fertility Rate Total Births Per Woman (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to 
the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates of the 































































































Fertility Rate Total Births Per Woman 1980-2018







Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births Per 1,000 Women Ages 15–19) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  



































































































Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births Per 1,000 Women Ages 15-19) 1980-2018







Population Growth (Annual Percentage) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from 
year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, 

































































































Population Growth (Annual %) 1980-2019







Life Expectancy (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns 










































































































Crude Death Rate (Per 1,000 People) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Crude death rate indicates the number of deaths occurring during the year, per 1,000 population 
estimated at midyear. Subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate provides the rate of 






























































































Crude Death Rate (Per 1,000 People) 1980-2018







Malnutrition Prevalence by Height for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) 
(1987–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Prevalence of stunting is the percentage of children under age 5 whose height for age is more than 2 
standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. For 
children up to 2 years old height is measured by recumbent length. For older children height is measured 
by stature while standing. The data are based on the WHO’s new child growth standards released in 2006 













































































Malnutrition Prevalence by Height for Age (% of Children Under 5) 1987-2019







Malnutrition Prevalence by Height for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) 
(1987–2015) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.  
*Prevalence of stunting is the percentage of children under age 5 whose height for age is more than 2 
standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months. For 
children up to 2 years old height is measured by recumbent length. For older children height is measured 
by stature while standing. The data are based on the WHO’s new child growth standards released in 2006 







































































Malnutrition Prevalence by Height for Age (% of Children Under 5) 1987-2015







Malnutrition Prevalence by Weight for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) 
(1987–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Prevalence of underweight children is the percentage of children under age 5 whose weight for age is 
more than 2 standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 













































































Malnutrition Prevalence by Weight for Age (% of Children Under 5) 1987-2019







Malnutrition Prevalence by Weight for Age (Percentage of Children Under 5 Years of Age) 
(1987–2015) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.  
*Prevalence of underweight children is the percentage of children under age 5 whose weight for age is 
more than 2 standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 










































































Malnutrition Prevalence by Weight for Age (% of Children Under 5) 1987-2015







Prevalence of Overweight Population (Percentage of Adults) (1980–2016) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Prevalence of overweight adults is the percentage of adults ages 18 and over whose Body Mass Index 
(BMI) is more than 25 kg/m2. Body Mass Index (BMI) is a simple index of weight-for-height, or the 



























































































Prevalence of Overweight Population (% of Adults) 1980-2016







Global Hunger Index (1990–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Global Hunger Index (GHI) scores are based on the values of four component indicators: 
undernourishment (share of the population with insufficient caloric intake), child wasting (share of 
children under age 5 who have low weight for their height, reflecting acute undernutrition), child stunting 
(share of children under age 5 who have low height for their age, reflecting chronic undernutrition), and 
child mortality (mortality rate of children under age 5, partly reflecting the fatal mix of inadequate 
nutrition and unhealthy environments). Based on the values of the four indicators, the GHI determines 
hunger on a 100-point scale where 0 is the best possible score (no hunger) and 100 is the worst (Global 






































































Global Hunger Index 1990-2019







Global Hunger Index (1990–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.  
*Global Hunger Index (GHI) scores are based on the values of four component indicators: 
undernourishment (share of the population with insufficient caloric intake), child wasting (share of 
children under age 5 who have low weight for their height, reflecting acute undernutrition), child stunting 
(share of children under age 5 who have low height for their age, reflecting chronic undernutrition), and 
child mortality (mortality rate of children under age 5, partly reflecting the fatal mix of inadequate 
nutrition and unhealthy environments). Based on the values of the four indicators, the GHI determines 
hunger on a 100-point scale where 0 is the best possible score (no hunger) and 100 is the worst (Global 





































































Global Hunger Index 1990-2019







Contraceptive Prevalence by Any Method (Percentage of Women Ages 15–49) (1981–2015) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Contraceptive prevalence rate is the percentage of women who are practicing, or whose sexual partners 
are practicing, any form of contraception. It is usually measured for women ages 15-49 who are married 


























































































Contraceptive Prevalence by Any Method (% of Women Ages 15-49) 1981-2015







Contraceptive Prevalence by Any Method (Percentage of Women Ages 15–49) (1981–2015) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries.  
*Contraceptive prevalence rate is the percentage of women who are practicing, or whose sexual partners 
are practicing, any form of contraception. It is usually measured for women ages 15-49 who are married 

























































































Contraceptive Prevalence by Any Method (% of Women Ages 15-49) 1981-2015







Immunization BGC (Tuberculosis) Percentage of 1-Year-Old Children (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Child immunization rate, BCG is the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received 
vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey for BCG. A child is considered adequately 

































































































Immunization BGC (Tuberculosis) % of One-Year Old Children 1980-2018







Immunization Measles (Percentage of Children 12 to 23 Months of Age) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Child immunization, measles, measures the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received the 
measles vaccination before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately 




































































































Immunization Measles (% of Children 12-23 Months) 1980-2019







Immunization HepB3 (Percentage of 1-Year-Old Children) (1999–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Child immunization rate, hepatitis B is the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received 
hepatitis B vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered 






























































Immunization Hep B3 (% of One-Year Old Children) 1999-2019







Immunization DPT (Percentage of Children 12–23 Months of Age) (1999–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Child immunization, DPT, measures the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received DPT 
vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately 
immunized against diphtheria, pertussis (or whooping cough), and tetanus (DPT) after receiving three 


































































































Immunization DPT (% of Children Ages 12-23 Months) 1980-2019







Immunization Hib3 (Percentage of Children 12–23 Months of Age) (1999–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Child immunization, Hib3, measures the percentage of children ages 12–23 months who received Hib3 
vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately 



























































Immunization Hib3 (% of Children 12-23 Months) 1999-2018







Immunization Polio (Percentage of Children 12 to 23 Months of Age) (1999 –2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Child immunization rate, polio, is the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received polio 
vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered adequately 


































































































Immunization Polio (% of Children 12-23 Months) 1980-2018







Hospital Beds (Per 1,000 People) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Hospital beds include inpatient beds available in public, private, general, and specialized hospitals and 






























































































Hospital Beds (Per 1,000 People) 1980-2018







Physicians Per 1,000 People (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  































































































Physicians (Per 1,000 People) 1980-2018







Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (Percentage of Current Health Expenditure) 
(2000–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Share of current health expenditures funded from domestic public sources for health. Domestic public 
sources include domestic revenue as internal transfers and grants, transfers, subsidies to voluntary health 
insurance beneficiaries, nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISH) or enterprise financing 
schemes as well as compulsory prepayment and social health insurance contributions. They do not 


















































Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of Current Health Expenditure) 
2000-2018







Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (Percentage of GDP) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Public expenditure on health from domestic sources as a share of the economy as measured by GDP 
























































Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 2000-2018







Current Health Expenditure (Percentage of GDP) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Level of current health expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP. Estimates of current health 
expenditures include healthcare goods and services consumed during each year. This indicator does not 
include capital health expenditures such as buildings, machinery, IT and stocks of vaccines for emergency 
























































Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 2000-2018







Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (Current U.S. Dollars) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Current expenditures on health per capita in current U.S. dollars. Estimates of current health 


























































Current Health Expenditure Per Capita (Current US$) 2000-2018







Current Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current U.S. Dollars) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Current expenditures on health per capita expressed in international dollars at purchasing power parity 

























































Current Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current US $) 2000-2018







Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current U.S. Dollars) 
(2000–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Public expenditure on health from domestic sources per capita expressed in international dollars at 























































Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita PPP (Current US $) 
2000-2018







Domestic Private Health Expenditure (Percentage of Current Health Expenditure) (2000–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Share of current health expenditures funded from domestic private sources. Domestic private sources 
include funds from households, corporations, and nonprofit organizations. Such expenditures can be 


















































Domestic Private Health Expenditure (% of Current Health Expenditure) 2000-2018 







Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita (Current U.S. Dollars) (2000–
2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  


























































Domestic General Government Health Expenditure Per Capita (Current US$) 
2000-2018











Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Public expenditure on health from domestic sources as a share of total public expenditure. It indicates 



















































Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Govt Expenditure) 
2000-2018







Age Dependency Ratio (Percentage of Working Age Population) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or older than 64--to the 
working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 




































































































Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working-Age Population) 1980-2019







Age Dependency Ratio for Young (Percentage of Working Age Population) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Age dependency ratio, young, is the ratio of younger dependents--people younger than 15--to the 
working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 




































































































Age Dependency Ratio for Young (% of Working-Age Population) 1980-2019







People Practicing Open Defecation (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*People practicing open defecation refers to the percentage of the population defecating in the open, such 
as in fields, forest, bushes, open bodies of water, on beaches, in other open spaces or disposed of with 




















































People Practicing Open Defecation (% of Population) 2000-2018







People Using Basic Drinking Water Services (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*The percentage of people using at least basic water services. This indicator encompasses both people 
using basic water services and those using safely managed water services. Basic drinking water services is 
defined as drinking water from an improved source, provided collection time is not more than 30 minutes 
for a round trip. Improved water sources include piped water, boreholes or tubewells, protected dug wells, 























































People Using Basic Drinking Water Services (% of Population) 2000-2018







People Using Basic Sanitation Services (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*The percentage of people using at least basic sanitation services, that is, improved sanitation facilities 
that are not shared with other households. This indicator encompasses both people using basic sanitation 
services and those using safely managed sanitation services. Improved sanitation facilities include 
flush/pour flush to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines; ventilated improved pit latrines, 























































People Using Basic Sanitation Services (% of the Population) 2000-2018







Access to Electricity (Percentage of Population) (2000–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to electricity. Electrification data are 











































































Access to Electricity (% of Population) 2000-2018 







Secure Internet Servers (Per 1 Million People) (2010–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*The number of distinct, publicly-trusted TLS/SSL certificates found in the Netcraft Secure Server 









































Secure Internet Servers (Per 1 Million People) 2010-2019 







Secure Internet Servers (Per 1 Million People) (2010–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua.  









































Secure Internet Servers (Per 1 Million People) 2010-2019 







Internet Users Total (Percentage of Population) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 3 months. The 
Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV 

































































































Internet Users Total (% of Population) 2000-2019







Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (Per 100 People) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Fixed broadband subscriptions refer to fixed subscriptions to high-speed access to the public Internet (a 
TCP/IP connection), at downstream speeds equal to, or greater than, 256 kbit/s. This includes cable 
modem, DSL, fiber-to-the-home/building, other fixed (wired)-broadband subscriptions, satellite 
broadband and terrestrial fixed wireless broadband. This total is measured irrespective of the method of 
payment. It excludes subscriptions that have access to data communications (including the Internet) via 
mobile-cellular networks. It should include fixed WiMAX and any other fixed wireless technologies. It 



















































Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (Per 100 People) 2000-2019  







Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (Per 100 People) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. Important to note that this downward trend is common worldwide, 
especially among rich nations. Most nations are leaving behind fixed telephone subscriptions for cell 
phone and internet subscriptions. 
*Fixed telephone subscriptions refers to the sum of active number of analogue fixed telephone lines, 
voice-over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-channel 

































































































Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 People) 1980-2019







Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (Per 100 People) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that 
provide access to the PSTN using cellular technology. The indicator includes (and is split into) the 
number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e., that have been used 
during the last 3 months). The indicator applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice 
communications. It excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to public mobile 




























































































Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (Per 100 People) 2000-2019







Electric Power Consumption (kWh Per Capita) (1980–2014) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power 
plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants. 

















































































Electric Power Consumption (kWh Per Capita) 1980-2014 







Agricultural Land (Percentage of Land Area) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the overall 
region.  
*Agricultural land refers to the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops, and under permanent 
pastures. Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas 
are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and 
land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded. Land under permanent 
crops is land cultivated with crops that occupy the land for long periods and need not be replanted after each 
harvest, such as cocoa, coffee, and rubber. This category includes land under flowering shrubs, fruit trees, nut 
trees, and vines, but excludes land under trees grown for wood or timber. Permanent pasture is land used for 5 

























































































Agricultural Land (% of Land Area) 1980-2018







Arable Land (Percentage of Land Area) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are 
counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and 


























































































Arable Land (% of Land Area) 2000-2018







Education Index From 1990 to 2019 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region 
*Education index is an average of mean years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of 
children), both expressed as an index obtained by scaling with the corresponding maxima (United Nations 






















































































Mean Years of Schooling (1990–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education 

















































































Mean Years of Schooling 1990-2019











Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region. 
*Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can both read and write with 



































































































Literacy Rate Adult Total (% of People Ages 15 and Above) 1980-2018







School Enrollment Ratio Primary (Percentage Gross) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Primary education provides children 
with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such 





























































































School Enrollment Ratio Primary (% Gross) 1980-2018







School Enrollment Ratio Secondary (Percentage Gross) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region. 
*Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes the 
provision of basic education that began at the primary level and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong 
learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more 



























































































School Enrollment Ratio Secondary (% Gross) 1980-2018







School Enrollment Ratio Tertiary (Percentage Gross) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Tertiary education, whether or not to an 
advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful 




























































































School Enrollment Ratio Tertiary (% Gross) 1980-2018







Persistence to Last Grade of Primary Total (Percentage of Cohort) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Persistence to last grade of primary is the percentage of children enrolled in the first grade of primary 
school who eventually reach the last grade of primary education. The estimate is based on the 


































































































Persistence to Last Grade of Primary Total (% of Cohort) 1980-2018







Primary Completion Rate (Percentage of Relevant Age Group) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Primary completion rate, or gross intake ratio to the last grade of primary education, is the number of 
new entrants (enrollments minus repeaters) in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, 
divided by the population at the entrance age for the last grade of primary education. Data limitations 




























































































Primary Completion Rate (% of Relevant Age Group) 1980-2018







Pupil-Teacher Ratio Primary (Percentage of Cohort) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  

























































































Pupil-Teacher Ratio Primary (% of Cohort) 1980-2018







School Enrollment Primary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Gender parity index for gross enrollment ratio in primary education is the ratio of girls to boys enrolled 


























































































School Enrollment Primary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) 1980-2018







School Enrollment Secondary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Gender parity index for gross enrollment ratio in secondary education is the ratio of girls to boys 



































































































School Enrollment Secondary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) 1980-2018







School Enrollment Tertiary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Gender parity index for gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education is the ratio of women to men enrolled 


































































































School Enrollment Tertiary (Gross) Gender Parity Index (GPI) 1980-2018






Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60KG Bags) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Green coffee beans are unroasted coffee beans. Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins 
either in October (Colombia), April (Indonesia) or July (Brazil), as examples. Coffee marketing year for 
































































































Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60 KG Bags) 1980-2019







Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60KG Bags) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle 
countries, Mexico, and Nicaragua. 
*Green coffee beans are unroasted coffee beans. Coffee marketing year for producer countries begins 
either in October (Colombia), April (Indonesia) or July (Brazil), as examples. Coffee marketing year for 
































































































Coffee (Green) Production (in 1,000 60 KG Bags) 1980-2019







Worldwide Coffee Average Closing Price (U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. Coffee prices are not country specific. Though premium prices do exist based on 
coffee quality. 
*The price shown is in U.S. Dollars per pound. Arabica coffee it is the world benchmark for coffee 
futures contracts that trade on the Inter-Continental Exchange (ICE). Arabica accounts for 75% of the 
world’s production and is mostly cultivated in Brazil (40% of the world’s total supply) and Colombia. 
Robusta account for the remaining 25% and is mostly produced in Vietnam (15% of global supply) and 




































































































Worldwide Coffee Price (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. Coffee prices are not country specific. Though premium prices do exist based on 
coffee quality. 
*The price shown is in U.S. Dollars per pound. Annual percentage change based of year close figures. 
Arabica coffee it is the world benchmark for coffee futures contracts that trade on the Inter-Continental 
Exchange (ICE). Arabica accounts for 75% of the world’s production and is mostly cultivated in Brazil 
(40% of the world’s total supply) and Colombia. Robusta account for the remaining 25% and is mostly 



































































































Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100) (1980–2016) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Food production index covers food crops that are considered edible and contain nutrients. Coffee and tea 































































































Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100) 1980-2016







Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100) (1980–2016) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Food production index covers food crops that are considered edible and contain nutrients. Coffee and tea 

































































































Food Production Index (2004-2006 = 100) 1980-2016







Manufacturing Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Annual growth rate for manufacturing value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-
37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard 



























































































Manufacturing Value Added (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019







Manufacturing Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Annual growth rate for manufacturing value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-
37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard 



























































































Manufacturing Value Added (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019







Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a 
sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The 
origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 












































































































Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 US $) 1990-2019







Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a 
sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The 
origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 







































































































Manufacturing Value Added (Constant 2010 US $) 1990-2019







Manufacturing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a 
sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The 
origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 




























































































Manufacturing Value Added (% of GDP) 1980-2018







Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It 
comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, 
electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. 







































































































Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It 
comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, 
electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars 







































































































Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







Industry (Including Construction) Value Added as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It 
comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, 
electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value 






















































































Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (% of GDP) 1980-2018







Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Annual growth rate for industrial value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on 
constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing 
(ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate 
subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding 
up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value 




























































































Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019 







Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Annual growth rate for industrial value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on 
constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing 
(ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate 
subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding 
up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value 




























































































Industry (Including Construction) Value Added (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019 







Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Annual growth rate for agricultural value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, 
hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), 



























































































Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Value Added (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019







Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Annuals Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Annual growth rate for agricultural value added based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, 
hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), 





























































































Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Value Added (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019







Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as 
cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is 
determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 







































































































Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value added (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019  







Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as 
cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is 
determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are in constant 







































































































Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Value added (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019  







Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as 
cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is 
determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB 





























































































Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Value Added (% of GDP) 1980-2019







International Tourism Receipts (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*International tourism receipts are expenditures by international inbound visitors, including payments to 
national carriers for international transport. These receipts include any other prepayment made for goods 
or services received in the destination country. They also may include receipts from same-day visitors, 
except when these are important enough to justify separate classification. For some countries they do not 








































































International Tourism Receipts (Current US$) 1995-2019







International Tourism Receipts (Current U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*International tourism receipts are expenditures by international inbound visitors, including payments to 
national carriers for international transport. These receipts include any other prepayment made for goods 
or services received in the destination country. They also may include receipts from same-day visitors, 
except when these are important enough to justify separate classification. For some countries they do not 
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International Tourism Number of Arrivals (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their 
neighbors and the overall region.  
*International inbound tourists (overnight visitors) are the number of tourists who travel to a country other 
than that in which they have their usual residence, but outside their usual environment, for a period not 
exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the 
country visited. When data on number of tourists are not available, the number of visitors, which includes 
tourists, same-day visitors, cruise passengers, and crew members, is shown instead. Sources and collection 
methods for arrivals differ across countries. In some cases, data are from border statistics (police, immigration, 
and the like) and supplemented by border surveys. In other cases, data are from tourism accommodation 

























































International Tourism Number of Arrivals 1980-2019





staying in hotels. Some countries include arrivals of nationals residing abroad while others do not. Caution 
should thus be used in comparing arrivals across countries. Data on inbound tourists refer to the number of 
arrivals, not to the number of people traveling. Thus, a person who makes several trips to a country during a 








International Tourism Number of Arrivals (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*International inbound tourists (overnight visitors) are the number of tourists who travel to a country other 
than that in which they have their usual residence, but outside their usual environment, for a period not 
exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the 
country visited. When data on number of tourists are not available, the number of visitors, which includes 
tourists, same-day visitors, cruise passengers, and crew members, is shown instead. Sources and collection 
methods for arrivals differ across countries. In some cases, data are from border statistics (police, immigration, 
and the like) and supplemented by border surveys. In other cases, data are from tourism accommodation 
establishments. For some countries, number of arrivals is limited to arrivals by air and for others to arrivals 
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should thus be used in comparing arrivals across countries. Data on inbound tourists refer to the number of 
arrivals, not to the number of people traveling. Thus, a person who makes several trips to a country during a 








Female Labor Force Participation Rate (Percentage of Female Population Over 15 Years of 
Age) (1980–2019) 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically 
active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period 

























































































Female Labor Force Participation Rate (% of Female Population Ages 15+) 1980-2019 







Domestic Credit Provided by the Financial Sector as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, 
with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The financial sector includes 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where data are 
available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as 
time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, 
























































































Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector (% of GDP) 1980-2018







Domestic Credit Provided by the Financial Sector as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Mexico. 
*Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, 
with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The financial sector includes 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where data are 
available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as 
time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, 
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Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Domestic credit to private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by 
other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, 
purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim 
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Domestic Credit to Private Sector as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial 
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other 
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit 
to public enterprises. The financial corporations include monetary authorities and deposit money banks, 
as well as other financial corporations where data are available (including corporations that do not accept 
transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other 
financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension 
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Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows as a Percentage of GDP (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest 
(10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It 
is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less 
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Economic Fitness Metric (Legacy) (1995–2015) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region. For this variable, the higher the score the better a country is doing. 
*Economic Fitness (EF) is both a measure of a country’s diversification and ability to produce complex 
goods on a globally competitive basis. Countries with the highest levels of EF have capabilities to 
produce a diverse portfolio of products, ability to upgrade into ever-increasing complex goods, tend to 
have more predictable long-term growth, and to attain good competitive position relative to other 
countries. Countries with low EF levels tend to suffer from poverty, low capabilities, less predictable 
growth, low value-addition, and trouble upgrading and diversifying faster than other countries. The 
comparison of the Fitness to the GDP reveals hidden information for the development and the growth of 






















































Economic Fitness Metric (Legacy) 1995-2015 







Economic Fitness Ranking (Legacy) (1995–2015) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country is doing. For this 
variable, the lower the rank the better a country is doing. 
*Economic Fitness Ranking (1 = high, 149 = low). Economic Fitness (EF) is both a measure of a 
country’s diversification and ability to produce complex goods on a globally competitive basis. Countries 
with the highest levels of EF have capabilities to produce a diverse portfolio of products, ability to 
upgrade into ever-increasing complex goods, tend to have more predictable long-term growth, and to 
attain good competitive position relative to other countries. Countries with low EF levels tend to suffer 
from poverty, low capabilities, less predictable growth, low value-addition, and trouble upgrading and 


















































Economic Fitness Ranking (Legacy) 1995-2015 





each country. This data defines a bipartite network of countries and products, or goods and services. A 
suitably designed mathematical algorithm applied to this network leads to the Economic Fitness of all 
countries and the Complexity of all products. The comparison of the Fitness to the GDP reveals hidden 








Exports of Goods and Services (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and 
other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, 
insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude 
compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer 



























































































Exports of Goods and Services (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019







Exports of Goods and Services (Annual Percentage Growth) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and 
other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, 
insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude 
compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer 































































































Exports of Goods and Services (Annual % Growth) 1980-2019







Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the 
rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, 
license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, 
personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income 





































































































Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 US $) 1980-2019







Exports of Goods and Services (Constant 2010 U.S. Dollars) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. This figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua. 
*Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the 
rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, 
license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, 
personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income 
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Employment in Agriculture as a Percentage of Total Employment (1991–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or 
provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to 
temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The agriculture sector consists of 
activities in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, in accordance with division 1 (ISIC 2) or categories 
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Employment in Industry as a Percentage of Total Employment (1991–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or 
provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to 
temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The industry sector consists of mining 
and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity, gas, and water), in accordance 




































































Employment in Industry (% of Total Employment) 1991-2019 







Employment in Services as a Percentage of Total Employment (1991–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or 
provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to 
temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The services sector consists of wholesale 
and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, insurance, 
real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal services, in accordance with 
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Unemployment Total (Percentage of Total Labor Force; National Estimate) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 





























































































Unemployment Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate) 1980-2019







Unemployment Total (Percentage of Total Labor Force) (ILO Estimate) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
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GINI Coefficient (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption 
expenditure) among individuals or households in an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. 
A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number 
of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between 
the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum 
area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies 











































































GINI Coefficient 1986-2018 







GINI Coefficient (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption 
expenditure) among individuals or households in an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. 
A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number 
of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between 
the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum 
area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies 













































































GINI Coefficient 1986-2018 







Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1981–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day 
at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual 




























































































Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) 1981-2018







Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1986–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day 
at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual 















































































Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) 1986-2018







Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1981–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Poverty headcount ratio at $3.20 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $3.20 a day 
at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual 
























































































Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) 1981-2018







Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1986–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Poverty headcount ratio at $3.20 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $3.20 a day 
at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual 












































































Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) 1986-2018







Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1981–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Poverty headcount ratio at $5.50 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $5.50 a day 
at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual 
























































































Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) 1981-2018







Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Population) (1986–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Poverty headcount ratio at $5.50 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $5.50 a day 
at 2011 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual 












































































Poverty Headcount Ratio at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (% of Population) 1981-2018






Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1981–2018) 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty 
line $1.90 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty 
line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence. As a result of revisions in PPP 
exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in 






















































































Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (%) 1981-2018 







Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty 
line $1.90 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty 
line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty and its incidence. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange 
rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier 










































































Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP) (%) 1986-2018 







Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1981–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Poverty gap at $3.20 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty 
line $3.20 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty 

























































































Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (%) 1981-2018







Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Poverty gap at $3.20 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty 
line $3.20 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty 













































































Poverty Gap at $3.20 a Day (2011 PPP) (%) 1986-2018







Poverty Gap at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Poverty gap at $5.50 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty 
line $5.50 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty 























































































Poverty Gap at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (%) 1981-2018







Poverty Gap at $5.50 a Day (2011 PPP) (Percentage of Poverty Line) (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. This 
figure takes a closer visual look at Northern Triangle countries. 
*Poverty gap at $5.50 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the poverty 
line $5.50 a day (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty 
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Income Share Held by Lowest 20% (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population 
indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 










































































Income Share Held by Lowest 20% 1986-2018







Income Share Held by the Second Lowest 20% (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population 
indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding 











































































Income Share Held by Second Lowest 20% 1986-2018







Income Share Held by the Third Lowest 20% (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population 
indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding 











































































Income Share Held by Third Lowest 20% 1986-2018







Income Share Held by the Fourth Lowest 20% (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population 
indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 










































































Income Share Held by Fourth Lowest 20% 1986-2018







Income Share Held by the Highest 20% (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population 
indicated by deciles or quintiles. Percentage shares by quintile may not sum to 100 because of rounding 









































































Income Share Held by the Highest 20% 1986-2018







Income Share Held by the Lowest 10% (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population 










































































Income Share Held by the Lowest 10% 1986-2018







Income Share Held by the Lowest 10% (1986–2018) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the Northern Triangle. In 
addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their neighbors and the 
overall region.  
*Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population 










































































Income Share Held by the Highest 10% 1986-2018







Ease of Doing Business Score (2010–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region.  
*The ease of doing business score helps assess the absolute level of regulatory performance over time. It 
captures the gap of each economy from the best regulatory performance observed on each of the 
indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. One can both see the gap 
between a particular economy’s performance and the best performance at any point in time and assess the 
absolute change in the economy’s regulatory environment over time as measured by Doing Business. An 
economy’s ease of doing business score is reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the 
lowest and 100 represents the best performance. For example, an ease of doing business score of 75 






























Ease of Doing Business Score 2010-2019





performance constructed across all economies and across time. A score of 80 in Doing Business 








Ease of Starting a Business Score (2010–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to their 
neighbors and the overall region.  
*This topic measures the number of procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital requirement for a 
small- to medium-size limited liability company to start up and formally operate in each economy’s largest 
business city. To make the data comparable across 190 economies, Doing Business uses a standardized 
business that is 100% domestically owned, has a start-up capital equivalent to 10 times the income per capita, 
engages in general industrial or commercial activities and employs between 10 and 50 people 1 month after the 
commencement of operations, all of whom are domestic nationals. The starting a business indicator consider 
two cases of local limited liability companies that are identical in all aspects, except that one company is 
owned by five married women and the other by five married men. The overall score for starting a business is 












































Ease of Starting a Business Score 2010-2019







Control of Corruption: Estimate (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country 
is doing. 
*Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. Estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard 

























































Control of Corruption: Estimate 1996-2019







Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country 
is doing. 
*Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. Percentile rank indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the 
aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have 
been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI. 

























































Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank 1996-2019







Government Effectiveness: Estimate (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country 
is doing. 
*Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the 
country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from 






























































Government Effectiveness: Estimate 1996-2019







Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country 
is doing. 
*Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Percentile rank 
indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding 
to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over 



























































Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank 1996-2019







Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism: Estimate (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country 
is doing. 
*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country’s score 
on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -




























































Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate 1996-2019











Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country 
is doing. 
*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Percentile rank indicates the 
country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest 
rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the 


























































Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank 1996-2019







Regulatory Quality: Estimate (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country 
is doing. 
*Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the 
country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from 


























































Regulatory Quality: Estimate 1996-2019







Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country 
is doing. 
*Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Percentile rank 
indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding 
to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over 





























































Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank 1996-2019







Rule of Law: Estimate (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country 
is doing. 
*Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate 





























































Rule of Law: Estimate 1996-2019







Rule of Law: Percentile Rank (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country 
is doing. 
*Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Percentile rank indicates the country’s rank among all 
countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest 
rank. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the 





























































Rule of Law: Percentile Rank 1996-2019







Voice and Accountability: Estimate (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the estimate score the better a country 
is doing. 
*Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. Estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 




























































Voice and Accountability: Estimate 1996-2019







Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank (1996–2019) 
 
 
Note. Includes updated data. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for 
macrolevel indicators gathered for this study to get a better sense of the socioeconomic situation in the 
Northern Triangle. In addition, the figure shows how Northern Triangle countries are doing relative to 
their neighbors and the overall region. For this variable, the higher the percentile rank the better a country 
is doing. 
*Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. Percentile rank indicates the country’s rank among all countries covered by the aggregate 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have been 



























































Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank 1996-2019







U.S. GDP Growth (Annual Percentage Change (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. USA 
GDP growth was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression models for all 
countries and region. 
*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates 
are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
































































































U.S. GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual Percentage Change) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. USA 
GDP per capita growth was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression 
models for all countries and region. 
*Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 


































































































U.S. Inflation (Percentage Change in Average Consumer Price Index) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. USA 
inflation was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression models for all 
countries and region. 
*The average consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of a country’s average level of prices based on the 
cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services in a given period. The rate of inflation is the 



































































































U.S. Unemployment Rate (Percentage of Total Labor Force) (1980–2019) 
 
 
Note. This figure provides a visual representation of general historical trends for macrolevel indicators 
gathered for this study to get a better sense of socioeconomic pull factors for the Northern Triangle. U.S. 
unemployment rate was a pull factor that was not country specific. It was applied to all regression models 
for all countries and region. 
*Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 































































































USA Unemployment Rate (% of Total Labor Force) 1980-2019
